[PATCH v2 net] net: ax25: fix integer overflow in ax25_rx_fragment()

The ax25_cb fragmentation reassembly accumulator:

  ax25->fraglen += skb->len;

operates on the unsigned short field 'fraglen' declared in ax25_cb:

  unsigned short  paclen, fragno, fraglen;

When fragments accumulate with a combined payload exceeding 65535
bytes, fraglen wraps to near zero.  The subsequent allocation:

  skb = alloc_skb(AX25_MAX_HEADER_LEN + ax25->fraglen, GFP_ATOMIC);

then allocates a tiny buffer.  Every skb_put() call in the copy loop
that follows writes far beyond the allocated headroom, corrupting
the kernel heap.

An attacker on an AX.25 link that supports multi-fragment I-frames
(AX25_SEG_FIRST / AX25_SEG_REM mechanism) can trigger this by
sending enough continuation fragments to wrap the 16-bit counter.
With AX.25 segment numbers limited to 7 bits (max 127 continuation
fragments), a fragment payload of ~516 bytes per fragment is
sufficient to overflow.

Fix mirrors the identical bug fixed in NET/ROM (nr_in.c): check for
overflow before adding skb->len to fraglen, and abort fragment
reassembly cleanly if the limit would be exceeded.

Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Acked-by: Joerg Reuter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mashiro Chen <[email protected]>
---
 net/ax25/ax25_in.c | 5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)

diff --git a/net/ax25/ax25_in.c b/net/ax25/ax25_in.c
index d75b3e9ed93de8..68202c19b19e3f 100644
--- a/net/ax25/ax25_in.c
+++ b/net/ax25/ax25_in.c
@@ -41,6 +41,11 @@ static int ax25_rx_fragment(ax25_cb *ax25, struct sk_buff *skb)
 				/* Enqueue fragment */
 				ax25->fragno = *skb->data & AX25_SEG_REM;
 				skb_pull(skb, 1);	/* skip fragno */
+				if ((unsigned int)ax25->fraglen + skb->len > USHRT_MAX) {
+					skb_queue_purge(&ax25->frag_queue);
+					ax25->fragno = 0;
+					return 1;
+				}
 				ax25->fraglen += skb->len;
 				skb_queue_tail(&ax25->frag_queue, skb);
 
-- 
2.53.0