Re: [PATCH v2] SECURITY.md: Codify the maintainer process
Stephen Smalley <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | org.kernel.vger.selinux |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <CAEjxPJ6a6d3+SDgq+9BV3Z7in0odjWxdZ7_c757yRY_EU4HMbQ@mail.gmail.com> |
On Mon, Aug 3, 2026 at 1:40 PM Stephen Smalley <[email protected]> wrote: > > From: Jason Zaman <[email protected]> > > Since security issues are quite rare, best to codify the processes so > when they come along we can fall back to this and don't forget any > steps. > > Signed-off-by: Jason Zaman <[email protected]> > Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <[email protected]> Sorry to nag but would like at least one other selinux maintainer to ack this before merging. > --- > v2 makes the changes suggested by reviewers and drops the RFC/draft > language. > > SECURITY.md | 44 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- > 1 file changed, 39 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/SECURITY.md b/SECURITY.md > index 49c40e97..52ab863c 100644 > --- a/SECURITY.md > +++ b/SECURITY.md > @@ -13,16 +13,23 @@ involved. > > ### Reporting Problems > > +Note that issues that depend on attacker-controlled policy can be > +reported as regular bugs to the public [email protected] mailing > +list and do not need to follow this process. > + > For serious problems or security vulnerabilities in the SELinux kernel code > please refer to the SELinux Kernel Subsystem Security Policy in the link below: > > * https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux-kernel/blob/main/SECURITY.md > > -Problems with the SELinux userspace that are not suitable for immediate public > -disclosure should be emailed to the current SELinux userspace maintainers, the > -list is below. We typically request at most a 90 day time period to address > -the issue before it is made public, but we will make every effort to address > -the issue as quickly as possible and shorten the disclosure window. > +Problems with the SELinux userspace that are not suitable for > +immediate public disclosure should be reported using > +[GitHub private vulnerability reporting](https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux/security) > +or emailed to the current SELinux userspace maintainers - the list is > +below. We typically request at most a 90 day time period to address > +the issue before it is made public, but we will make every effort to > +address the issue as quickly as possible and shorten the disclosure > +window. > > * Petr Lautrbach, [email protected] > * James Carter, [email protected] > @@ -35,6 +42,10 @@ the issue as quickly as possible and shorten the disclosure window. > * (GPG fingerprint) 6319 1CE9 4183 0986 89CA B8DB 7EF1 37EC 935B 0EAF > * Ondrej Mosnacek, [email protected] > > +If unsure about whether an issue is in kernel or userspace, feel free > +to send it to both the kernel and userspace maintainers and the > +maintainers will handle it internally. > + > ### Resolving Sensitive Security Issues > > Upon disclosure of a bug, the maintainers should work together to investigate > @@ -57,3 +68,26 @@ lists. > > * https://oss-security.openwall.org/wiki/mailing-lists/distros > * https://oss-security.openwall.org/wiki/mailing-lists/oss-security > + > +### Maintainer Process > + > +This is the process maintainers will follow upon receiving a security notification. > + > +1. Make sure all appropriate SELinux maintainers are notified. Regardless of > + which maintainer was initially contacted, others should be looped in. This > + may also include the kernel maintainers if relevant to the issue. > +2. After an initial review of the issue, maintainers will agree on one person > + to be main point of contact. The response to the initial mail may come from a > + different maintainer. If the initial mail was PGP signed/encrypted, the > + replies will also be PGP signed/encrypted with one of the above keys. > +3. Maintainers will work together in private to verify and fix the issue. For > + larger fixes, this might involve a github private fork within a draft github > + security advisory. > +4. Maintainers will prepare the fix as soon as reasonable. Maintainers may > + invite the reporter to the draft security advisory or private fork to help > + verifying the fix. > +5. We will aim to release the fix publicly quickly, but may request an embargo > + period up to 90 days if the complexity of the issue requires it or if > + severity of the issue requires coordinated rollout amongst distros. > +6. Public disclosure will involve pushing the fix to the public repo and > + publishing the security advisory on Github and to the mailing list. > -- > 2.55.0 >