Re: xserver policy
"Rahul Sandhu" <[email protected]> Wed, 06 May 2026 18:18:40 +0000
| Newsgroups | org.kernel.vger.selinux-refpolicy |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
On Wed May 6, 2026 at 9:50 AM BST, Russell Coker wrote: > On Wednesday, 6 May 2026 18:17:33 AEST Rahul Sandhu wrote: >> The other thing to consider is Xwayland. I don't personally use it (or X= org) >> at all myself, however I do know that some stuff still requires Xwayland >> and it is very common as of 2026. It might be worth seeing if there is s= ome >> bits that we can share between a future xwayland_t and xserver_t, althou= gh >> that may turn out to be a fruitless endeavour, I'm not entirely sure wha= t >> Xwayland entails yet. > > Currently Xwayland is running without any domain transition and works fin= e in=20 > user_t, what do you think we need to do in addition to this? Ideally, we'd have an xwayland_t imo. I've been hacking on this on the Gent= oo side of things, so I'll submit something upstream when it's of decent quali= ty. Xwayland has a fair amount of attack surface and the codebase it's a part o= f (Xorg) has a poor security record in the past. Also, whilst most compositor= s run Xwayland rootless now (either via doing it directly like say wlroots do= es or using something like xwayland-satellite like numerous of the new smithay compositors), there are still quite a few running it rootful. Hence, I am personally of the opinion that it's a good target for a private domain. Ideally, I'm looking to slowly get the major components of modern desktops, such as the compositor and desktop tooling into some form of private domain= . Whilst it will be a lot less granular for more complex desktop environments with a monolithic design (such as say Gnome), a lot of the components of th= e "modern" Wayland desktop are both security critical targets that function a= s a security boundry of some kind while also being reasonably modular such th= at a private domain is actually within the realm of possibility for them. I'm also currently working quite a bit on the portals. The labelling situat= ion is not the best for them, as the entire document portal has all documents a= s fuse_t. This is because fuse is not a seclabelfs, something which I intent = to try and solve upstream in the kernel. This is however quite a bit of work a= s previous efforts to do as such have resulted in deadlocks. --=20 Rahul Sandhu