Re: [PATCH v9 10/41] KVM: guest_memfd: Add base support for KVM_SET_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES2

Ackerley Tng via B4 Relay <[email protected]>
writes:

> From: Ackerley Tng <[email protected]>
>
> Add a new ioctl (and matching struct), KVM_SET_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES2, using
> the same base ioctl number (0xd2), but with R/W semantics for the kernel
> instead of just read semantics.  "Officially" documenting that KVM writes
> to the payload will allow KVM to support partial/incremental conversions,
> instead of all-or-nothing updates (which requires complex unwinding), by
> recording the failing offset if an error occurs.
>
> Opportunistically add a new struct as well, even though KVM could squeeze
> the error offset into "struct kvm_memory_attributes", as there's no cost to
> doing so in practice.  Pad the struct with a pile of extra space to try and
> avoid ending up with "struct kvm_memory_attributes3" in the future.  Use
> the same layout for the fields that common to version 1 of the struct,
> e.g. to ease upgrading userspace, and to provide flexibility if KVM ever
> adds support for KVM_SET_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES2 at VM scope.
>
> Introduce KVM_CAP_GUEST_MEMFD_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES to advertise the
> availability of the KVM_SET_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES2 ioctl.
>
> Update the KVM API documentation to define the new ioctl and its behavior,
> and add the necessary UAPI definitions and capability checks.
>
> The process of setting memory attributes has a clear point of no return
> because, for CoCo VMs, zapping stage 2 page tables is a destructive
> operation. Unlike regular VMs, where re-faulting pages into the stage 2
> page tables merely incurs a performance penalty, CoCo guests must
> (re-):accept pages after every fault. To preserve CoCo security guarantees,
> guests will not accept pages they did not explicitly request faults
> for. Consequently, during memory conversions, any operation that could
> cause the process to abort must be completed before the stage 2 page tables
> are zapped.
>
> Zap only the ranges that are not already in the requested state to avoid
> inadvertently destroying (CoCo) data. ARM CCA guests will try to mark the
> entire DRAM as private at boot. If there are no shared pages at all, the
> to-private conversion can be skipped, but the existence of a single shared
> page would require the conversion process to proceed, and if it proceeds,
> zapping both shared and private pages would destroy data and break the
> guest.
>
> Co-developed-by: Vishal Annapurve <[email protected]>
> Signed-off-by: Vishal Annapurve <[email protected]>
> Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Fuad Tabba <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Binbin Wu <[email protected]>
> Suggested-by: Michael Roth <[email protected]>
> Tested-by: Shivank Garg <[email protected]>
> Signed-off-by: Ackerley Tng <[email protected]>
>
>
> [...snip...]
>
> +	filter = to_private ? KVM_FILTER_SHARED : KVM_FILTER_PRIVATE;

I left out a

Suggested-by: Suzuki K Poulose <[email protected]>

for the suggestion. Sorry! Will add it.

And thank you Fuad for letting me know!

> +	kvm_gmem_invalidate_start(inode, start, end, filter);
> +	mas_store_prealloc(&mas, xa_mk_value(attrs));
> +	kvm_gmem_invalidate_end(inode, start, end);
> +out:
> +	filemap_invalidate_unlock(mapping);
> +	return r;
> +}
> +
>
> [...snip...]
>