Re: [PATCH net] sctp: validate cached peer INIT chunk length in COOKIE_ECHO processing

Hello:

This patch was applied to netdev/net.git (main)
by Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>:

On Mon,  1 Jun 2026 21:06:06 -0400 you wrote:
> When a listening SCTP server processes a COOKIE_ECHO chunk, the cached
> peer INIT chunk embedded after the cookie is parsed and its parameters
> are later walked by sctp_process_init() using sctp_walk_params().
> 
> However, the chunk header length of this cached INIT chunk was not
> validated against the remaining buffer in the COOKIE_ECHO payload. If
> the length field is inflated, the parameter walk can run beyond the
> actual received data, leading to out-of-bounds reads and potential
> memory corruption during later parameter handling (e.g. STATE_COOKIE
> processing and kmemdup() copies).
> 
> [...]

Here is the summary with links:
  - [net] sctp: validate cached peer INIT chunk length in COOKIE_ECHO processing
    https://git.kernel.org/netdev/net/c/0861615c28de

You are awesome, thank you!
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