[openssl/openssl] 4f8d2b: Reject oversized inputs in ASN1_mbstring_ncopy()

  Branch: refs/heads/openssl-3.4
  Home:   https://github.com/openssl/openssl
  Commit: 4f8d2bddaa2c8e06f9c33390ee1717059a6e4be6
      https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/4f8d2bddaa2c8e06f9c33390ee1717059a6e4be6
  Author: Viktor Dukhovni <[email protected]>
  Date:   2026-06-08 (Mon, 08 Jun 2026)

  Changed paths:
    M crypto/asn1/a_mbstr.c

  Log Message:
  -----------
  Reject oversized inputs in ASN1_mbstring_ncopy()

In ASN1_mbstring_ncopy() the destination size for BMPSTRING and
UNIVERSALSTRING output was computed by a signed left shift on an
int:

    outlen = nchar << 1;        /* MBSTRING_BMP  */
    outlen = nchar << 2;        /* MBSTRING_UNIV */

For nchar large enough the result is not representable in int.  In
the worst case (nchar == 0x40000000) nchar << 2 wraps to zero,
OPENSSL_malloc(1) is called, and traverse_string() then writes
4*nchar bytes into the one-byte allocation: a heap buffer
overflow.  The MBSTRING_UTF8 path computes outlen by summing
per-character byte counts in out_utf8(), and that sum can overflow
the same int under similarly large inputs.

Neither path is reachable from code that processes X.509
certificates through the DIRSTRING_TYPE mask used by
ASN1_STRING_set_by_NID(): UNIVERSALSTRING is absent from that
mask, and the UTF-8 sum requires inputs on the order of half a
gigabyte.  Reaching them needs an application that calls
ASN1_mbstring_copy()/ASN1_mbstring_ncopy() directly, or registers
a custom NID via ASN1_STRING_TABLE_add(), with an oversized
attacker-controlled input.

Add range checks before each shift and in out_utf8(), raising
ASN1_R_STRING_TOO_LONG at the point of detection.  Move the
existing ASN1_R_INVALID_UTF8STRING raise into out_utf8() too so
the two failure modes report distinct codes; the MBSTRING_UTF8
caller is left with cleanup only and now frees dest on error,
matching the BMP/UNIV branches.

Fixes CVE-2026-7383

Reviewed-by: Nikola Pajkovsky <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Norbert Pocs <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kubec <[email protected]>
MergeDate: Mon Jun  8 13:59:47 2026
(cherry picked from commit d32350ae8ef7426718f5aa9e383d4b51398ee255)


  Commit: 05b066366842f930fadd9a6e94df98030af431bb
      https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/05b066366842f930fadd9a6e94df98030af431bb
  Author: Nikola Pajkovsky <[email protected]>
  Date:   2026-06-08 (Mon, 08 Jun 2026)

  Changed paths:
    M crypto/cms/cms_pwri.c

  Log Message:
  -----------
  cms: kek_unwrap_key: Fix out-of-bounds read in check-byte validation

the check-byte test in kek_unwrap_key() reads tmp[1] through tmp[6]
unconditionally, so the decrypted buffer must hold at least seven
octets. The pre-decryption size check enforces inlen >= 2 * blocklen,
which yields the required seven octets only when blocklen >= 4. For
a KEK cipher with a smaller block size, inlen can be as small as
2 * blocklen and the check-byte read overruns the inlen-sized tmp
allocation.

Reject blocklen < 4 in the early sanity check. All block ciphers
appropriate for CMS PasswordRecipientInfo key wrapping have a block
size of at least 8 octets (DES/3DES = 8, AES = 16), so this only
forbids ciphers that would not be valid KEK choices anyway, and the
existing inlen >= 2 * blocklen check then guarantees the seven-octet
lower bound the check-byte test relies on.

