Re: [PATCH v6 bpf-next 3/4] bpf: add bpf_init_inode_xattr kfunc for atomic inode labeling
"Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi" <[email protected]> Fri, 31 Jul 2026 21:20:50 +0200
| Newsgroups | org.kernel.vger.selinux,org.kernel.vger.bpf,org.kernel.vger.linux-fsdevel,org.kernel.vger.linux-integrity,org.kernel.vger.linux-kernel,org.kernel.vger.linux-kselftest,org.kernel.vger.linux-security-module |
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| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
On Fri Jul 31, 2026 at 9:05 PM CEST, Paul Moore wrote: > On Fri, Jul 31, 2026 at 2:50=E2=80=AFPM Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi > <[email protected]> wrote: >> On Fri Jul 31, 2026 at 8:42 PM CEST, Paul Moore wrote: >> > On Fri, Jul 31, 2026 at 2:18=E2=80=AFPM Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi >> > <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> On Fri Jul 31, 2026 at 6:59 PM CEST, Paul Moore wrote: >> >> > On Fri, Jul 31, 2026 at 12:32=E2=80=AFPM Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi >> >> > <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> >> On Fri Jul 31, 2026 at 6:02 PM CEST, Paul Moore wrote: >> >> >> > On Fri, Jul 31, 2026 at 11:44=E2=80=AFAM Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi >> >> >> > <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Fri Jul 31, 2026 at 5:30 PM CEST, David Windsor wrote: >> >> >> >> > On Fri, Jul 31, 2026 at 11:17=E2=80=AFAM Paul Moore <paul@pau= l-moore.com> wrote: >> > >> > ... >> > >> >> Yes, I understand you feel it should be placed under security/. You a= re entitled >> >> to your opinion. >> >> >> >> No, I do not think the newly added kfunc is a big enough layering vio= lation such >> >> that we need to do it ASAP, disregarding everything else outlined abo= ve. I am >> >> sure you see that too. There are several other instances of similar k= funcs. >> >> >> >> Therefore, please attempt to meet me halfway here. >> > >> > I'm happy to work with you, and/or anyone else, who wants to work on >> > finding a way to test kfuncs that live in security/bpf_lsm_kfuncs.c. >> >> Right, and for that file to exist, you need to get everyone (FS, BPF fol= ks) to >> agree on whether placing all such kfuncs there makes sense. It is not fo= r both >> of us to decide on our own. So let's revisit this whole topic once you'v= e done >> that exercise. > > The kfunc that David has proposed must be located in > security/bpf_lsm_kfuncs.c, similar to the VFS kfuncs and > fs/bpf_fs_kfuncs.c. If you read David's bpf_init_inode_xattr() kfunc Sigh. I now went and read the archives, and Christian already told you no before = [0], which I missed in my first read. So two people whom this code affects alrea= dy objected to your proposal. [0]: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20260625-schnabel-rennmaschine-parieren-= bcb352c3cf59@brauner > you will notice there is nothing in the function relating to the VFS, > well other than the "inode" and "xattr" in the name of the function; I can also read it the other way. There is only one "security_lsmxattr_add(= )" call that is LSM related, and the rest is VFS or BPF specific stuff. There would be no xattr support in LSM code without filesystems implementin= g them. Please avoid making absurd and non-sensical arguments. If we went by this logic, we would have to move the entirety of the kernel = under security/, since anything that calls into LSM code becomes eligible to go t= here. > this is purely a LSM kfunc and I stand by my previous comments. The > BPF maintainers have seen fit to decide quite a few things LSM related > solely on their own, I see no reason why requiring a LSM kfunc be > located in security/bpf_lsm_kfuncs.c is unreasonable given our current > situation. > > As I said earlier, I'm happy to work with you, David, or anyone else > on ensuring security/bpf_lsm_kfuncs.c has the proper test coverage, > but I'm not going to continue to go back and forth about the location > of the bpf_init_inode_xattr() kfunc that is proposed in this patchset. > If you, or any of the other BPF maintainers, are not able to live with > that location then David will need to find another way. Yeah, I think we've spilled enough ink on this. We'll figure out a way to m= ove things forward. Since VFS people disagree too, the kfunc should stay where= it is in this series. I am always open to revisiting all this once you can convince others by mak= ing useful arguments, instead of imposing your will onto them and throwing a ta= ntrum.