Re: [PATCH] sctp: validate cookie AUTH state before use
| Newsgroups | org.kernel.vger.linux-sctp,org.kernel.vger.linux-kernel,org.kernel.vger.netdev |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <178614240590.2445639.1288172802373951589.git-patchwork-notify@kernel.org> |
Hello: This patch was applied to netdev/net.git (main) by Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>: On Tue, 4 Aug 2026 20:00:42 +0000 you wrote: > When cookie authentication is disabled, COOKIE_ECHO restores fixed-size > AUTH fields directly from peer-controlled cookie bytes. A forged RANDOM > length, HMAC list, or CHUNKS list can then reach association consumers > with lengths or identifiers that were never validated against the local > backing arrays. > > A forged RANDOM length can cause out-of-bounds reads during key-vector > construction. A forged HMAC identifier also caused a 32-byte write past > a zero-length AUTH chunk, providing a primitive for a local privilege > escalation chain. > > [...] Here is the summary with links: - sctp: validate cookie AUTH state before use https://git.kernel.org/netdev/net/c/3dbb44d88b1e You are awesome, thank you! -- Deet-doot-dot, I am a bot. https://korg.docs.kernel.org/patchwork/pwbot.html