Fixes CVE-2026-9076
Signed-off-by: Nikola Pajkovsky <[email protected]>

Reviewed-by: Daniel Kubec <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <[email protected]>
MergeDate: Mon Jun  8 14:10:14 2026
(cherry picked from commit 715349a1d7c6db970e6815dafb90915f07307f98)


  Commit: f436b3b5403c22fbed4fbe5caf5fd5c3bd79f7f6
      https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/f436b3b5403c22fbed4fbe5caf5fd5c3bd79f7f6
  Author: Nikola Pajkovsky <[email protected]>
  Date:   2026-06-08 (Mon, 08 Jun 2026)

  Changed paths:
    M test/cmsapitest.c
    M test/recipes/80-test_cmsapi.t
    A test/recipes/80-test_cmsapi_data/cms_pwri_kek_oob.der

  Log Message:
  -----------
  cms: kek_unwrap_key: test for fix out-of-bounds read in check-byte validation

added EnvelopedData blob with a PasswordRecipientInfo using
id-alg-PWRI-KEK and an AES-128-CFB key encryption cipher. CFB's 1-byte
effective block size let the inlen >= 2 * blocklen guard in
kek_unwrap_key() accept a wrapped key shorter than the seven octets
the check-byte test reads from tmp[1..6]; the encryptedKey OCTET
STRING here is only two bytes.

Signed-off-by: Nikola Pajkovsky <[email protected]>

Reviewed-by: Daniel Kubec <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <[email protected]>
MergeDate: Mon Jun  8 14:10:15 2026
(cherry picked from commit d7f6d25944e2498d0a054bc1d4fff945cfa85890)


  Commit: 1c6908e4fa5fa568752221d8eaf561a809751e5d
      https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/1c6908e4fa5fa568752221d8eaf561a809751e5d
  Author: Viktor Dukhovni <[email protected]>
  Date:   2026-06-08 (Mon, 08 Jun 2026)

  Changed paths:
    M crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c

  Log Message:
  -----------
  Avoid length truncation in ASN1_STRING_set

The ASN1_STRING_set() function takes an `int` length, make sure the
argument is not inadvertently truncated when it is called from
asn1_ex_c2i().

Fixes CVE-2026-34180

Reviewed-by: Nikola Pajkovsky <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Norbert Pocs <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <[email protected]>
MergeDate: Mon Jun  8 14:13:56 2026
(cherry picked from commit 5f525cace61a53311ee533374919356c700847d9)


  Commit: 79eb76a937e474bb7610a0a3dc57131dc8dc6610
      https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/79eb76a937e474bb7610a0a3dc57131dc8dc6610
  Author: Alicja Kario <[email protected]>
  Date:   2026-06-08 (Mon, 08 Jun 2026)

  Changed paths:
    M crypto/pkcs12/p12_mutl.c
    M test/recipes/80-test_pkcs12.t
    A test/recipes/80-test_pkcs12_data/pbmac1_256_256.bad-key-len.p12
    A test/recipes/80-test_pkcs12_data/pbmac1_256_256.good-shorter-key-len.p12

  Log Message:
  -----------
  pkcs12: verify that the pbmac1 key length is safe

Short mac keys (as short as 1 byte) can be used to probe the
system under attack to accept a PKCS#12 file created by an attacker
even if the attacker doesn't know the password used for MAC protection.

Fixes CVE-2026-34181

(also update the reference to the PBMAC1 PKCS#12 RFC)

Signed-off-by: Alicja Kario <[email protected]>

Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Norbert Pocs <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <[email protected]>
MergeDate: Mon Jun  8 14:20:38 2026
(cherry picked from commit ec36f2417c4ddd8cabce4b4a60a3d7a7365f2d81)


  Commit: 316dfe19e674ae3e647f54b081102411916d898a
      https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/316dfe19e674ae3e647f54b081102411916d898a
  Author: Jakub Zelenka <[email protected]>
  Date:   2026-06-08 (Mon, 08 Jun 2026)

  Changed paths:
    M crypto/cms/cms_enc.c
    M crypto/cms/cms_env.c
    M crypto/cms/cms_err.c
    M crypto/cms/cms_local.h
    M crypto/err/openssl.txt
    M include/crypto/cmserr.h
    M include/openssl/cmserr.h
    A test/cms-msg/enveloped-content-type-for-aes-gcm.pem
    M test/cmsapitest.c
    M test/recipes/80-test_cms.t

  Log Message:
  -----------
  CMS: Produce error when AEAD algorithms are used in enveloped data

Fixes GH-21414

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <[email protected]>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/27772)


  Commit: d2ca86bcd43e4f17d899f347101766b6107676e0
      https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/d2ca86bcd43e4f17d899f347101766b6107676e0
  Author: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
  Date:   2026-06-08 (Mon, 08 Jun 2026)

  Changed paths:
    M crypto/cms/cms_enc.c
    M crypto/cms/cms_local.h

  Log Message:
  -----------
  Reject potentially forged encrypted CMS AuthEnvelopedData messages

1. Adjust ossl_cms_EncryptedContent_init_bio to not accept non-AEAD
ciphers.

If a forged CMS message with AuthEnvelopedData is received with
a non-AEAD cipher specified, we silently accept that and decrypt
the message, skipping any authentication, which violates RFC 5083.

