Re: /run/systemd/inaccessible
Topi Miettinen <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | org.kernel.vger.selinux-refpolicy |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
On 27.2.2020 14.20, Dominick Grift wrote: > Russell Coker <[email protected]> writes: > >> allow systemd_logind_t init_var_run_t:chr_file write; >> >> audit2allow shows me that the above is attempted on Debian/Unstable. What's >> this inaccessible directory about anyway? > > systemd-userruntimedir (245) now also creates it in /run/user/%{USERID} The relevant code has this comment: /* Set up inaccessible nodes now so they're available if we decide to use them with user namespaces. */ > probably used for InaccessiblePath= directive but I am not sure. Yes, these are bind mounted over the path which is wanted inaccessible. Perhaps this could be improved by giving them a dedicated label and then some new TE rules could prevent anything other than PID1 from managing them. Now if a service has CAP_SYS_ADMIN and is not blocked by seccomp filters from using mount and umount system calls, it could dismantle the bind mount. -Topi >> >> # ls -lZ /run/systemd/inaccessible >> total 0 >> b---------. 1 root root system_u:object_r:init_var_run_t:s0 0, 0 Feb 27 13:36 >> blk >> c---------. 1 root root system_u:object_r:init_var_run_t:s0 0, 0 Feb 27 13:36 >> chr >> d---------. 2 root root system_u:object_r:init_var_run_t:s0 40 Feb 27 13:36 >> dir >> p---------. 1 root root system_u:object_r:init_var_run_t:s0 0 Feb 27 13:36 >> fifo >> ----------. 1 root root system_u:object_r:init_var_run_t:s0 0 Feb 27 13:36 >> reg >> s---------. 1 root root system_u:object_r:init_var_run_t:s0 0 Feb 27 13:36 >> sock >