Fwd: Please make stable NON-US homes for strong crypto projects

----- Forwarded message from John Gilmore <[email protected]> -----

*>Date: Sat, 15 Sep 2001 00:32:12 -0700
*>From: John Gilmore <[email protected]>
*>To: [email protected], [email protected]
*>Delivered-To: [email protected]
*>Delivered-To: [email protected]
*>Subject: Please make stable NON-US homes for strong crypto projects
*>X-Authentication-Warning: toad.com: Host localhost [127.0.0.1] didn't use HELO protocol
*>Precedence: bulk
*>
*>It's clear that the US administration is putting out feelers to
*>again ban publication of strong encryption.  See:
*>  http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,46816,00.html
*>
*>The evil gnomes who keep advancing unconstitutional US anti-crypto
*>policies know that the current hysteria in Congress and the
*>Administration will not last forever.  So they will probably move very
*>quickly -- within a week is my guess -- to re-control encryption,
*>either by a unilateral action of the Administration (by amending
*>the Export Administration Regulations), or by stuffing a rider onto
*>some so-called "emergency" bill in Congress.
*>
*>They maneuvered very carefully in the Bernstein case such that there
*>is no outstanding injunction against violating the Constitution this
*>way -- and even no binding 9th-Circuit precedent that tells them it's
*>unconstitutional to do so.  They know in their hearts that numerous
*>judges have found it unconstitutional, but they have proven throughout
*>the seven-year history of the case that they don't give a damn about
*>the Constitution.  Which means it may take weeks, months or years for
*>civil liberties workers to get a judge to roll back any such action.
*>Not just days.  We won the case, but they squirmed out of any
*>permanent restrictions -- so far.
*>
*>The US government has a new mania for wiretapping everyone in case
*>they might be a terrorist.  There's already two bills in Congress to
*>make it trivial for them to wiretap anybody on flimsy excuses, and to
*>retroactively justify their precipitous act of rolling Carnivore boxes
*>into major ISPs this week and demanding, without legal authority, that
*>they be put at the heart of the networks.  See:
*>  http://www.politechbot.com/docs/cta.091401.html
*>
*>Even more than before, we will need good encryption tools, merely to
*>maintain privacy for law-abiding citizens, political activists, and
*>human rights workers.  (In the current hysteria, mere messages
*>advocating peace or Constitutional rights might best be encrypted.)
*>The European Parliament also recently recommended that European
*>communications be routinely encrypted to protect them from pervasive
*>US Echelon wiretaps.
*>
*>Some US developers, who thought such a reversal would never happen,
*>have built or maintained a number of good open source encryption tools
*>in the United States, and may not have lined up solid foreign
*>maintainers or home sites.
*>
*>LET'S FIX THAT!  We need volunteers in many countries to mirror
*>current distributions, CVS trees, etc.  We need volunteers to also
*>act as maintainers, accepting patches and integrating them into
*>solid releases.
*>
*>(Note that too many countries have pledged to stand toe-to-toe with the
*>US while they march off to make war on somebody they can't figure out
*>who it is yet.  If you live in one of those countries, you may
*>suddenly find that your own crypto regs have been sneakily altered.
*>Take care that each useful package has maintainers and distribution
*>points in diverse countries.)
*>
*>I haven't kept close track of which packages are in danger.  I
*>suggest that people nominate packages on this mailing list, and that
*>others immediately grab mirror copies of them as they are nominated.
*>And that some of those who mirror them keep quiet, in case hysterical
*>governments make a concerted effort to stamp out all copies and/or all
*>major distribution sites.  If you aren't the quiet type, then *AFTER*
*>IMMEDIATELY PULLING A COPY OF THE CODE OUTSIDE US JURISDICTION,
*>announce your mirror on this mailing list.
*>
*>We freedom-loving US citizens have had to rely on the freedom-loving
*>citizens of saner countries, to do the work of making strong
*>encryption, for many years.  We had a brief respite, which we will
*>eventually resume for good.  In the meantime, please let me apologize
*>for my countrymen and for my government, for asking you to shoulder
*>most of the burden again.  Thank you so much.
*>
*>	John Gilmore
*>
*>PS: Companies with proprietary encryption packages might consider
*>immediately open-sourcing and exporting their encryption add-ins, so
*>their customers can still get them from overseas archives.  Or taking
*>other actions to safeguard the privacy and integrity of their
*>customers' data and their society's infrastructure.  I also advise
*>that they lobby like hell to keep privacy and integrity legal in the US.
*>
*>
*>
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----- End forwarded message -----