We also add checks to ensure we fail if we try to encrypt
AuthEnvelopedData without using an AEAD cipher.

2. Ensure that tag lengths on cms AEAD data is the recommended size.

RFC 5084 recommends that mac tags be at least 12 bytes for AES-GCM
and 4 bytes for AES-CCM on AuthEnvelopedData. As this code is not
algorith-specific we add a check for a minimal size and just use the
lower limit which is sufficient to prevent this attack.

Without this check, its possible to set the tag length to 1 and within
256 guesses, forge a CMS message.

Fixes CVE-2026-34182

Reviewed-by: Nikola Pajkovsky <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <[email protected]>
MergeDate: Mon Jun  8 14:29:56 2026


  Commit: 887c5cce1dafcb1a25e8f2ba7bdd51d3994d8490
      https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/887c5cce1dafcb1a25e8f2ba7bdd51d3994d8490
  Author: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
  Date:   2026-06-08 (Mon, 08 Jun 2026)

  Changed paths:
    M test/cmsapitest.c

  Log Message:
  -----------
  Add tests for CVE-2026-34182

Test to ensure that for a given CMS message:

1) We do not allow the creation of a CMS message containing
   AuthEnvelopedData with a non-AEAD cipher.
2) We do not accept a message containing AuthEnvelopedData with a
   non-AEAD cipher specified in the AlgorithmIdentifier.
3) We do not allow tag lengths less that 4 bytes.

Reviewed-by: Nikola Pajkovsky <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <[email protected]>
MergeDate: Mon Jun  8 14:29:58 2026


  Commit: d2e9efbe4900a373227deb136e8665401404ffac
      https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/d2e9efbe4900a373227deb136e8665401404ffac
  Author: Alexandr Nedvedicky <[email protected]>
  Date:   2026-06-08 (Mon, 08 Jun 2026)

  Changed paths:
    M include/internal/quic_cfq.h
    M include/internal/quic_channel.h
    M include/internal/quic_fifd.h
    M ssl/quic/quic_cfq.c
    M ssl/quic/quic_channel.c
    M ssl/quic/quic_channel_local.h
    M ssl/quic/quic_fifd.c
    M ssl/quic/quic_rx_depack.c
    M ssl/quic/quic_txp.c

  Log Message:
  -----------
  QUIC stack must limit the number of PATH_CHALLENGE frames processed in RX

Currently local QUIC stack allocates PATH_RESPONSE frame for every
PATH_CHALLENGE frame it receives in single packet from its remote peer.
The memory with PATH_RESPONSE frame is released after local QUIC stack
receives an ACK which confirms reception of PATH_RESPONSE by remote peer.
This gives remote peer too much control over memory resources local
QUIC stack may consume.

Quoting RFC 9000 section 9.2.1:
	...an endpoint SHOULD NOT send multiple
	PATH_CHALLENGE frames in a single packet.

Limiting the number of PATCH_CHALLENGE frames to 1 per QUIC packet received
helps to reduce heap memory overhead required to process PATH_CHALLENGE
frame.

Currently QUIC ACKM (ACK-manager) keeps all frames in retransmission
buffer until ACK is received. It can be changed such frames which
don't need to be ACKed don't need to be kept in retrans buffer,
those can be released right after transmission.

Fixes CVE-2026-34183

Reviewed-by: Nikola Pajkovsky <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <[email protected]>
MergeDate: Mon Jun  8 14:43:13 2026


  Commit: ab52d88cb5374876d59aee3c91f9e4ccce2b7ce4
      https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/ab52d88cb5374876d59aee3c91f9e4ccce2b7ce4
  Author: Igor Ustinov <[email protected]>
  Date:   2026-06-08 (Mon, 08 Jun 2026)

  Changed paths:
    M crypto/cms/cms_pwri.c

  Log Message:
  -----------
  Fix potential NULL dereference processing CMS PasswordRecipientInfo

Avoid NULL dereferencing when keyDerivationAlgorithm is absent
in CMS PasswordRecipientInfo.

