Re: [PATCH net v2] sctp: fix uninit-value in __sctp_rcv_asconf_lookup()
David Laight <[email protected]> Mon, 8 Jun 2026 09:42:15 +0100
| Newsgroups | org.kernel.vger.linux-sctp,org.kernel.vger.linux-kernel,org.kernel.vger.netdev |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <20260608094215.4dd984ed@pumpkin> |
On Sun, 7 Jun 2026 19:42:25 -0400 Xin Long <[email protected]> wrote: > On Sat, Jun 6, 2026 at 2:39 PM Michael Bommarito > <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > __sctp_rcv_asconf_lookup() in net/sctp/input.c only checks that the ASCONF > > chunk can hold the ADDIP header and a parameter header, then calls > > af->from_addr_param(), which reads the full address (16 bytes for IPv6) > > trusting the parameter's declared length. > > > > An unauthenticated peer can send a truncated trailing ASCONF chunk that > > declares an IPv6 address parameter but stops after the 4-byte parameter > > header; reached from the no-association lookup path, from_addr_param() then > > reads uninitialized bytes past the parameter. > > > > Impact: an unauthenticated SCTP peer makes the receive path read up to 16 > > bytes of uninitialized memory past a truncated ASCONF address parameter. > > > > The sibling __sctp_rcv_init_lookup() bounds parameters with > > sctp_walk_params(); this path open-codes the fetch and omits the bound. > > Verify the whole address parameter lies within the chunk before > > from_addr_param() reads it, the same class of fix as commit 51e5ad549c43 > > ("net: sctp: fix KMSAN uninit-value in sctp_inq_pop"). > > > > Fixes: df2185771439 ("[SCTP]: Update association lookup to look at ASCONF chunks as well") > > Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-8 > > Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito <[email protected]> > > --- > > v2: > > - Regenerate from net/main so the patch has index lines and applies > > cleanly (Xin Long). > > - Use unsigned int for the decoded length and compare it against the > > remaining parameter space after the ADDIP header (David Laight). > > v1: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/ > > > > net/sctp/input.c | 13 +++++++++++++ > > 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+) > > > > diff --git a/net/sctp/input.c b/net/sctp/input.c > > index e119e460ccde0..c63d42500aa28 100644 > > --- a/net/sctp/input.c > > +++ b/net/sctp/input.c > > @@ -1197,13 +1197,26 @@ static struct sctp_association *__sctp_rcv_asconf_lookup( > > struct sctp_af *af; > > union sctp_addr_param *param; > > union sctp_addr paddr; > > + unsigned int param_space; > > + unsigned int plen; > > > > if (ntohs(ch->length) < sizeof(*asconf) + sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr)) > > return NULL; > > > > + param_space = ntohs(ch->length) - sizeof(*asconf); > > + > > /* Skip over the ADDIP header and find the Address parameter */ > > param = (union sctp_addr_param *)(asconf + 1); > > > > + /* The whole address parameter must lie within the chunk before > > + * af->from_addr_param() reads the variable-length address; otherwise a > > + * truncated trailing ASCONF chunk lets it read uninitialized bytes past > > + * the parameter. > > + */ > > + plen = ntohs(param->p.length); > > + if (plen < sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr) || plen > param_space) > > + return NULL; > > + > I think we don't really need to check plen < sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr). > This check is to ensure param->p.length can be safely accessed, but it's > already guaranteed by the early check: > > if (ntohs(ch->length) < sizeof(*asconf) + sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr)) > > I think you can just simplify your patch to: > > if (ntohs(param->p.length) > ntohs(ch->length) - sizeof(*asconf)) > return NULL; To stop having to think about the values wrapping, how about swapping to: if (sizeof(*asconf) + ntohs(param->p.length) > ntohs(ch->length)) return NULL; so that it is 100% clear they don't. Even if the earlier test is missing/incorrect that will only read invalid data and then return NULL. -- David > > Also note ntohs(param->p.length) < sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr) will be > caught by af->from_addr_param(sctp_v4/v6_from_addr_param) and return NULL. > > Thanks. > > > af = sctp_get_af_specific(param_type2af(param->p.type)); > > if (unlikely(!af)) > > return NULL; > > -- > > 2.53.0 >