Re: [PATCH] sctp: validate cookie AUTH state before use

[email protected]
Newsgroups org.kernel.vger.linux-sctp,org.kernel.vger.linux-kernel,org.kernel.vger.netdev
Message-ID <178614240590.2445639.1288172802373951589.git-patchwork-notify@kernel.org>
Hello:

This patch was applied to netdev/net.git (main)
by Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>:

On Tue,  4 Aug 2026 20:00:42 +0000 you wrote:
> When cookie authentication is disabled, COOKIE_ECHO restores fixed-size
> AUTH fields directly from peer-controlled cookie bytes.  A forged RANDOM
> length, HMAC list, or CHUNKS list can then reach association consumers
> with lengths or identifiers that were never validated against the local
> backing arrays.
> 
> A forged RANDOM length can cause out-of-bounds reads during key-vector
> construction.  A forged HMAC identifier also caused a 32-byte write past
> a zero-length AUTH chunk, providing a primitive for a local privilege
> escalation chain.
> 
> [...]

Here is the summary with links:
  - sctp: validate cookie AUTH state before use
    https://git.kernel.org/netdev/net/c/3dbb44d88b1e

You are awesome, thank you!
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