Re: [PATCH v2] scsi: target: iscsi: validate CHAP_R length before base64 decode
Alexandru Hossu <[email protected]> Wed, 20 May 2026 17:43:38 -0700 (PDT)
| Newsgroups | org.kernel.vger.target-devel,org.kernel.vger.linux-scsi,org.kernel.vger.stable |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
On Wed, May 20, 2026, Dmitry Bogdanov <[email protected]> wrote: > Yes, the length of Base64 decoded string is not deterministic. > Moreover, length of Base64 encoded string must be divisible by 4. Which > is biger that 4/3 of decoded. > > | MD5_SIGNATURE_SIZE | 16 | 21,33333 | 22 | 24 | > | SHA256_SIGNATURE_SIZE | 32 | 42,66667 | 43 | 44 | > > So, that formula is not correct and will break all iscsi authentication. v3 (sent about an hour before your email) already handles this. Trailing '=' are stripped before the comparison, so the check is applied only to the data characters: while (r_len > 0 && chap_r[r_len - 1] == '=') r_len--; if (r_len > DIV_ROUND_UP(chap->digest_size * 4, 3)) { Using your table as input: MD5 padded: "data==" -> r_len = 24-2 = 22, 22 <= 22 ✓ SHA-256 padded: "data=" -> r_len = 44-1 = 43, 43 <= 43 ✓ > Alexandru, may be better just to change size of client_diggest variable > to match it with chap_r like for initiatorchg and initiatorchg_binhex? That also prevents the overflow. The length check is preferred for consistency with the HEX branch, which validates input length before calling the decoder rather than relying on a larger destination buffer. Alexandru