Re: [PATCH] docs: threat-model: fix /dev/kmsg reference

Hi Johan,

On Wed, Aug 19, 2026 at 03:40:39PM +0200, Johan Hovold wrote:
> Fix a '/dev/kmsg' reference which got replaced with '/proc/kmsg' (which
> is not accessible to regular users).

Actually it wasn't "replaced", it's because I didn't know about /dev/kmsg,
for having been used to /proc/kmsg for decades long before its /dev cousin
was born :-)

> Fixes: a03ef333fbd6 ("Documentation: security-bugs: explain what is and is not a security bug")
> Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <[email protected]>

Acked-by: Willy Tarreau <[email protected]>

Thanks,
Willy

> ---
>  Documentation/process/threat-model.rst | 2 +-
>  1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
> 
> diff --git a/Documentation/process/threat-model.rst b/Documentation/process/threat-model.rst
> index a68be888ce8e..04e5df6a6f78 100644
> --- a/Documentation/process/threat-model.rst
> +++ b/Documentation/process/threat-model.rst
> @@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ possibilities of user namespaces are not covered in this document.
>  The kernel also offers a lot of troubleshooting and debugging facilities, which
>  can constitute attack vectors when placed in wrong hands. While some of them
>  are designed to be accessible to regular local users with a low risk (e.g.
> -kernel logs via ``/proc/kmsg``), some would expose enough information to
> +kernel logs via ``/dev/kmsg``), some would expose enough information to
>  represent a risk in most places and the decision to expose them is under the
>  administrator's responsibility (perf events, traces), and others are not
>  designed to be accessed by non-privileged users (e.g. debugfs). Access to these
> -- 
> 2.54.0