Filthy Whoreson Mutt, Edwin Clontz, Publicly Reprimanded by the NC Supreme Court, Should Have Been Solemnly Defrocked if SCONC Had Known About His Numerous Other Corruptions and Malfeasance

IN RE CLONTZ
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2. Under the statutes governing the Commission, a public
reprimand is appropriate where “a judge has violated
the Code of Judicial Conduct and has engaged in
conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, but
that misconduct is minor.” N.C.G.S. § 7A-374.2(7). The
Commission considers Respondent’s misconduct to be
“minor” because of the lack of prejudice to Mr. Logan in
his criminal proceeding given the low bar for the State
to establish probable cause and his ability to appeal the
probable cause determination. The Commission also
considers Respondent’s conduct in reducing Mr. Logan’s
bond following the finding of probable cause and the
isolated nature of the incident.
3. Finally, in recommending reprimand as opposed to a
more severe sanction, the Commission considers as
mitigating factors Respondent’s willingness to enter
into the Stipulation of Facts and the character
affidavits submitted by Respondent that attest to
Respondent’s professionalism, reputation for
impartiality in criminal cases, and courteous demeanor
as a jurist.
(citations to pages of the Stipulation and Record omitted).
In proceedings brought pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-376, this Court acts as a
court of original jurisdiction rather than an appellate court. In re Hill, 357 N.C. 559,
564 (2003) (citing In re Peoples, 296 N.C. 109, 147 (1978)). The Commission’s
recommendations are not binding on this Court, and this Court makes its own
independent judgment when considering the evidence. In re Nowell, 293 N.C. 235,
244 (1977). This Court may “adopt the Commission’s findings of fact if they are
supported by clear and convincing evidence, or [we] may make [our] own findings.”
In re Hartsfield, 365 N.C. 418, 428 (2012) (quoting In re Badgett, 362 N.C. 202, 206
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(2008)). If this Court finds that the Commission’s findings of fact are supported by
clear and convincing evidence and chooses to adopt them, we must determine whether
those findings support the Commission’s conclusions of law. In re Stone, 373 N.C. 368,
379 (2020) (citing In re Hartsfield, 365 N.C. at 429)
The Commission based its findings of fact on the stipulated facts and exhibits,
and respondent does not contest these findings. After careful review, we agree that
the Commission’s findings of fact are supported by clear, cogent, and convincing
evidence, and we adopt them as our own.
Respondent does not contest the fact that he held a probable-cause hearing
without defendant’s counsel present but instead argues that an objectively reasonable
reading of our statutes allows a district court to conduct a probable-cause hearing
without a defendant’s counsel present. As an initial matter, this Court need not find
a violation of our statutes in order to find a violation of our Code of Judicial Conduct.
See In re Tucker, 350 N.C. 649, 651 (1999) (finding that respondent violated our Code
of Judicial Conduct by rejecting a guilty plea and entering a verdict of not guilty
without determining whether the judge’s conduct also violated our General Statutes).
Instead, this Court must determine whether respondent’s statements, actions, and
inactions constitute “conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings
the judicial office into disrepute.” N.C.G.S. § 7A-376(b) (2019).
Although our analysis hinges on respondent’s conduct rather than his
compliance with our General Statutes, we reject respondent’s argument that his
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conduct was the result of an objectively reasonable interpretation of our statutes
governing probable-cause proceedings. Respondent argues that N.C.G.S. § 15A-606(e)
allows probable-cause hearings to proceed without defense counsel present and
N.C.G.S. § 15A-606(f) barred him from continuing the matter. A thorough
examination of these statutes shows why this argument fails. These two sub-sections
provide that:
(e) If an unrepresented defendant is not indigent and has
indicated his desire to be represented by counsel, the
district court judge must inform him that he has a choice
of appearing without counsel at the probable-cause hearing
or of securing the attendance of counsel to represent him
at the hearing. The judge must further inform him that the
judge presiding at the hearing will not continue the
hearing because of the absence of counsel except for
extraordinary cause.
(f) Upon a showing of good cause, a scheduled probable-
cause hearing may be continued by the district court upon
timely motion of the defendant or the State. Except for
extraordinary cause, a motion is not timely unless made at
least 48 hours prior to the time set for the probable-cause
hearing.
N.C.G.S. § 15A-606(e)–(f) (2019). Although § 15A-606(e) allows for a probable-cause
hearing to proceed without counsel present, it only applies to defendants who are not
indigent, and it also requires that the trial court inform the defendant that they have
a choice of appearing without counsel or securing the attendance of counsel and that
the hearing will not be continued due to counsel’s absence except for extraordinary
cause. Respondent’s conduct does not objectively comply with this statute because
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there is no evidence that he ascertained whether defendant was indigent, as a
threshold matter, and there is no evidence that he informed defendant of his choice
between appearing without counsel or securing the attendance of counsel.
