Re: [Ksummit-discuss] [TECH TOPIC] seccomp feature development
Kees Cook <[email protected]> Wed, 20 May 2020 11:05:58 -0700
| Newsgroups | org.linuxfoundation.lists.ksummit-discuss,dev.linux.lists.ksummit |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <202005201104.72FED15776@keescook> |
On Wed, May 20, 2020 at 05:31:02PM +0100, Al Viro wrote: > On Wed, May 20, 2020 at 09:17:41AM -0700, Kees Cook wrote: > > As recently outlined[1], there are are a number of seccomp topics that > > need discussion: > > > > - fd passing > > - deep argument inspection > > - changing structure sizes > > - syscall bitmasks > > > > Specifically, seccomp needs to grow the ability to inspect Extensible > > Argument syscalls, which requires that it inspect userspace memory > > without Time-of-Check/Time-of-Use races and without double-copying. > > Additionally, since the structures can grow and be nested, there needs > > to be a way to > > ... catch and kill the bullshit ABI "enhancements" that would attempt that > kind of garbage. I'm not sure why that is seccomp-related, though... We already have structs passed to syscalls that contain pointers to yet more structs. Do you mean those should be disallowed? (Personally, I would love that, but this doesn't seem to match the reality of the design considerations of those syscalls.) -- Kees Cook _______________________________________________ Ksummit-discuss mailing list [email protected] https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/ksummit-discuss