Re: [PATCH 3/4] mm/secretmem: zeroize secret pages before kdump
"David Hildenbrand (Arm)" <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | org.kernel.vger.linux-integrity,org.infradead.lists.kexec,org.kernel.vger.keyrings,org.kernel.vger.linux-devicetree,org.kernel.vger.linux-kernel,org.kernel.vger.linux-security-module,org.kvack.linux-mm |
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| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
On 8/11/26 17:18, Jan Sebastian Götte wrote: > On 8/11/26 17:14, David Hildenbrand (Arm) wrote: >> On 8/11/26 17:05, Jan Sebastian Götte wrote: >>> >>> I'm aware nobody is really using secretmem. I decided to build this on top of >>> secretmem because it's an existing API that actually kind of fits the use case. >>> While I could have added a new API just for this (marking userspace memory as >>> wipe-on-crash), making it part of secretmem instead gives some additional >>> defense-in-depth protection for both users who only need wiping, and for users >>> who only want secretmem's additional protection against kernel memory read >>> primitives so I think everyone wins here. >> >> What I was thinking when I looked at patch #3+#4: 50% of the users you add are >> irrelevant in practice. >> >> Or are you saying that you are going to start using secretmem for your use case? > > I'm in fact going to start using secretmem. Okay, thanks for clarifying! -- Cheers, David