SECURITY: policycoreutils/fixfiles <= 3.11: relabel files to incorrect security context
Stephen Smalley <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | org.kernel.vger.selinux |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <CAEjxPJ69EVhwVX3sCUguMNF8M=0G3shhfzOh1QM+TUiEJMZ8WQ@mail.gmail.com> |
An upstream security advisory for CVE-2026-19079 has been published at: https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux/security/advisories/GHSA-647q-jhqw-6p4w The description is included below but please refer to the link for the latest information as it may be updated. Title policycoreutils/fixfiles <= 3.11: relabel files to incorrect security context Description fixfiles is a script that wraps the setfiles and restorecon programs to provide a more user-friendly interface for fixing or checking file security contexts. When called with the relabel command, fixfiles also attempts to clean up /tmp and to relabel any unlabeled files in /tmp, /var/tmp, /var/run, and /var/lib/debug that may be leftover from a previous SELinux-disabled boot. fixfiles does so in an unsafe manner that is subject to TOCTOU issues, making it possible for files to be mislabeled. Impact If an unprivileged user/process can execute commands/code while fixfiles relabel is being run by an admin or other privileged process, the user may be able to trigger a relabel of a file they do not own to the wrong security context. Patches Upstream fixed this issue by dropping the functionality in commit https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux/commit/a556538c2d5d2583273e025b45c02651fef47679, which will be included in the 3.12 release. Workarounds Enable the fs.protected_symlinks and fs.protected_hardlinks sysctl settings. Only run fixfiles relabel at boot using autorelabel before any untrusted users/processes can run. References https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/cve-2026-19079