Re: [PATCH] sctp: diag: fix uninitialized stack leak via INET_DIAG_LOCALS/PEERS
Xin Long <[email protected]> Wed, 15 Jul 2026 12:15:40 -0400
| Newsgroups | org.kernel.vger.linux-sctp,org.kernel.vger.linux-kernel,org.kernel.vger.netdev,org.kernel.vger.stable |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <CADvbK_ew0KJjY5Ya64LTFgWastL34A7LNOBFqFjJUceGS+qHCA@mail.gmail.com> |
On Tue, Jul 14, 2026 at 11:35=E2=80=AFPM MingXuan <[email protected]> wrot= e: > > inet_diag_msg_sctpladdrs_fill() copies sizeof(union sctp_addr) (28 bytes, > the size of sockaddr_in6) from each sctp_sockaddr_entry.a into the netlin= k > INET_DIAG_LOCALS attribute and then only zeroes the bytes from offset 28 = to > sizeof(sockaddr_storage). The same pattern is used by > inet_diag_msg_sctpaddrs_fill() for INET_DIAG_PEERS. > > The IPv4 address-filling helpers sctp_v4_from_addr_param() and > sctp_v4_from_skb() only initialize the sockaddr_in portion (16 bytes) of = the > union sctp_addr; the trailing 12 bytes (offset 16..27, the sockaddr_in6-o= nly > region) are left uninitialized. Those bytes are propagated verbatim thro= ugh > sctp_add_bind_addr() (which copies sizeof(union sctp_addr)=3D28 bytes) an= d then > copied straight to userspace by the diag fill functions, leaking 12 bytes= of > kernel stack residue per local/peer address to any process that can issue= a > SOCK_DIAG_BY_FAMILY dump for IPPROTO_SCTP. > > Fix it by computing the actually-initialized length of the address from i= ts > sa_family (struct sockaddr_in for AF_INET, the whole union otherwise) and > copying only that many bytes into an already-zeroed sockaddr_storage slot= , so > the uninitialized tail is never read and never reaches userspace. > > Fixes: 8f840e47f190cbe61a96945c13e9551048d42cef ("sctp: add the sctp_diag= .c file") > Cc: [email protected] > Signed-off-by: MingXuan <[email protected]> > --- > net/sctp/diag.c | 17 ++++++++++++----- > 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/net/sctp/diag.c b/net/sctp/diag.c > index d758f5c3e06e..12557e924cc2 100644 > --- a/net/sctp/diag.c > +++ b/net/sctp/diag.c > @@ -85,8 +85,12 @@ static int inet_diag_msg_sctpladdrs_fill(struct sk_buf= f *skb, > info =3D nla_data(attr); > rcu_read_lock(); > list_for_each_entry_rcu(laddr, address_list, list) { > - memcpy(info, &laddr->a, sizeof(laddr->a)); > - memset(info + sizeof(laddr->a), 0, addrlen - sizeof(laddr= ->a)); > + size_t addr_len =3D laddr->a.sa.sa_family =3D=3D AF_INET = ? > + sizeof(struct sockaddr_in) : > + sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6); > + > + memset(info, 0, addrlen); > + memcpy(info, &laddr->a, addr_len); > info +=3D addrlen; > > if (!--addrcnt) > @@ -113,9 +117,12 @@ static int inet_diag_msg_sctpaddrs_fill(struct sk_bu= ff *skb, > info =3D nla_data(attr); > list_for_each_entry(from, &asoc->peer.transport_addr_list, > transports) { > - memcpy(info, &from->ipaddr, sizeof(from->ipaddr)); > - memset(info + sizeof(from->ipaddr), 0, > - addrlen - sizeof(from->ipaddr)); > + size_t addr_len =3D from->ipaddr.sa.sa_family =3D=3D AF_I= NET ? > + sizeof(struct sockaddr_in) : > + sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6); > + > + memset(info, 0, addrlen); > + memcpy(info, &from->ipaddr, addr_len); > info +=3D addrlen; > } > > -- > 2.50.1 (Apple Git-155) > Acked-by: Xin Long <[email protected]>