Re: [PATCH] fs: allow vfs code to open an O_PATH file with negative dentry
Amir Goldstein <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | org.kernel.vger.linux-unionfs,org.kernel.vger.linux-fsdevel,org.kernel.vger.linux-security-module,org.kernel.vger.selinux,org.ozlabs.lists.linux-erofs |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <CAOQ4uxinSLXKWjMgwyA2A_UU5e+6ZjbdsFUY-+f9DMfQcxH0qA@mail.gmail.com> |
On Thu, Mar 19, 2026 at 4:55 PM Paul Moore <[email protected]> wrote: > > On Thu, Mar 19, 2026 at 10:50 AM Amir Goldstein <[email protected]> wrote: > > On Thu, Mar 19, 2026 at 2:13 PM Christian Brauner <[email protected]> wrote: > > > On Thu, Mar 19, 2026 at 01:46:16PM +0100, Amir Goldstein wrote: > > > > The fields f_mapping, f_wb_err, f_sb_err are irrelevant for O_PATH file. > > > > Skip setting them for O_PATH file, so that the O_PATH file could be > > > > opened with a negative dentry. > > > > > > > > This is not something that a user should be able to do, but vfs code, > > > > such as ovl_tmpfile() can use this to open a backing O_PATH tmpfile > > > > before instantiating the dentry. > > > > > > > > Reported-by: [email protected] > > > > Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <[email protected]> > > > > --- > > > > > > > > Christian, > > > > > > > > This patch fixes the syzbot report [1] that the > > > > backing_file_user_path_file() patch [2] introduces. > > > > > > > > This is not the only possible fix, but it is the cleanest one IMO. > > > > There is a small risk in introducing a state of an O_PATH file with > > > > NULL f_inode, but I (and the bots that I asked) did not find any > > > > obvious risk in this state. > > > > > > > > Note that specifically, the user path inode is accessed via d_inode() > > > > and not via file_inode(), which makes this safe for file_user_inode() > > > > callers. > > > > > > > > BTW, I missed this regression with the original patch because I > > > > only ran the quick overlayfs sanity test. > > > > > > > > Now I ran a full quick fstest cycle and verified that the O_TMPFILE > > > > test case is covered and that the bug is detected. > > > > > > > > WDYT? > > > > > > > > Thanks, > > > > Amir. > > > > > > > > [1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=f34aab278bf5d664e2be > > > > [2] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel/[email protected]/ > > > > > > > > fs/open.c | 7 ++++--- > > > > 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) > > > > > > > > diff --git a/fs/open.c b/fs/open.c > > > > index 91f1139591abe..2004a8c0d9c97 100644 > > > > --- a/fs/open.c > > > > +++ b/fs/open.c > > > > @@ -893,9 +893,6 @@ static int do_dentry_open(struct file *f, > > > > > > > > path_get(&f->f_path); > > > > f->f_inode = inode; > > > > - f->f_mapping = inode->i_mapping; > > > > - f->f_wb_err = filemap_sample_wb_err(f->f_mapping); > > > > - f->f_sb_err = file_sample_sb_err(f); > > > > > > > > if (unlikely(f->f_flags & O_PATH)) { > > > > f->f_mode = FMODE_PATH | FMODE_OPENED; > > > > @@ -904,6 +901,10 @@ static int do_dentry_open(struct file *f, > > > > return 0; > > > > } > > > > > > > > + f->f_mapping = inode->i_mapping; > > > > + f->f_wb_err = filemap_sample_wb_err(f->f_mapping); > > > > + f->f_sb_err = file_sample_sb_err(f); > > > > + > > > > if ((f->f_mode & (FMODE_READ | FMODE_WRITE)) == FMODE_READ) { > > > > i_readcount_inc(inode); > > > > } else if (f->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE && !special_file(inode->i_mode)) { > > > > > > I think this is really ugly and I'm really unhappy that we should adjust > > > initialization of generic vfs code for this. My preference is to push > > > the pain into the backing file stuff. And my ultimate preference is for > > > this backing file stuff to be removed again for a simple struct path. > > > We're working around some more fundamental cleanup here imho. > > > > Fair enough, we can rip the entire thing from vfs if you don't like it. > > The user path file can be opened and stored internally by selinux > > without adding all the associated risks in vfs. > > > > Paul, > > > > Please see compile tested code at: > > https://github.com/amir73il/linux/commits/user_path_file/ > > No. Definitely no. Ignoring the fact that there is no reason we > should pushing this into the LSM, doing it in this way means it is > very likely that each LSM wanting to provide mmap/mprotect controls on > overlayfs will have to create a new O_PATH file. No. > > ... and let me preemptively comment that this doesn't belong in the > LSM framework either. > > As Christian already mentioned, this really needs to be addressed in > the backing file code, please do it there. > OK, will give it another try. Thanks, Amir.