Re: [PATCH] nvmet-tcp: fix out-of-bounds write when receiving an over-long PDU
Keith Busch <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | org.kernel.vger.stable,org.infradead.lists.linux-nvme |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <aozo4lBg1fhoojdP@kbusch-mbp> |
On Fri, Aug 14, 2026 at 03:48:11PM -0400, Shivam Kumar wrote: > nvmet_tcp_try_recv_pdu() reads a PDU header into the fixed 128-byte > queue->pdu union, then computes the remaining payload length as > > queue->left = hdr->hlen - queue->offset + hdgst; > > and reads that many more bytes into &queue->pdu + queue->offset, without > ever bounding the result against sizeof(queue->pdu). > > A struct nvme_tcp_icreq_pdu is itself 128 bytes, exactly the size of the > union. Once a header digest has been negotiated (hdgst = 4), a second > ICReq passes the hlen == nvmet_tcp_pdu_size() check but yields > queue->left = 128 - 8 + 4 = 124, so bytes 8..132 are written into the > 128-byte buffer -- 4 bytes past its end, over queue->hdr_digest and > queue->data_digest. Those bytes are attacker-controlled (an ICReq > carries no digest), and the duplicate ICReq is only rejected later, > after the overflow. A remote unauthenticated host can thus corrupt > kernel memory adjacent to the receive buffer. > > Reject any PDU whose declared length would read past the end of > queue->pdu before the second recv. Thanks, applied to nvme-7.3.