[meta-virtualization][scarthgap][PATCH] libvirt: fix for CVE-2026-63622

Pick patch from [1] also mentioned at Debian report in [2]

[1] https://gitlab.com/libvirt/libvirt/-/commit/801160fd414ca2cc402bc01ead09b7ed4c3b8f5b
[2] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-63622
[3] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-63622

Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <[email protected]>
---
 .../libvirt/libvirt/CVE-2026-63622.patch      | 73 +++++++++++++++++++
 recipes-extended/libvirt/libvirt_10.0.0.bb    |  1 +
 2 files changed, 74 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 recipes-extended/libvirt/libvirt/CVE-2026-63622.patch

diff --git a/recipes-extended/libvirt/libvirt/CVE-2026-63622.patch b/recipes-extended/libvirt/libvirt/CVE-2026-63622.patch
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..093cd1c6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/recipes-extended/libvirt/libvirt/CVE-2026-63622.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+From 801160fd414ca2cc402bc01ead09b7ed4c3b8f5b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?HE=20WEI=EF=BC=88=E3=82=AE=E3=82=AB=E3=82=AF=EF=BC=89?=
+ <[email protected]>
+Date: Tue, 28 Jul 2026 17:49:02 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] util: virFileChownFiles: do not follow symlinks
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+virFileChownFiles() selected entries with virFileIsRegular() (stat(), follows
+symlinks) and changed ownership with chown() (follows symlinks). A component
+that owns the target directory at a lower privilege (e.g. the swtpm/tss state
+directory) can plant a symlink to an arbitrary regular file and have the root
+caller chown that file. Use lstat() to skip non-regular entries and
+fchownat(..., AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) so a symlink final component is never
+followed.
+
+Fixes: CVE-2026-63622
+Signed-off-by: HE WEI（ギカク） <[email protected]>
+[DB: use g_lstat instead of stat; use lchown instead of
+ fchownat for portability; added comment]
+Reviewed-by: Ján Tomko <[email protected]>
+Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <[email protected]>
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-63622
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.com/libvirt/libvirt/-/commit/801160fd414ca2cc402bc01ead09b7ed4c3b8f5b]
+Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <[email protected]>
+---
+ src/util/virfile.c | 16 ++++++++++++++--
+ 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/util/virfile.c b/src/util/virfile.c
+index f3108e9..baeb842 100644
+--- a/src/util/virfile.c
++++ b/src/util/virfile.c
+@@ -3172,6 +3172,12 @@ int virDirIsEmpty(const char *path,
+  *
+  * Change ownership of all regular files in a directory.
+  *
++ * This will NOT follow any symlinks, to avoid security risks.
++ * It is assumed the process using content under @name will
++ * be unprivileged, thus less trusted than libvirt. If it is
++ * compromised it might attempt to create symlinks in @name to
++ * escalate privileges on a subsequent call to virFileChownFiles.
++ *
+  * Returns -1 on error, with error already reported, 0 on success.
+  */
+ #ifndef WIN32
+@@ -3188,13 +3194,19 @@ int virFileChownFiles(const char *name,
+ 
+     while ((direrr = virDirRead(dir, &ent, name)) > 0) {
+         g_autofree char *path = NULL;
++        struct stat sb;
+ 
+         path = g_build_filename(name, ent->d_name, NULL);
+ 
+-        if (!virFileIsRegular(path))
++        if (g_lstat(path, &sb) < 0) {
++            virReportSystemError(errno, _("cannot stat '%1$s'"), path);
++            return -1;
++        }
++
++        if (!S_ISREG(sb.st_mode))
+             continue;
+ 
+-        if (chown(path, uid, gid) < 0) {
++        if (lchown(path, uid, gid) < 0) {
+             virReportSystemError(errno,
+                                  _("cannot chown '%1$s' to (%2$u, %3$u)"),
+                                  ent->d_name, (unsigned int) uid,
+-- 
+2.50.1
+
diff --git a/recipes-extended/libvirt/libvirt_10.0.0.bb b/recipes-extended/libvirt/libvirt_10.0.0.bb
index c6e6069c..4076a0cf 100644
--- a/recipes-extended/libvirt/libvirt_10.0.0.bb
+++ b/recipes-extended/libvirt/libvirt_10.0.0.bb
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ SRC_URI = "http://libvirt.org/sources/libvirt-${PV}.tar.xz;name=libvirt \
            file://CVE-2024-2494.patch \
            file://CVE-2024-4418.patch \
            file://CVE-2025-13193.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-63622.patch \
           "
 
 SRC_URI[libvirt.sha256sum] = "8ba2e72ec8bdd2418554a1474c42c35704c30174b7611eaf9a16544b71bcf00a"
-- 
2.50.1