[PATCH net v5 2/3] net/smc: bound the receive length to the RMB in smc_rx_recvmsg()
Bryam Vargas via B4 Relay <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | org.kernel.vger.linux-rdma,org.kernel.feeds.b4-sent,org.kernel.vger.linux-kernel,org.kernel.vger.linux-s390,org.kernel.vger.netdev |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
From: Bryam Vargas <[email protected]> conn->bytes_to_rcv is accumulated in the receive tasklet from the peer's wire-controlled producer cursor via smc_curs_diff(), whose differing-wrap branch can exceed rmb_desc->len; a forged cursor drives bytes_to_rcv past the RMB, and over many CDC messages overflows the signed counter negative. smc_rx_recvmsg() reads it as the readable length and does a wrap-around copy whose second chunk is not re-bounded to rmb_desc->len, reading past the RMB into adjacent kernel memory and disclosing it to the peer. The nearby readable >= rmb_desc->len test only feeds SMC_STAT_RMB_RX_FULL on a separate earlier read; it does not bound the copy. Bound the readable length to rmb_desc->len at the consumer, treating a negative (sign-overflowed) value as out of range too, so the copy can never exceed the ring. This enforces the documented 0 <= bytes_to_rcv <= rmb_desc->len invariant where it is race-free against the producer update in the tasklet; conforming peers are unaffected. Fixes: 952310ccf2d8 ("smc: receive data from RMBE") Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Bryam Vargas <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Dust Li <[email protected]> --- net/smc/smc_rx.c | 12 ++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/smc/smc_rx.c b/net/smc/smc_rx.c index c1d9b923938d..f461cf10b085 100644 --- a/net/smc/smc_rx.c +++ b/net/smc/smc_rx.c @@ -442,6 +442,18 @@ int smc_rx_recvmsg(struct smc_sock *smc, struct msghdr *msg, /* initialize variables for 1st iteration of subsequent loop */ /* could be just 1 byte, even after waiting on data above */ readable = smc_rx_data_available(conn, peeked_bytes); + /* bytes_to_rcv is accumulated from the peer's wire-controlled + * producer cursor; a forged cursor can drive it past the RMB, + * or overflow the signed accumulator to a negative value across + * many CDC messages (which a plain "> len" check would miss + * before the size_t cast below turns it huge). Bound it to the + * RMB in either case so the wrap-around copy cannot run past + * rmb_desc->len. This enforces the documented + * 0 <= bytes_to_rcv <= rmb_desc->len invariant at the consumer, + * race-free against the producer update in the receive tasklet. + */ + if (readable < 0 || readable > conn->rmb_desc->len) + readable = conn->rmb_desc->len; splbytes = atomic_read(&conn->splice_pending); if (!readable || (msg && splbytes)) { if (splbytes) -- 2.55.0