Re: [PATCH V4] security/selinux: Always allow FIOCLEX and FIONCLEX

Paul Moore <[email protected]> Fri, 25 Feb 2022 15:46:35 -0500

Newsgroups	org.kernel.vger.selinux-refpolicy,org.kernel.vger.linux-kernel,org.kernel.vger.selinux
Message-ID	<CAHC9VhRY8+R3Tnz9TTKiP12u7Cv1QiYnKoMjrS=VkAG-DF=eWg@mail.gmail.com>

On Fri, Feb 25, 2022 at 12:54 PM Richard Haines
<[email protected]> wrote:
>
> These ioctls are equivalent to fcntl(fd, F_SETFD, flags), which SELinux
> always allows too.  Furthermore, a failed FIOCLEX could result in a file
> descriptor being leaked to a process that should not have access to it.
>
> As this patch removes access controls, a policy capability needs to be
> enabled in policy to always allow these ioctls.
>
> Based-on-patch-by: Demi Marie Obenour <[email protected]>
> Signed-off-by: Richard Haines <[email protected]>
> ---
> V2 Change: Control via a policy capability.
> V3 Change: Update switch check.
> V4 Change: Use POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_IOCTL_SKIP_CLOEXEC
>
>  security/selinux/hooks.c                   | 6 ++++++
>  security/selinux/include/policycap.h       | 1 +
>  security/selinux/include/policycap_names.h | 3 ++-
>  security/selinux/include/security.h        | 7 +++++++
>  4 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

Merged into selinux/next, thanks everyone!

-- 
paul-moore.com