Re: [PATCH 2/3] proc: query LSMs for introspective mem access (if PROC_MEM_FORCE_ALWAYS)

On Fri, Aug 21, 2026 at 8:52 PM Lorenzo Stoakes (ARM) <[email protected]> wrote:
> OK so the whole thing is:
>
> mem_open()
>   -> __mem_open()
>     -> proc_mem_open()
>       -> mm_access()
>         -> may_access_mm()
>
> And:
>
> static bool may_access_mm(struct mm_struct *mm, struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
> {
>         if (mm == current->mm)
>                 return true;
>         ...
> }
>
> And what this flag is carrying is 'hey the reason we allowed the _open_ is
> because it's looking at its own address space'.

Yes.

> I did wonder if what you're protecting against is even a process updating
> execmem _it_ owns, no fd shared anywhere, as something LSM might want to
> prevent even so?

Sorry, can you rephrase that? My goal with this series is to let LSMs
block a process that tries to modify its own non-writable executable
memory using /proc/self/mem; I'm not sure if that answers your
question.

For context: In this series, I'm using "execmem" to refer to the
SELinux permission PROCESS__EXECMEM, which essentially controls
whether a process is allowed to create writable+executable mappings
that can contain anonymous pages. Additionally, it blocks creating
executable mappings of S_PRIVATE inodes. There are other SELinux
permissions for things like making a VMA containing anonymous pages
executable (FILE__EXECMOD and others) or mapping files as executable
(FILE__EXECUTE). FILE__EXECUTE is granular, it can be granted based on
the security labels of the process and the file that is mapped.

> The sharing a /proc/mem fd seems like that's a pretty dumb thing to do in
> general :) but I guess you have to protect against that.

Yeah, it's a kinda weird thing to do...