[PATCH v2 1/1] s390/zcrypt: Validate length in reply before using it

The length information in the reply is used to copy the key token to
the target buffer. An invalid information in t->len of the reply may
cause an over-read of the target buffer and also a over-write of the
target buffer. To prevent that, check t->len before using it.

As the available space in destination and source buffer is always
larger than the valid length value in the parameter block in the
reply, compare t->len with this (already validated) length
information. As a side effect, this check also prevents buffer
over-read and over-write.

Reviewed-by: Harald Freudenberger <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Holger Dengler <[email protected]>
---
 drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_ccamisc.c | 15 ++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_ccamisc.c b/drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_ccamisc.c
index d4ce6352b5b2..19909bf43dc9 100644
--- a/drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_ccamisc.c
+++ b/drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_ccamisc.c
@@ -1158,8 +1158,21 @@ static int _ip_cprb_helper(u16 cardnr, u16 domain,
 
 	/* do not check the key here, it may be incomplete */
 
-	/* copy the vlsc key token back */
+	/*
+	 * Copy the vlsc key token back.
+	 * The available space in the destination (key_token) and the source
+	 * (t) buffer is always larger as the valid range of prepparm->kb.len.
+	 * Validate t->len by comparing it with the length information in the
+	 * param block of the request (prepparm->kb.len)
+	 * The value range of prepparm->kb.len has been checked above.
+	 */
 	t = (struct cipherkeytoken *)prepparm->kb.tlv1.key_token;
+	if (t->len != prepparm->kb.len - 3 * sizeof(uint16_t)) {
+		ZCRYPT_DBF_ERR("%s reply with invalid key_token length %u\n",
+			       __func__, t->len);
+		rc = -EIO;
+		goto out;
+	}
 	memcpy(key_token, t, t->len);
 	*key_token_size = t->len;
 
-- 
2.55.0