[merged mm-stable] mm-secretmem-dont-allow-highmem-folios.patch removed from -mm tree

The quilt patch titled
     Subject: mm/secretmem: don't allow highmem folios
has been removed from the -mm tree.  Its filename was
     mm-secretmem-dont-allow-highmem-folios.patch

This patch was dropped because it was merged into the mm-stable branch
of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm

------------------------------------------------------
From: Brendan Jackman <[email protected]>
Subject: mm/secretmem: don't allow highmem folios
Date: Fri, 17 Jul 2026 09:48:59 +0000

secretmem_fault() allocates a folio with GFP_HIGHUSER and then calls
set_direct_map_invalid_noflush() without checking folio_test_highmem(). 
This causes a warning and process crash (vibe-coded reproducer in Link
below):

Su[   30.071284] ------------[ cut here ]------------
ccessfully allocated and mapped 2097152000 bytes at 0x3a449000
Populating memor[   30.074614] CPA: called for zero pte. vaddr = 0 cpa->vaddr = 0
y...
[   30.078636] WARNING: arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c:1840 at __cpa_process_fault+0x34d/0x360, CPU#5: allocate_secret/570
[   30.084789] CPU: 5 UID: 0 PID: 570 Comm: allocate_secret Not tainted 7.1.0-14063-g4edcdefd4083-dirty #10 PREEMPTLAZY
[   30.090937] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.17.0-0-gb52ca86e094d-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[   30.097543] EIP: __cpa_process_fault+0x34d/0x360
[   30.100514] Code: ff ff 85 c0 0f 89 7d fe ff ff e9 3d fe ff ff 8b 03 8b 00 c7 04 24 c8 ff 64 c1 89 44 24 08 8b 45 e8 89 44 24 04 e8 53 7
a 00 00 <0f> 0b c7 45 f0 f2 ff ff ff e9 fc fc ff ff 90 8d 74 26 00 55 25 00
[   30.110829] EAX: 00000000 EBX: f64afe98 ECX: 00000000 EDX: 00000000
[   30.114799] ESI: 00000000 EDI: f64afe98 EBP: f64afe04 ESP: f64afdcc
[   30.118785] DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 0033 SS: 0068 EFLAGS: 00010246
[   30.123020] CR0: 80050033 CR2: 46c48ffc CR3: 038c8000 CR4: 00000690
[   30.127010] Call Trace:
[   30.129078]  __change_page_attr_set_clr+0x5e7/0x870
[   30.132275]  ? console_unlock+0x99/0x130
[   30.135069]  ? irq_work_queue+0x36/0x70
[   30.137853]  ? page_address+0xd3/0xf0
[   30.140421]  set_direct_map_invalid_noflush+0x52/0x60
[   30.143782]  secretmem_fault+0x128/0x210
[   30.146560]  __do_fault+0x25/0x90
[   30.149053]  handle_mm_fault+0x6d1/0xcb0
[   30.151759]  exc_page_fault+0x135/0x3b0
[   30.154487]  ? doublefault_shim+0x150/0x150
[   30.157416]  handle_exception+0x130/0x130
[   30.160137] EIP: 0x804d29f
[   30.162307] Code: 89 54 08 e1 89 54 08 e5 89 54 08 e9 89 54 08 ed c3 0f b6 44 24 08 89 7c 24 0c 69 c0 01 01 01 01 8b 7c 24 04 f7 c7 0f 0
0 00 00 <89> 44 0f fc 75 0e c1 e9 02 f3 ab 8b 44 24 04 8b 7c 24 0c c3 31 d2
[   30.172936] EAX: 5a5a5a5a EBX: 00000000 ECX: 0c800000 EDX: 3a449000
[   30.176927] ESI: 00000000 EDI: 3a449000 EBP: bfbbae18 ESP: bfbbadac
[   30.180897] DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 0000 GS: 0033 SS: 007b EFLAGS: 00010246
[   30.185161]  ? doublefault_shim+0x150/0x150
[   30.187979] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
Bus error                  (core dumped) ./allocate_secret_i686 2000M

The equivalent bug was pointed out by a local Sashiko instance on
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/

This hasn't been reproduced it on older kernel versions but from code
inspection the bug seems to go back to the original introduction in commit
1507f51255c9f ("mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret"
memory areas").  If this configuration has always been broken, there's no
need to worry too much about feature regression here.

Nonetheless, instead of just completely disabling secretmem under
!HIGHMEM, just drop __GFP_HIGHMEM.  This means that now where you
previously got a crash, instead you'll just see the secretmem process OOM.

Could secretmem just support highmem by saying "this isn't in the direct
map anyway" and bailing out before the set_direct_map_invalid_noflush()? 
Maybe.  That depends on requirements that are not well-defined (e.g.  is
it OK that kmap_local_page() is not a NOP for those pages?), and would
require some research and deep thinking.  Let's "defer" that until an
actual usecase arises.

Link: https://github.com/bjackman/limmat-kernel-nix/commit/7b2acba2d3a5ef01400d493a155beb1d135b6bb5
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/[email protected]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
Fixes: 1507f51255c9 ("mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas")
Signed-off-by: Brendan Jackman <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand (Arm) <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Lorenzo Stoakes (ARM) <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport (Microsoft) <[email protected]>
Cc: Brendan Jackman <[email protected]>
Cc: Liam R. Howlett <[email protected]>
Cc: Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <[email protected]>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
---

 mm/secretmem.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/mm/secretmem.c~mm-secretmem-dont-allow-highmem-folios
+++ a/mm/secretmem.c
@@ -202,7 +202,7 @@ static struct file *secretmem_file_creat
 	if (IS_ERR(file))
 		goto err_free_inode;
 
-	mapping_set_gfp_mask(inode->i_mapping, GFP_HIGHUSER);
+	mapping_set_gfp_mask(inode->i_mapping, GFP_USER);
 	mapping_set_unevictable(inode->i_mapping);
 
 	inode->i_op = &secretmem_iops;
_

Patches currently in -mm which might be from [email protected] are