Re: [PATCH] Input: synaptics - add transparent pass-through mode for TrackPoint
[email protected] Sun, 09 Aug 2026 16:12:28 +0000
| Newsgroups | org.kernel.vger.linux-input |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 3 potential issue(s) to consider: - [Critical] Self-deadlock and Use-After-Free/Double-Free of the pass-through serio port during parent driver unbind or port unregistration. - [Critical] Type confusion in synaptics_pt_open() leads to arbitrary memory corruption when toggling transparent mode. - [High] Bypassed mutex synchronization in synaptics_pt_write() causes concurrent hardware command injection and data races. -- --- Patch [1]: [PATCH] Input: synaptics - add transparent pass-through mode for TrackPoint --- commit 1a99c1461a4c3bd59a184b3551c27088c1845e41 Author: laserology oss <[email protected]> Input: synaptics - add transparent pass-through mode for TrackPoint This patch reworks an earlier implementation to add a transparent pass-through mode for Synaptics touchpads with a TrackPoint. It documents the interface and modifies the protocol handling to support relaying the raw byte stream of the pass-through guest. > diff --git a/drivers/input/mouse/synaptics.c b/drivers/input/mouse/synaptics.c > index 2170bbe4c5897..29e9a0c24dc23 100644 > --- a/drivers/input/mouse/synaptics.c > +++ b/drivers/input/mouse/synaptics.c [ ... ] > static int synaptics_pt_write(struct serio *serio, u8 c) > { > struct psmouse *parent = psmouse_from_serio(serio->parent); > + struct synaptics_data *priv = parent->private; > u8 rate_param = SYN_PS_CLIENT_CMD; /* indicates that we want pass-through port */ > int error; > > + if (READ_ONCE(priv->transparent_mode)) > + return parent->ps2dev.serio->write(parent->ps2dev.serio, c); > + [Severity: High] Does this bypass the parent's ps2_cmd_mutex? Since the child port uses its own isolated ps2_cmd_mutex, returning parent->ps2dev.serio->write(...) directly could allow concurrent hardware commands. This could interleave raw PS/2 bytes if userspace triggers a command on the parent device (like changing transparent_mode) while the child is writing. > error = ps2_sliced_command(&parent->ps2dev, c); > if (error) > return error; [ ... ] > @@ -669,9 +747,30 @@ static void synaptics_pt_stop(struct serio *serio) > { > struct psmouse *parent = psmouse_from_serio(serio->parent); > struct synaptics_data *priv = parent->private; > + bool exit_mode; > > - guard(serio_pause_rx)(parent->ps2dev.serio); > - priv->pt_port = NULL; > + exit_mode = READ_ONCE(priv->transparent_mode); > + > + /* > + * The guest is going away. Take the hardware out of transparent > + * mode first so the device stops relaying the guest's byte stream > + * and resumes producing host packets, then update the software state > + * with RX paused so the interrupt handler never observes a torn > + * configuration. > + */ > + if (exit_mode) { > + if (synaptics_exit_transparent_mode(parent)) > + psmouse_warn(parent, > + "failed to exit transparent mode after pass-through port removal\n"); > + } [Severity: High] Does this create a data race if a driver like serio_raw is bound to the child port? Unbinding serio_raw invokes synaptics_pt_stop() without holding the global psmouse_mutex. Modifying hardware state and priv->transparent_mode here could race with synaptics_set_transparent_mode() running concurrently on the parent device. > + > + { > + guard(serio_pause_rx)(parent->ps2dev.serio); > + > + priv->pt_port = NULL; > + WRITE_ONCE(priv->transparent_mode, false); > + synaptics_update_protocol_handler(parent); > + } > } > > static int synaptics_pt_open(struct serio *serio) > @@ -681,6 +780,7 @@ static int synaptics_pt_open(struct serio *serio) > > guard(serio_pause_rx)(parent->ps2dev.serio); > priv->pt_port_open = true; > + priv->pt_psmouse = psmouse_from_serio(serio); [Severity: Critical] Can this cast cause memory corruption? If userspace binds a non-psmouse driver (like serio_raw) to the pass-through port, the driver data points to a different structure (e.g., struct serio_raw). This caches a bogus pointer in priv->pt_psmouse, which is later dereferenced in synaptics_set_transparent_mode(). > > return 0; > } [ ... ] > + /* > + * The touchpad is stopped for the duration of the mode switch, but the > + * pass-through guest keeps streaming. It may therefore be left with a > + * partially assembled packet from the previous mode. Drop it so the > + * stream restarts cleanly in the new mode and no stale bytes are > + * misparsed as pointer motion or spurious button clicks. > + */ > + if (READ_ONCE(priv->pt_port)) { > + struct psmouse *child = READ_ONCE(priv->pt_psmouse); > + > + if (child && child->state == PSMOUSE_ACTIVATED) > + psmouse_set_state(child, PSMOUSE_ACTIVATED); [Severity: Critical] If a different driver (like serio_raw) is bound, this could interpret arbitrary memory as a struct psmouse. By manipulating the serio_raw queue buffer to match PSMOUSE_ACTIVATED and injecting a pointer, could this result in psmouse_set_state() dereferencing an attacker-controlled pointer to acquire a spinlock? > + } > + > + return len; > +} [ ... ] > static void synaptics_disconnect(struct psmouse *psmouse) > { > struct synaptics_data *priv = psmouse->private; > @@ -1448,10 +1649,24 @@ static void synaptics_disconnect(struct psmouse *psmouse) > */ > psmouse_smbus_cleanup(psmouse); > > + if (READ_ONCE(priv->transparent_mode)) { > + synaptics_exit_transparent_mode(psmouse); > + WRITE_ONCE(priv->transparent_mode, false); > + } > + > if (!priv->absolute_mode && > SYN_ID_DISGEST_SUPPORTED(priv->info.identity)) > device_remove_file(&psmouse->ps2dev.serio->dev, > &psmouse_attr_disable_gesture.dattr); > + if (SYN_CAP_PASS_THROUGH(priv->info.capabilities)) > + device_remove_file(&psmouse->ps2dev.serio->dev, > + &psmouse_attr_transparent_mode.dattr); > + > + if (priv->pt_serio) { > + serio_unregister_port(priv->pt_serio); > + kfree(priv->pt_serio); > + priv->pt_serio = NULL; > + } [Severity: Critical] Can this cause a use-after-free, double-free, and self-deadlock? If the parent port is unregistered (e.g. physical removal), the serio core traverses the tree depth-first and synchronously destroys the child pass-through port, freeing its memory. When synaptics_disconnect() is then called for the parent, calling serio_unregister_port() and kfree() on the dangling priv->pt_serio pointer could use freed memory and deadlock on serio_mutex, which is already held by the core's unregistration path. Alternatively, if userspace manually unbinds the parent driver via sysfs: psmouse_disconnect() (acquires psmouse_mutex) synaptics_disconnect() serio_unregister_port() (unbinds child driver) psmouse_disconnect() for child (tries to acquire psmouse_mutex) Could this sequence lead to a permanent self-deadlock on psmouse_mutex? -- Sashiko AI review ยท https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/[email protected]?part=1