Re: Filthy Whoreson Mutt, Edwin Clontz, Publicly Reprimanded by the NC Supreme Court, Should Have Been Solemnly Defrocked if SCONC Had Known About His Numerous Other Corruptions and Malfeasance

On Tuesday, January 31, 2023 at 1:19:15 PM UTC-5, Jimmy knows crooked Sammie Ervin IV wrote:
> IN RE CLONTZ 
> Order of the Court 
> -13- 
> 2. Under the statutes governing the Commission, a public 
> reprimand is appropriate where “a judge has violated 
> the Code of Judicial Conduct and has engaged in 
> conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, but 
> that misconduct is minor.” N.C.G.S. § 7A-374.2(7). The 
> Commission considers Respondent’s misconduct to be 
> “minor” because of the lack of prejudice to Mr. Logan in 
> his criminal proceeding given the low bar for the State 
> to establish probable cause and his ability to appeal the 
> probable cause determination. The Commission also 
> considers Respondent’s conduct in reducing Mr. Logan’s 
> bond following the finding of probable cause and the 
> isolated nature of the incident. 
> 3. Finally, in recommending reprimand as opposed to a 
> more severe sanction, the Commission considers as 
> mitigating factors Respondent’s willingness to enter 
> into the Stipulation of Facts and the character 
> affidavits submitted by Respondent that attest to 
> Respondent’s professionalism, reputation for 
> impartiality in criminal cases, and courteous demeanor 
> as a jurist. 
> (citations to pages of the Stipulation and Record omitted). 
> In proceedings brought pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-376, this Court acts as a 
> court of original jurisdiction rather than an appellate court. In re Hill, 357 N.C. 559, 
> 564 (2003) (citing In re Peoples, 296 N.C. 109, 147 (1978)). The Commission’s 
> recommendations are not binding on this Court, and this Court makes its own 
> independent judgment when considering the evidence. In re Nowell, 293 N.C. 235, 
> 244 (1977). This Court may “adopt the Commission’s findings of fact if they are 
> supported by clear and convincing evidence, or [we] may make [our] own findings.” 
> In re Hartsfield, 365 N.C. 418, 428 (2012) (quoting In re Badgett, 362 N.C. 202, 206 
> IN RE CLONTZ 
> Order of the Court 
> -14- 
> (2008)). If this Court finds that the Commission’s findings of fact are supported by 
> clear and convincing evidence and chooses to adopt them, we must determine whether 
> those findings support the Commission’s conclusions of law. In re Stone, 373 N.C. 368, 
> 379 (2020) (citing In re Hartsfield, 365 N.C. at 429) 
> The Commission based its findings of fact on the stipulated facts and exhibits, 
> and respondent does not contest these findings. After careful review, we agree that 
> the Commission’s findings of fact are supported by clear, cogent, and convincing 
> evidence, and we adopt them as our own. 
> Respondent does not contest the fact that he held a probable-cause hearing 
> without defendant’s counsel present but instead argues that an objectively reasonable 
> reading of our statutes allows a district court to conduct a probable-cause hearing 
> without a defendant’s counsel present. As an initial matter, this Court need not find 
> a violation of our statutes in order to find a violation of our Code of Judicial Conduct. 
> See In re Tucker, 350 N.C. 649, 651 (1999) (finding that respondent violated our Code 
> of Judicial Conduct by rejecting a guilty plea and entering a verdict of not guilty 
> without determining whether the judge’s conduct also violated our General Statutes). 
> Instead, this Court must determine whether respondent’s statements, actions, and 
> inactions constitute “conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings 
> the judicial office into disrepute.” N.C.G.S. § 7A-376(b) (2019). 
