Re: [PATCH bpf v2] bpf: guard uprobes against private-stack corruption
Andrii Nakryiko <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | org.kernel.vger.stable,org.kernel.vger.bpf |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <CAEf4BzbkKwM-uwc1=o2p2v-bjuYNxM++La8Gr5edv5H6sGGqDA@mail.gmail.com> |
On Tue, Aug 18, 2026 at 1:33 PM Christian Simon <[email protected]> wrote: > > Eligible BPF programs use one private stack per program and CPU. Both > bpf_prog_run_array_uprobe() and uprobe_prog_run() use migrate_disable() > to keep an invocation on one CPU, but another task can still preempt it > and run the same program on that CPU. The second invocation then reuses > and can overwrite the first invocation's private stack. > > Protect each real program invocation with the existing per-program > recursion context. When the program is already active on this CPU, > account for the missed invocation and skip it. Return zero when skipping > an uprobe-multi invocation so session handling does not suppress its > return probe. > > Skip dummy_bpf_prog in the classic array path before acquiring the > recursion context because its active pointer is NULL. > > Add a regression test that pins two threads to one CPU and overlaps > classic and multi uprobe invocations while preserving a sentinel in a > private stack frame. Without the guards, the second invocation executes > and corrupts the first invocation's sentinel. > > Fixes: 7d1cd70d4b16 ("bpf, x86: Support private stack in jit") > Fixes: 6c17a882d380 ("bpf, arm64: JIT support for private stack") > Closes: https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-ebpf-instrumentation/issues/3056 > Cc: [email protected] > Signed-off-by: Christian Simon <[email protected]> > --- > Changes in v2: > - Address review comments from sashiko-bot > - Guard the uprobe-multi path as well. > - Remove const from correct line > - Add a regression selftest for uprobe-classic/multi paths. > - Add the arm64 Fixes tag. > > include/linux/bpf.h | 33 +++-- > kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c | 11 +- > .../bpf/prog_tests/uprobe_private_stack.c | 118 ++++++++++++++++++ > .../bpf/progs/uprobe_private_stack.c | 54 ++++++++ > 4 files changed, 206 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) > create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/uprobe_private_stack.c > create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/uprobe_private_stack.c > > diff --git a/include/linux/bpf.h b/include/linux/bpf.h > index 7719f6528445..a94fc9898ece 100644 > --- a/include/linux/bpf.h > +++ b/include/linux/bpf.h > @@ -2572,6 +2572,14 @@ static inline void bpf_reset_run_ctx(struct bpf_run_ctx *old_ctx) > > typedef u32 (*bpf_prog_run_fn)(const struct bpf_prog *prog, const void *ctx); > > +#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL > +void notrace bpf_prog_inc_misses_counter(struct bpf_prog *prog); > +#else > +static inline void bpf_prog_inc_misses_counter(struct bpf_prog *prog) > +{ > +} > +#endif > + > static __always_inline u32 > bpf_prog_run_array(const struct bpf_prog_array *array, > const void *ctx, bpf_prog_run_fn run_prog) > @@ -2617,7 +2625,7 @@ bpf_prog_run_array_uprobe(const struct bpf_prog_array *array, > const void *ctx, bpf_prog_run_fn run_prog) > { > const struct bpf_prog_array_item *item; > - const struct bpf_prog *prog; > + struct bpf_prog *prog; > struct bpf_run_ctx *old_run_ctx; > struct bpf_trace_run_ctx run_ctx; > u32 ret = 1; > @@ -2635,15 +2643,30 @@ bpf_prog_run_array_uprobe(const struct bpf_prog_array *array, > old_run_ctx = bpf_set_run_ctx(&run_ctx.run_ctx); > item = &array->items[0]; > while ((prog = READ_ONCE(item->prog))) { > + /* dummy_bpf_prog has no recursion state. */ > + if (unlikely(!prog->len)) { > + item++; > + continue; > + } > + > + if (unlikely(!bpf_prog_get_recursion_context(prog))) { > + bpf_prog_inc_misses_counter(prog); > + bpf_prog_put_recursion_context(prog); > + item++; > + continue; > + } > + I think it's unacceptable to skip sleepable uprobe execution just because there is the same BPF program attached to a *different* uprobe (and all due to a private stack that no one asked for or needs for uprobes, really). As a short-term fix, we should probably disable private stack for sleepable uprobe/kprobe program (and tracepoint/raw_tracepoint), and think how we can make private stack less per-CPU dependent. pw-bot: cr > if (!prog->sleepable) > rcu_read_lock(); > > run_ctx.bpf_cookie = item->bpf_cookie; > ret &= run_prog(prog, ctx); > - item++; > > if (!prog->sleepable) > rcu_read_unlock(); > + > + bpf_prog_put_recursion_context(prog); > + item++; > } > bpf_reset_run_ctx(old_run_ctx); > migrate_enable(); > @@ -3208,8 +3231,6 @@ static inline bool has_current_bpf_ctx(void) > return !!current->bpf_ctx; > } > > -void notrace bpf_prog_inc_misses_counter(struct bpf_prog *prog); > - > void bpf_dynptr_init(struct bpf_dynptr_kern *ptr, void *data, > enum bpf_dynptr_type type, u32 offset, u32 size); > void bpf_dynptr_set_null(struct bpf_dynptr_kern *ptr); [...]