[PATCH 5.10] bpf: reject negative CO-RE accessor indices in bpf_core_parse_spec()
Andrey Troshin <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | org.kernel.vger.stable,org.kernel.vger.bpf,org.kernel.vger.netdev |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
From: Weiming Shi <[email protected]> [ Upstream commit 1c22483a2c4bbf747787f328392ca3e68619c4dc ] CO-RE accessor strings are colon-separated indices that describe a path from a root BTF type to a target field, e.g. "0:1:2" walks through nested struct members. bpf_core_parse_spec() parses each component with sscanf("%d"), so negative values like -1 are silently accepted. The subsequent bounds checks (access_idx >= btf_vlen(t)) only guard the upper bound and always pass for negative values because C integer promotion converts the __u16 btf_vlen result to int, making the comparison (int)(-1) >= (int)(N) false for any positive N. When -1 reaches btf_member_bit_offset() it gets cast to u32 0xffffffff, producing an out-of-bounds read far past the members array. A crafted BPF program with a negative CO-RE accessor on any struct that exists in vmlinux BTF (e.g. task_struct) crashes the kernel deterministically during BPF_PROG_LOAD on any system with CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF=y (default on major distributions). The bug is reachable with CAP_BPF: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffed11818b6626 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 85 Comm: poc Not tainted 7.0.0-rc6 #18 PREEMPT(full) RIP: 0010:bpf_core_parse_spec (tools/lib/bpf/relo_core.c:354) RAX: 00000000ffffffff Call Trace: <TASK> bpf_core_calc_relo_insn (tools/lib/bpf/relo_core.c:1321) bpf_core_apply (kernel/bpf/btf.c:9507) check_core_relo (kernel/bpf/verifier.c:19475) bpf_check (kernel/bpf/verifier.c:26031) bpf_prog_load (kernel/bpf/syscall.c:3089) __sys_bpf (kernel/bpf/syscall.c:6228) </TASK> CO-RE accessor indices are inherently non-negative (struct member index, array element index, or enumerator index), so reject them immediately after parsing. Fixes: ddc7c3042614 ("libbpf: implement BPF CO-RE offset relocation algorithm") Reported-by: Xiang Mei <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Weiming Shi <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Emil Tsalapatis <[email protected]> Acked-by: Paul Chaignon <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]> [Andrey Troshin: backport fixs from tools/lib/bpf/relo_core.c to tools/lib/bpf/libbpf.c] Signed-off-by: Andrey Troshin <[email protected]> --- Backport fix for CVE-2026-45839 Link: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45839 --- tools/lib/bpf/libbpf.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/tools/lib/bpf/libbpf.c b/tools/lib/bpf/libbpf.c index 4c6902c7bdff..e826557c45f3 100644 --- a/tools/lib/bpf/libbpf.c +++ b/tools/lib/bpf/libbpf.c @@ -4554,6 +4554,8 @@ static int bpf_core_parse_spec(const struct btf *btf, ++spec_str; if (sscanf(spec_str, "%d%n", &access_idx, &parsed_len) != 1) return -EINVAL; + if (access_idx < 0) + return -EINVAL; if (spec->raw_len == BPF_CORE_SPEC_MAX_LEN) return -E2BIG; spec_str += parsed_len; -- 2.34.1