Re: [PATCH 0/2] scsi: target: fix CHAP_N handling
David Disseldorp <[email protected]> Wed, 3 Jun 2026 09:19:24 +1000
| Newsgroups | org.kernel.vger.target-devel,org.kernel.vger.linux-scsi |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
On Tue, 2 Jun 2026 17:42:57 +0100, John Garry wrote: > On 02/06/2026 12:43, David Disseldorp wrote: > > The sashiko bot pointed out issues with CHAP_N handling recently, when > > reviewing a patch for a separate issue: > > https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://sashiko.dev/*/patchset/20260521151121.808477-1-hossu.alexandru*40gmail.com__;IyU!!ACWV5N9M2RV99hQ!MNesZJ3IsH9Mv0iZxHUcVmbC_3uwDkJgMhAX8i1TelyqqZD_dAq1cwIy6RtYI8D3boJh5iFeGhtTvfTX$ > > Since extract_param() unconditionally strips '0x' or '0b' prefixes and > > alters the returned type, wouldn't a valid user with a name like '0xalice' or > > '0bob' have their username mutated to 'alice' or 'ob'? > > is there a real world case or vulnerability being fixed here? No vulnerability - the "real world case" is as above: CHAP authentication currently fails if the CHAP username begins with 0x, 0b or the upper case variants. The bug is trivial to reproduce. Thanks, David