> Although our analysis hinges on respondent’s conduct rather than his 
> compliance with our General Statutes, we reject respondent’s argument that his 
> IN RE CLONTZ 
> Order of the Court 
> -15- 
> conduct was the result of an objectively reasonable interpretation of our statutes 
> governing probable-cause proceedings. Respondent argues that N.C.G.S. § 15A-606(e) 
> allows probable-cause hearings to proceed without defense counsel present and 
> N.C.G.S. § 15A-606(f) barred him from continuing the matter. A thorough 
> examination of these statutes shows why this argument fails. These two sub-sections 
> provide that: 
> (e) If an unrepresented defendant is not indigent and has 
> indicated his desire to be represented by counsel, the 
> district court judge must inform him that he has a choice 
> of appearing without counsel at the probable-cause hearing 
> or of securing the attendance of counsel to represent him 
> at the hearing. The judge must further inform him that the 
> judge presiding at the hearing will not continue the 
> hearing because of the absence of counsel except for 
> extraordinary cause. 
> (f) Upon a showing of good cause, a scheduled probable- 
> cause hearing may be continued by the district court upon 
> timely motion of the defendant or the State. Except for 
> extraordinary cause, a motion is not timely unless made at 
> least 48 hours prior to the time set for the probable-cause 
> hearing. 
> N.C.G.S. § 15A-606(e)–(f) (2019). Although § 15A-606(e) allows for a probable-cause 
> hearing to proceed without counsel present, it only applies to defendants who are not 
> indigent, and it also requires that the trial court inform the defendant that they have 
> a choice of appearing without counsel or securing the attendance of counsel and that 
> the hearing will not be continued due to counsel’s absence except for extraordinary 
> cause. Respondent’s conduct does not objectively comply with this statute because 
> IN RE CLONTZ 
> Order of the Court 
> -16- 
> there is no evidence that he ascertained whether defendant was indigent, as a 
> threshold matter, and there is no evidence that he informed defendant of his choice 
> between appearing without counsel or securing the attendance of counsel. 
> Sub-section 15A-606(f) does not justify respondent’s conduct either because it 
> explicitly only applies to motions made by the defendant or the State, not the trial 
> court. Respondent’s admission that he would not have conducted the hearing if he 
> had known that the ADA threatened to withhold a plea offer if defendant challenged 
> probable cause further negates his original argument that § 15A-606(f) barred him 
> from continuing the matter. 
> Additionally, if respondent attempted to objectively follow all relevant statutes 
> he would have followed N.C.G.S. § 15A-611, which is titled “Probable-cause hearings.” 
> Subsection (c) provides that: 
> If a defendant appears at a probable-cause hearing without 
> counsel, the judge must determine whether counsel has 
> been waived. If he determines that counsel has been 
> waived, he may proceed without counsel. If he determines 
> that counsel has not been waived, except in a situation 
> covered by G.S. 15A-606(e) he must take appropriate action 
> to secure the defendant’s right to counsel. 
> N.C.G.S. § 15A-611(c). The plain language of this subsection requires the trial court 
> to inquire whether a defendant has waived counsel if they appear without counsel 
> and further requires “appropriate action” if counsel has not been waived and the 
> defendant is indigent. There is no evidence that the trial court ascertained whether 
> defendant waived counsel, and respondent failed to take any “appropriate action to 
> IN RE CLONTZ 
> Order of the Court 
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> secure the defendant’s right to counsel.” Id. Therefore, respondent’s conduct failed to 
> reflect an objectively reasonable reading and interpretation of our General Statutes 
> governing probable-cause proceedings. 
> Respondent further argues that subjecting him to punishment for a legal error 
> would create a slippery slope and “extend the disciplinary provisions in the Code of 
> Judicial Conduct to cover legal errors committed by trial judges[.]” He cites to our 
> recent decision in State v. Simpkins, 373 N.C. 530 (2020), in which we held that the 
> trial court erred by determining the defendant had waived his right to counsel and 
> remanded the matter for a new trial. Id. at 541. This analogy is inapposite. Unlike 
> respondent here, the trial court in Simpkins made multiple attempts to determine 
> whether the defendant wished to waive counsel and appointed standby counsel. Id. 