Fixes CVE-2026-42766

Reviewed-by: Eugene Syromiatnikov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <[email protected]>
MergeDate: Mon Jun  8 18:57:52 2026
(cherry picked from commit f019b72c589071a73acda9812775389a857884c9)


  Commit: cf55a4d8e53eac085dadf0e22abe327b6c100091
      https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/cf55a4d8e53eac085dadf0e22abe327b6c100091
  Author: Igor Ustinov <[email protected]>
  Date:   2026-06-08 (Mon, 08 Jun 2026)

  Changed paths:
    A test/cms-msg/make_missing_kdf_der.py
    A test/cms-msg/missing-kdf.der
    M test/recipes/80-test_cms.t

  Log Message:
  -----------
  Test for CVE-2026-42766

The script make_missing_kdf_der.py was developed by Mayank Jangid
and Kushal Khemka.

Co-Authored-by: Mayank Jangid <[email protected]>
Co-Authored-by: Kushal Khemka <[email protected]>

Reviewed-by: Eugene Syromiatnikov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <[email protected]>
MergeDate: Mon Jun  8 18:57:53 2026
(cherry picked from commit 7020987c162fe81e12e10101dd32f57bdfc7ff5e)


  Commit: dd68364107a58841c0a2546812518b65d3a23abd
      https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/dd68364107a58841c0a2546812518b65d3a23abd
  Author: Dmitry Belyavskiy <[email protected]>
  Date:   2026-06-08 (Mon, 08 Jun 2026)

  Changed paths:
    M crypto/cms/cms_env.c
    M crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c
    M doc/man3/CMS_decrypt.pod
    M doc/man3/PKCS7_decrypt.pod

  Log Message:
  -----------
  Enforce implicit rejection for CMS/PKCS#7 decryption

Drop the disablement of the implicit rejection for RSA PKCS#1 v1.5
decryption.

Fixes CVE-2026-42768

Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Milan Broz <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alicja Kario <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <[email protected]>
MergeDate: Mon Jun  8 19:49:19 2026
(cherry picked from commit 33def545a0c173aec43891f24c3df4f7d2e4fd87)


  Commit: 777b363b16fcf2153bb3ded39dc3838713667c44
      https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/777b363b16fcf2153bb3ded39dc3838713667c44
  Author: Bob Beck <[email protected]>
  Date:   2026-06-08 (Mon, 08 Jun 2026)

  Changed paths:
    M crypto/cmp/cmp_genm.c

  Log Message:
  -----------
  Use the correct issuer when validating rootCAKeyUpdate

This correctly uses the existing root, and not the same certificate
as the root of the chain to validate.

While we are here, we also turn on self signed certificate signature
checking as this case is actually bringing in trust anchors as
self signed certs, and fix a possible NULL deref.

Fixes CVE-2026-42769

Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <[email protected]>
MergeDate: Mon Jun  8 19:54:01 2026
(cherry picked from commit 8b6c5dacb6ade54f30778cf344600d4a9df1f032)


  Commit: 5f452bba2c681423d8fcffd120a19b757ee42e3c
      https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/5f452bba2c681423d8fcffd120a19b757ee42e3c
  Author: Norbert Pocs <[email protected]>
  Date:   2026-06-08 (Mon, 08 Jun 2026)

  Changed paths:
    M providers/implementations/exchange/dh_exch.c

  Log Message:
  -----------
  Match the local q DHX parameter against the peer's q

As FFC/DH peer public key validation uses the peer's q value instead
of checking against the local q, we must also check that these
q values match when setting the peer's public key.

Fixes CVE-2026-42770

Signed-off-by: Norbert Pocs <[email protected]>

Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <[email protected]>
MergeDate: Mon Jun  8 19:56:27 2026
(cherry picked from commit 29b9df160cc5f20ee3907cce0cb271b982846bce)


  Commit: 7ac4715234ee72d9f3c93426a2c08554b5b771af
      https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/7ac4715234ee72d9f3c93426a2c08554b5b771af
  Author: Viktor Dukhovni <[email protected]>
  Date:   2026-06-08 (Mon, 08 Jun 2026)

  Changed paths:
    M providers/implementations/ciphers/cipher_aes_ocb.c
    M test/evp_extra_test.c

  Log Message:
  -----------
  Apply the buffered IV on the AES-OCB EVP_Cipher() path

aes_ocb_cipher(), the OCB provider's OSSL_FUNC_CIPHER_CIPHER slot,
processed input without flushing the buffered IV into the OCB
context.  Effective nonce was 0 regardless of the caller's IV;
EVP_*Final_ex() then emitted a tag depending only on (key, iv).
This gave (key, nonce) reuse and single-query universal forgery on
the EVP_Cipher() path.

