Re: [Intel-wired-lan] [PATCH] e100: prevent shift out-of-bounds in e100_eeprom_load
Kohei Enju <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | org.osuosl.intel-wired-lan,org.kernel.vger.linux-kernel,org.kernel.vger.netdev |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <andBqsDhcLG9vDmn@x1> |
On 08/07 20:26, [email protected] wrote: > From: Yalagada Pavan Kumar <[email protected]> > > When reading the EEPROM address length, e100_eeprom_read() can return > an invalid length (0 or >= 16). Passing an invalid addr_len to bit-shift > operations causes a shift out-of-bounds, triggering a kernel panic or > UBSAN warning. > > Validate addr_len after reading it from EEPROM and return -EINVAL if > the value is out of bounds. Additionally, use 1U to prevent > signed integer overflow when calculating eeprom_wc. > > Reported-by: [email protected] > Tested-by: [email protected] > Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=e0abb1d45ac291ebebeb > Signed-off-by: Yalagada Pavan Kumar <[email protected]> > --- > Tested using syzbot c reproducer. > --- > drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e100.c | 17 +++++++++++++++-- > 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e100.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e100.c > index 29960762e64a..1de5cd41ea0c 100644 > --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e100.c > +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e100.c > @@ -744,7 +744,12 @@ static __le16 e100_eeprom_read(struct nic *nic, u16 *addr_len, u16 addr) > * complete address. Use this to adjust addr_len. */ > ctrl = ioread8(&nic->csr->eeprom_ctrl_lo); > if (!(ctrl & eedo) && i > 16) { > - *addr_len -= (i - 16); > + u16 len = i - 16; > + > + if (len > *addr_len) > + *addr_len = 0; > + else > + *addr_len -= len; > i = 17; > } > > @@ -765,7 +770,15 @@ static int e100_eeprom_load(struct nic *nic) > > /* Try reading with an 8-bit addr len to discover actual addr len */ > e100_eeprom_read(nic, &addr_len, 0); > - nic->eeprom_wc = 1 << addr_len; > + > + if (!addr_len || addr_len >= 16) { > + netif_err(nic, probe, nic->netdev, > + "Invalid EEPROM address length %u\n", > + addr_len); > + return -EINVAL; An invalid address length here appears to indicate an unexpected response from the EEPROM, rather than an invalid argument. Therefore, -EINVAL seems somewhat misleading. Would -EIO be more appropriate here? Also, e100_eeprom_save() seems to have the same pattern. Shouldn't we fix that as well? > + } > + > + nic->eeprom_wc = 1U << addr_len; The commit message says that the U suffix prevents signed integer overflow. However, after the validation addr_len is in [1, 15], so 1 << addr_len cannot overflow an int. I think what prevents the out-of-bounds shift is the validation, not the U. > > for (addr = 0; addr < nic->eeprom_wc; addr++) { > nic->eeprom[addr] = e100_eeprom_read(nic, &addr_len, addr); > -- > 2.43.0 >