Re: [PATCH] RDMA/srpt: fix integer overflow in immediate data length check

On Mon, 04 May 2026 01:00:36 -0700, Sara Venkatesh wrote:
> imm_buf->len is a user-controlled uint32_t received from the network.
> Adding it to imm_data_offset without overflow checking allows a
> malicious initiator to send len=0xFFFFFFFF, causing req_size to wrap
> around to a small value, bypassing the bounds check, and subsequently
> passing a ~4GB length to sg_init_one().
> 
> Use check_add_overflow() to detect wrapping before the comparison.
> 
> [...]

Applied, thanks!

[1/1] RDMA/srpt: fix integer overflow in immediate data length check
      https://git.kernel.org/rdma/rdma/c/3f716b34c639f6

Best regards,
-- 
Leon Romanovsky <[email protected]>