Apply update_iv() at the head of aes_ocb_cipher() to mirror the
streaming handler.  The matching GCM one-shot does this already.

Add a cross-driver round-trip test for AES-{GCM,CCM,OCB} and
ChaCha20-Poly1305 in test/evp_extra_test.c.  Each cipher is
exercised with and without AAD; the no-AAD case is needed because
any prior EVP_CipherUpdate(NULL, aad, ...) routes through the
streaming handler and applies the IV itself, masking the bug.

Fixes CVE-2026-45445

Reviewed-by: Eugene Syromiatnikov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <[email protected]>
MergeDate: Mon Jun  8 20:02:00 2026
(cherry picked from commit 50c95c5d1e83f4f46a555dfa7fd9c632d3eba9dc)


  Commit: ec8bdc7523f90604363c640bbd51c3135aee32f3
      https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/ec8bdc7523f90604363c640bbd51c3135aee32f3
  Author: Billy Brumley <[email protected]>
  Date:   2026-06-08 (Mon, 08 Jun 2026)

  Changed paths:
    M providers/implementations/ciphers/cipher_aes_gcm_siv.c
    M providers/implementations/ciphers/cipher_aes_gcm_siv_hw.c
    M test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evpciph_aes_gcm_siv.txt

  Log Message:
  -----------
  [providers/implementations/ciphers] make aes-gcm-siv work with zero-length messages

test cases lifted from RFC 8452

fixes #26431

Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Eugene Syromiatnikov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <[email protected]>
MergeDate: Mon Jun  8 20:19:01 2026


  Commit: daca0f48e4a69a2892a62262bad59e62a8a76598
      https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/daca0f48e4a69a2892a62262bad59e62a8a76598
  Author: Dmitry Belyavskiy <[email protected]>
  Date:   2026-06-08 (Mon, 08 Jun 2026)

  Changed paths:
    M providers/implementations/ciphers/cipher_aes_gcm_siv_hw.c
    M providers/implementations/ciphers/cipher_aes_siv.c
    M test/evp_extra_test.c

  Log Message:
  -----------
  Fix handling of empty-ciphertext messages in AES-GCM-SIV and AES-SIV

AES-GCM-SIV: EVP_DecryptFinal_ex Accepts All-Zero Tag for Empty-Ciphertext
Messages.

AES-SIV: EVP_DecryptUpdate_ex Accepts All-Zero Tag for Empty-Ciphertext
Messages on context reuse.

Fixes CVE-2026-45446

Reviewed-by: Eugene Syromiatnikov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <[email protected]>
MergeDate: Mon Jun  8 20:19:02 2026


  Commit: a541ae8bfe849a30cc885e8780715c0f488e496c
      https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/a541ae8bfe849a30cc885e8780715c0f488e496c
  Author: Igor Ustinov <[email protected]>
  Date:   2026-06-08 (Mon, 08 Jun 2026)

  Changed paths:
    M crypto/pkcs7/pk7_smime.c

  Log Message:
  -----------
  Fix possible use-after-free in OpenSSL PKCS7_verify()

Fixes CVE-2026-45447

Reviewed-by: Eugene Syromiatnikov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <[email protected]>
MergeDate: Mon Jun  8 20:22:50 2026
(cherry picked from commit b4fbcf9fd25f781b17b763e3ec84d6b6dc096f6e)


  Commit: dbb20d9ee8fc44033510fe946a9c7eb4ab910afb
      https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/dbb20d9ee8fc44033510fe946a9c7eb4ab910afb
  Author: Igor Ustinov <[email protected]>
  Date:   2026-06-08 (Mon, 08 Jun 2026)

  Changed paths:
    M test/recipes/80-test_cms.t
    A test/smime-eml/pkcs7-empty-digest-set.eml

  Log Message:
  -----------
  Test for CVE-2026-45447 (UAF in PKCS7_verify)

The test data were created with a tool developed by
Thai Duong <[email protected]>.

