Re: [PATCH] Fix incorrect flush address in direct page table reclaim
Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Mon, 3 Aug 2026 18:30:32 -0700
| Newsgroups | org.kernel.vger.stable,org.kvack.linux-mm |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
On Mon, 3 Aug 2026 17:37:08 -0700 [email protected] wrote: > From: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]> > > When zap_pte_range reclaims a page table, it does: > > pte_free_tlb(tlb, pmd_pgtable(pmdval), addr); > > and this is unconditionally wrong: if this code executes, addr *always* > points one past the end of the range covered by the table. The addr > parameter is used to flush the TLB (really the paging-structure-cache) > to drop references to the to-be-freed table, and any architecture that > cares about the parameter will flush the wrong address. (But they'll > still free the correct page). > > I think it's worth contemplating why the kernel works at all. > > If we hit the offending line of code, we will first clear the PMD entry > (line 1954, zap_empty_pte_table), then we will issue pending flushes if > force_flush is set (tlb_flush_mmu_tlbonly(tlb)), then we will skip the > retry on line 1979 (phew!), and then we will do the offending > pte_free_tlb call. *Or* we will clear the PMD entry immediately before > pte_free_tlb (line 1983, zap_pte_table_if_empty). > > If we have any pending flushes (i.e. we actually zapped any last-level > entries) at the time we clear the PMD entry, then the flush really ought > to flush all references to the table (Linus certainly seems to think it > will on all architectures [0]). > > The condition under which we have no accumulated flushes at the time of > the clear is very complex (the whole zap_pte_range function has absurdly > complex control flow). If we do hit the bad case, then we will end up > clearing the PMD entry after the last time the range is flushed, and any > CPU is free to cache a reference to the (empty) page table. If this > happens due to an ordinary read or write, it would segfault, so it would > be rare. But the cache could be speculatively filled as well. Then > we'll flush the wrong address and then free and possibly reuse the > table. > > On x86, even flushing the wrong address works on non-KPTI Intel systems > because INVLPG flushes *all* paging-structure-caches, not just the ones > for the target address. But INVPCID does not, and flush_tlb_one_user > will use INVPCID if it's available. And then we're toast. AMD systems > are more susceptible: we set the EFER.TCE bit, which makes even INVLPG > only flush the target address. > > P.S. IMO zap_pte_range is a mess. The control flow is excessively > complex. The direct_reclaim variable itself has a confused meaning -- > for the first part of the function it means, approximately, "we should > free the table if can_reclaim_pt". But, later on, it means "we ALREADY > reclaimed the table". And the goto retry on line 1979 is IMO just > asking for trouble if the condition ever changes such that it might > happen after clearing the PMD. > > I think this might fix an issue in ripgrep reported here: > https://github.com/BurntSushi/ripgrep/issues/3494 Huh, cool. Very recently I was scratching my head at Daniel's ripgrep report. Upon which he obviously did a ton of work (many thanks). https://github.com/dfoxfranke/ripgrep-3494-analysis Daniel also pointed a finger at 4c640eb4181c ("mm: move pte table reclaim code to memory.c"). The manifestation is that a tiny race window causes the zero page to magically appear where an anon page was expected. Anyway, I see Daniel is testing this patch. Please let us know the result. (I think I found his email address). I can't find an email address for BurntSushi.