> at 532. These additional actions by the trial court in Simpkins would foster public 
> faith and confidence in the judiciary, even though the trial court was ultimately 
> wrong in its determination that defendant waived counsel. Unlike the trial court in 
> Simpkins, respondent rushed to hold a hearing without counsel present, he failed to 
> explore other options regarding counsel prior to commencing the proceeding, and he 
> made comments about “making a point” after the proceeding. This conduct 
> demonstrated a disregard for the defendant’s statutory and constitutional rights, and 
> that disregard undermines public faith and confidence in the judiciary. 
> For the reasons articulated above, we agree with and adopt as our own the 
> Commission’s conclusions that respondent’s conduct violates Canons 2A and 3A(4) of 
> IN RE CLONTZ 
> Order of the Court 
> -18- 
> the North Carolina Code of Judicial Conduct and is prejudicial to the administration 
> of justice, thus bringing the judicial office into disrepute in violation of N.C.G.S. § 7A- 
> 376(b). 
> The Commission recommended that respondent be publicly reprimanded. This 
> Court is not bound by the recommended sanction of the Commission. Hartsfield, 365 
> N.C. at 429. “[W]e may exercise our own judgment in arriving at a disciplinary 
> decision in light of respondent’s violations of the North Carolina Code of Judicial 
> Conduct.” In re Stone, 373 N.C. 368, 379 (2020) (citing Hartsfield, 365 N.C. at 429). 
> Therefore, “[w]e may adopt the Commission’s recommendation, or we may impose a 
> lesser or more severe sanction.” Id. This Court does not have established guidelines 
> for determining the appropriate sanction and “each case should be decided upon its 
> own facts.” In re Martin, 295 N.C. 291, 305 (1978). 
> We recognize the multiple affidavits submitted on respondent’s behalf from 
> attorneys in the Buncombe County Bar that attest to his fairness and further 
> recognize that respondent has never been the subject of discipline from this Court. In 
> light of this mitigating evidence and the fact that respondent voluntarily entered into 
> a Stipulation of Facts, we conclude that the Commission’s additional findings and 
> recommendation of public reprimand are appropriate, and we adopt them as our own. 
> Therefore, the Supreme Court of North Carolina orders that respondent Edwin 
> D. Clontz be publicly reprimanded for conduct in violation of Canon 2A and Canon 
> 3A(4) of the North Carolina Code of Judicial Conduct, and for conduct prejudicial to 
> IN RE CLONTZ 
> Order of the Court 
> -19- 
> the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute in violation 
> of N.C.G.S. § 7A-376. 
> By order of the Court in Conference, this the 15th day of December, 2020. 
> s/Davis, J. For the Court 
> WITNESS my hand and the seal of the Supreme Court of North Carolina, this 
> the 15th day of December, 2020. 
> AMY L. FUNDERBURK 
> Clerk of the Supreme Court 
> s/M.C. Hackney 
> Assistant Clerk
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The crazy little one-eyed bastard Clontz malevolently found a man in contempt and ordered him to appear and show cause why he should not be jailed for 6 months and fined $5,000 for refusal to abide by a restraining order.   If Clontz had not been such a stupid, slovenly, lazy sonofabitch he would have known that the man could not be found in contempt of a court order he could not possibly have violated at the time Clontz signed the contempt and show-cause order.  Matter of fact at the time the defendant/respondent was being served with the original restraining order, also signed by the slut Clontz, the restraining order plaintiff -- by now shown to have been an infamous serial perjurer -- was already heading to the courthouse to have her targeted victim ordered to appear and show cause why he should not be punished for contempt.  Another filthy slut, Julie Kepple, quietly dismissed the order to show cause.   Even that stupid, malignant bitch knew conspicuous tyranny when she saw it.    Although she was herself capable of tyranny and practiced it frequently, she knew that particular tyranny of slut Eddie Clontz was a bit too outrageous ON ITS FACE to countenance.