Reviewed-by: Eugene Syromiatnikov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <[email protected]>
MergeDate: Mon Jun  8 20:22:52 2026
(cherry picked from commit a60763a01490bd747ab716342b87d55bd0a27a39)


  Commit: 665d5254083affde9982efca7c41dd01cacc8774
      https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/665d5254083affde9982efca7c41dd01cacc8774
  Author: Igor Ustinov <[email protected]>
  Date:   2026-06-08 (Mon, 08 Jun 2026)

  Changed paths:
    M crypto/crmf/crmf_lib.c

  Log Message:
  -----------
  Fix potential NULL dereference in OSSL_CRMF_ENCRYPTEDVALUE_get1_encCert()

Check that 'parameter' != NULL before dereferencing in
OSSL_CRMF_ENCRYPTEDVALUE_get1_encCert().

Fixes CVE-2026-42767

Co-authored-by: Tomas Mraz <[email protected]>

Reviewed-by: Eugene Syromiatnikov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Milan Broz <[email protected]>
MergeDate: Mon Jun  8 20:40:47 2026


  Commit: 6f9b9cf532f072f13a672addf3145090e64db7d1
      https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/6f9b9cf532f072f13a672addf3145090e64db7d1
  Author: Eugene Syromiatnikov <[email protected]>
  Date:   2026-06-09 (Tue, 09 Jun 2026)

  Changed paths:
    M CHANGES.md
    M NEWS.md

  Log Message:
  -----------
  CHANGES.md, NEWS.md: update for 3.4.6

3.4.6 CHANGES.md includes the following:
 * CVE-2026-7383, CVE-2026-9076, CVE-2026-34180, CVE-2026-34181,
   CVE-2026-34182, CVE-2026-34183, CVE-2026-42766, CVE-2026-42768,
   CVE-2026-42769, CVE-2026-42770, CVE-2026-45445, CVE-2026-45446,
   CVE-2026-45447
 * https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/30626
   "TLSv1.3: Fix server not sending NewSessionTicket after ciphersuite mismatch"
 * https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/31058
   "Validate that a PSK identity is at least one byte long"
 * https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/31146
   "ktls: Fix invalid memory access on retry with moving write buffer"

3.4.6 NEWS.md includes the following:
 * CVE-2026-7383, CVE-2026-9076, CVE-2026-34180, CVE-2026-34181,
   CVE-2026-34182, CVE-2026-34183, CVE-2026-42766, CVE-2026-42768,
   CVE-2026-42769, CVE-2026-42770, CVE-2026-45445, CVE-2026-45446,
   CVE-2026-45447

Signed-off-by: Eugene Syromiatnikov <[email protected]>

Reviewed-by: Norbert Pocs <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Milan Broz <[email protected]>
MergeDate: Tue Jun  9 11:21:56 2026


  Commit: 2a2998ffa81b91904818b4dc819541b284c4eb53
      https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/2a2998ffa81b91904818b4dc819541b284c4eb53
  Author: openssl-machine <[email protected]>
  Date:   2026-06-09 (Tue, 09 Jun 2026)

