Re: [PATCH v4] security: Expand task_setscheduler LSM hook

On Tue, Jul 21, 2026 at 07:45:41AM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> On 7/19/2026 6:41 PM, Aaron Tomlin wrote:
> > At present, the task_setscheduler LSM hook provides security modules
> > with the opportunity to mediate changes to a task's scheduling policy by
> > inspecting the requested sched_attr. However, when invoked via
> > sched_setaffinity(), the hook lacks visibility into the actual CPU
> > affinity mask being requested. Consequently, security modules are
> > entirely blind to the target CPUs and cannot make granular access
> > control decisions based on spatial isolation.
> >
> > In modern multi-tenant and real-time environments, CPU isolation is a
> > critical boundary. The inability to audit or restrict specific CPU
> > pinning requests limits the effectiveness of security policies,
> > particularly when attempting to shield isolated or cryptographic cores
> > from unprivileged or compromised tasks.
> >
> > This patch expands the security_task_setscheduler() hook signature to
> > include a pointer to the requested cpumask alongside the existing
> > sched_attr. Because this is a shared hook used for multiple scheduling
> > attribute changes, call sites that do not modify CPU affinity are
> > updated to safely pass NULL for the mask. To protect against unverified
> > dereferences, the parameter is annotated with __nullable in the LSM hook
> > definition, ensuring the BPF verifier mandates explicit NULL checks for
> > attached eBPF programs.
> >
> > Historically, SELinux has governed all scheduling alterations under a
> > single, monolithic PROCESS__SETSCHED access vector. However, by
> > inspecting fields such as attr->sched_policy or attr->sched_priority, a
> > security module can introduce granular access controls. For instance,
> > differentiating between standard time-sharing policies and
> > latency-sensitive real-time policies.
> >
> > This change updates all in-tree security modules (SELinux and Smack) to
> > accommodate the new parameter mechanically, while providing LSMs with
> > the necessary context to enforce strict affinity policies.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Aaron Tomlin <[email protected]>
> > ---
> > Changes since v3:
> >
> >  - Expanded the task_setscheduler LSM hook to accept the 'sched_attr'
> >    payload, enabling BPF and other LSMs to inspect scheduling attributes
> >    (Peter Zijlstra)
> >
> >  - Updated all call sites for security_task_setscheduler() to correctly
> >    pass the attr structure when available, or NULL otherwise
> >    (Peter Zijlstra)
> >
> >  - Added the necessary forward declaration for struct sched_attr to
> >    include/linux/security.h
> >
> >  - Linked to v3: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
> >
> > Changes since v2:
> >
> >  - Dropped patch 1. This is to be addressed by the cgroup cpuset
> >    maintainer (Waiman Long)
> >
> >  - Dropped patch 3. Will be submitted as a separate patch (Paul Moore)
> >
> >  - Linked to v2: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
> >
> > Changes since v1:
> >
> >  - Reordered the allocation and user-copy of new_mask in the MIPS
> >    architecture's mipsmt_sys_sched_setaffinity() to occur before the
> >    LSM hook is invoked. This ensures the security modules evaluate a fully
> >    populated mask rather than uninitialised memory, while cleanly handling
> >    error unwinding
> >
> >  - Updated cpuset_can_fork() to pass the destination cpuset's effective CPU
> >    mask instead of NULL
> >
> >  - Linked to v1: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Aaron Tomlin <[email protected]>
> 
> For the (trivial) Smack changes:
> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>

Thank you Casey.

-- 
Aaron Tomlin

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