Sub-section 15A-606(f) does not justify respondent’s conduct either because it
explicitly only applies to motions made by the defendant or the State, not the trial
court. Respondent’s admission that he would not have conducted the hearing if he
had known that the ADA threatened to withhold a plea offer if defendant challenged
probable cause further negates his original argument that § 15A-606(f) barred him
from continuing the matter.
Additionally, if respondent attempted to objectively follow all relevant statutes
he would have followed N.C.G.S. § 15A-611, which is titled “Probable-cause hearings.”
Subsection (c) provides that:
If a defendant appears at a probable-cause hearing without
counsel, the judge must determine whether counsel has
been waived. If he determines that counsel has been
waived, he may proceed without counsel. If he determines
that counsel has not been waived, except in a situation
covered by G.S. 15A-606(e) he must take appropriate action
to secure the defendant’s right to counsel.
N.C.G.S. § 15A-611(c). The plain language of this subsection requires the trial court
to inquire whether a defendant has waived counsel if they appear without counsel
and further requires “appropriate action” if counsel has not been waived and the
defendant is indigent. There is no evidence that the trial court ascertained whether
defendant waived counsel, and respondent failed to take any “appropriate action to
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secure the defendant’s right to counsel.” Id. Therefore, respondent’s conduct failed to
reflect an objectively reasonable reading and interpretation of our General Statutes
governing probable-cause proceedings.
Respondent further argues that subjecting him to punishment for a legal error
would create a slippery slope and “extend the disciplinary provisions in the Code of
Judicial Conduct to cover legal errors committed by trial judges[.]” He cites to our
recent decision in State v. Simpkins, 373 N.C. 530 (2020), in which we held that the
trial court erred by determining the defendant had waived his right to counsel and
remanded the matter for a new trial. Id. at 541. This analogy is inapposite. Unlike
respondent here, the trial court in Simpkins made multiple attempts to determine
whether the defendant wished to waive counsel and appointed standby counsel. Id.
at 532. These additional actions by the trial court in Simpkins would foster public
faith and confidence in the judiciary, even though the trial court was ultimately
wrong in its determination that defendant waived counsel. Unlike the trial court in
Simpkins, respondent rushed to hold a hearing without counsel present, he failed to
explore other options regarding counsel prior to commencing the proceeding, and he
made comments about “making a point” after the proceeding. This conduct
demonstrated a disregard for the defendant’s statutory and constitutional rights, and
that disregard undermines public faith and confidence in the judiciary.
For the reasons articulated above, we agree with and adopt as our own the
Commission’s conclusions that respondent’s conduct violates Canons 2A and 3A(4) of
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the North Carolina Code of Judicial Conduct and is prejudicial to the administration
of justice, thus bringing the judicial office into disrepute in violation of N.C.G.S. § 7A-
376(b).
The Commission recommended that respondent be publicly reprimanded. This
Court is not bound by the recommended sanction of the Commission. Hartsfield, 365
N.C. at 429. “[W]e may exercise our own judgment in arriving at a disciplinary
decision in light of respondent’s violations of the North Carolina Code of Judicial
Conduct.” In re Stone, 373 N.C. 368, 379 (2020) (citing Hartsfield, 365 N.C. at 429).
Therefore, “[w]e may adopt the Commission’s recommendation, or we may impose a
lesser or more severe sanction.” Id. This Court does not have established guidelines
for determining the appropriate sanction and “each case should be decided upon its
own facts.” In re Martin, 295 N.C. 291, 305 (1978).
We recognize the multiple affidavits submitted on respondent’s behalf from
attorneys in the Buncombe County Bar that attest to his fairness and further
recognize that respondent has never been the subject of discipline from this Court. In
light of this mitigating evidence and the fact that respondent voluntarily entered into
a Stipulation of Facts, we conclude that the Commission’s additional findings and
recommendation of public reprimand are appropriate, and we adopt them as our own.
Therefore, the Supreme Court of North Carolina orders that respondent Edwin
D. Clontz be publicly reprimanded for conduct in violation of Canon 2A and Canon
3A(4) of the North Carolina Code of Judicial Conduct, and for conduct prejudicial to
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the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute in violation
of N.C.G.S. § 7A-376.
By order of the Court in Conference, this the 15th day of December, 2020.
s/Davis, J. For the Court
WITNESS my hand and the seal of the Supreme Court of North Carolina, this
the 15th day of December, 2020.
AMY L. FUNDERBURK
Clerk of the Supreme Court
s/M.C. Hackney
Assistant Clerk