Re: [PATCH v3 2/3] Documentation: security-bugs: explain what is and is not a security bug

Greg KH <[email protected]>
Newsgroups org.kernel.vger.workflows,org.kernel.vger.linux-doc,org.kernel.vger.linux-kernel
Message-ID <2026051333-puzzle-smokiness-8096@gregkh>
On Tue, May 12, 2026 at 11:20:51AM -0600, Jonathan Corbet wrote:
> Willy Tarreau <[email protected]> writes:
> 
> > The use of automated tools to find bugs in random locations of the kernel
> > induces a raise of security reports even if most of them should just be
> > reported as regular bugs. This patch is an attempt at drawing a line
> > between what qualifies as a security bug and what does not, hoping to
> > improve the situation and ease decision on the reporter's side.
> >
> > It defers the enumeration to a new file, threat-model.rst, that tries
> > to enumerate various classes of issues that are and are not security
> > bugs. This should permit to more easily update this file for various
> > subsystem-specific rules without having to revisit the security bug
> > reporting guide.
> 
> One thing here:
> 
> [...]
> 
> > +* **Capability-based protection**:
> > +
> > +  * users not having the ``CAP_SYS_ADMIN`` capability may not alter the
> > +    kernel's configuration, memory nor state, change other users' view of the
> > +    file system layout, grant any user capabilities they do not have, nor
> > +    affect the system's availability (shutdown, reboot, panic, hang, or making
> > +    the system unresponsive via unbounded resource exhaustion).
> 
> That is pretty demonstrably not true, and will likely elicit challenges
> at some point.  There are a lot of "make me root" capabilities that
> enable users to do all of those things; consider CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE as an
> obvious example.  I think that just about all of the capabilities will
> enable at least one of those things - that's why the capabilities exist
> in the first place.  So I think this needs to be written far more
> generally.

You are right, there are more capabilities, but we get bug reports all
the time that basically come down to "a user with CAP_SYS_ADMIN can go
and do..." which are pointless for us to be handling.  Just got one a
few minutes ago, so LLMs are churning this crap out quite frequently.

So any rewording of this to prevent us from getting these pointless
reports would be great.

> As a lower-priority thing, lockdown mode is meant to at least try to
> provide some stronger guarantees, and lockdown circumvention seems to be
> normally be viewed as a security bug.  Worth a mention?

lockdown issues are best discussed on the list where the lockdown people
are as most of us feel that really isn't a "security" thing at all :)

thanks,

greg k-h
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