Re: [PATCH v8 4/8] image-fit-sig: Optionally require signatures
Jonas Karlman <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | org.u-boot-project.lists.u-boot |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
Hi Ludwig,
On 8/26/2026 3:52 PM, Ludwig Nussel wrote:
> On 8/22/26 00:48, Jonas Karlman wrote:
>> Hi Ludwig,
>>
>> On 8/13/2026 8:09 AM, Ludwig Nussel via U-Boot wrote:
>>> If U-Boot is built with signature verification but no keys are
>>> included in the device tree, the boot would still continue.
>>> Introduce FIT_SIGNATURE_REQUIRED to avoid a fail-open setup.
>>> Defaults to off so existing setups are not affected; boards wanting
>>> fail-closed behaviour must enable it explicitly.
>>>
>>> Consistently use log_err for errors in fit_config_verify_required_keys()
>>> while at it
> [...]
>>>
>>> /* Work out what we need to verify */
>>> key_node = fdt_subnode_offset(key_blob, 0, FIT_SIG_NODENAME);
>>> if (key_node < 0) {
>>> - debug("%s: No signature node found: %s\n", __func__,
>>> - fdt_strerror(key_node));
>>> + log_err("No signature node found: %s\n", fdt_strerror(key_node));
>>
>> This change is causing a verbose error messages on Rockchip where the
>> FIT_SIGNATURE feature it used to check image integrity during boot. The
>> config nodes is not expected to contain any signature, only hash(es) of
>> images.
>
> Is the message a problem? The intention was to at least leave some clue
> about the potential fail-open behavior.
Yes, printing a verbose error message for something that should not
always be treated as an error is an issue.
> Looks like you are also not using signed configurations with is even
> more suspicious:
> https://docs.u-boot.org/en/latest/usage/fit/signature.html#signed-configurations
It is not, as mentioned, Rockchip platform only use FIT_SIGNATURE for
image integrity checks, and not for signed configuration validation.
This series seem to make an assumption that signed configurations always
is desired, and for the Rockchip platform that is not the case.
On Rockchip we enable the FIT_SIGNATURE feature and only ensures image
hash nodes are populated. At runtime SPL checksum validates the images
and are able to fallback to load FIT from a different media in case the
image have been corrupted, possible due to bit-rot, user failing a
firmware upgrade or accidentally overwriting part of the FIT.
Regards,
Jonas
>
> cu
> Ludwig
>