  Changed paths:
    M .github/workflows/oss-fuzz.yml
    M Configure
    M apps/list.c
    M apps/speed.c
    M apps/testdsa.h
    M apps/testrsa.h
    M crypto/aes/asm/aesfx-sparcv9.pl
    M crypto/asn1/a_d2i_fp.c
    M crypto/asn1/a_mbstr.c
    M crypto/asn1/asn1_lib.c
    M crypto/asn1/asn_mime.c
    M crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c
    M crypto/bio/bss_dgram_pair.c
    M crypto/bn/bn_const.c
    M crypto/bn/bn_mod.c
    M crypto/cast/cast_s.h
    M crypto/chacha/asm/chachap10-ppc.pl
    M crypto/cmp/cmp_genm.c
    M crypto/cms/cms_enc.c
    M crypto/cms/cms_env.c
    M crypto/cms/cms_pwri.c
    M crypto/crmf/crmf_lib.c
    M crypto/des/fcrypt.c
    M crypto/dso/dso_win32.c
    M crypto/ec/curve448/scalar.c
    M crypto/ec/curve448/word.h
    M crypto/ec/ec_curve.c
    M crypto/ec/ecp_s390x_nistp.c
    M crypto/ec/ecp_sm2p256.c
    M crypto/evp/asymcipher.c
    M crypto/evp/encode.c
    M crypto/evp/m_sigver.c
    M crypto/ffc/ffc_params.c
    M crypto/hpke/hpke_util.c
    M crypto/md2/md2_dgst.c
    M crypto/modes/wrap128.c
    M crypto/objects/obj_dat.c
    M crypto/objects/obj_lib.c
    M crypto/param_build_set.c
    M crypto/pkcs7/pk7_smime.c
    M crypto/rc2/rc2_skey.c
    M crypto/sm2/sm2_crypt.c
    M crypto/sm2/sm2_sign.c
    M crypto/threads_win.c
    M crypto/x509/v3_ist.c
    M demos/cipher/aeskeywrap.c
    M demos/cipher/ariacbc.c
    M demos/digest/EVP_MD_demo.c
    M demos/encrypt/rsa_encrypt.h
    M demos/mac/cmac-aes256.c
    M demos/mac/hmac-sha512.c
    M demos/signature/EVP_EC_Signature_demo.h
    M doc/man1/openssl-pkcs8.pod.in
    M doc/man1/openssl-rehash.pod.in
    M doc/man1/openssl-s_client.pod.in
    M doc/man1/openssl-s_server.pod.in
    M doc/man1/openssl-smime.pod.in
    M doc/man3/BIO_s_bio.pod
    M doc/man3/BN_add.pod
    M doc/man3/CMS_decrypt.pod
    M doc/man3/OSSL_HTTP_REQ_CTX.pod
    M doc/man3/OSSL_HTTP_parse_url.pod
    M doc/man3/OSSL_HTTP_transfer.pod
    M doc/man3/PKCS7_decrypt.pod
    M doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode.pod
    M doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context.pod
    M doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback.pod
    M doc/man3/d2i_X509.pod
    M doc/man7/EVP_CIPHER-AES.pod
    M doc/man7/provider-asym_cipher.pod
    M fuzz/dtlsserver.c
    M fuzz/server.c
    M include/internal/quic_cfq.h
    M include/internal/quic_channel.h
    M include/internal/quic_fifd.h
    M include/internal/quic_stream_map.h
    M include/internal/rcu.h
    M include/openssl/bn.h
    M include/openssl/ssl.h.in
    M providers/defltprov.c
    M providers/fips/self_test_data.inc
    M providers/implementations/ciphers/cipher_aes_gcm_hw_rv64i.inc
    M providers/implementations/ciphers/cipher_aes_gcm_siv.c
    M providers/implementations/ciphers/cipher_aes_gcm_siv_hw.c
    M providers/implementations/ciphers/cipher_aes_siv.c
    M providers/implementations/exchange/dh_exch.c
    M providers/implementations/include/prov/implementations.h
    M providers/implementations/keymgmt/ecx_kmgmt.c
    M providers/implementations/macs/poly1305_prov.c
    M ssl/quic/quic_ackm.c
    M ssl/quic/quic_cfq.c
    M ssl/quic/quic_channel.c
    M ssl/quic/quic_fifd.c
    M ssl/quic/quic_port.c
    M ssl/quic/quic_record_rx.c
    M ssl/quic/quic_record_tx.c
    M ssl/quic/quic_txp.c
    M ssl/record/methods/ktls_meth.c
    M ssl/ssl_ciph.c
    M ssl/ssl_rsa.c
    M ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c
    M ssl/statem/statem.c
    M ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c
    M ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c
    M ssl/t1_trce.c
    M test/bad_dtls_test.c
    M test/bio_tfo_test.c
    M test/chacha_internal_test.c
    M test/cipherlist_test.c
    M test/destest.c
    M test/dsatest.c
    M test/ectest.c
    M test/endecode_test.c
    M test/enginetest.c
    M test/evp_extra_test2.c
    M test/evp_kdf_test.c
    M test/evp_libctx_test.c
    M test/evp_pkey_provided_test.c
    M test/helpers/predefined_dhparams.c
    M test/hpke_test.c
    M test/ideatest.c
    M test/param_build_test.c
    M test/pbetest.c
    M test/pkcs12_format_test.c
    M test/quic_record_test.c
    M test/quic_txp_test.c
    M test/quic_wire_test.c
    M test/quicapitest.c
    M test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evpciph_aes_gcm_siv.txt
    M test/siphash_internal_test.c
    M test/stack_test.c
    M test/x509_test.c

  Log Message:
  -----------
  Copyright year updates


Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Saša Nedvědický <[email protected]>
MergeDate: Tue Jun  9 12:00:18 2026
Release: yes


  Commit: cb07bb118c3e1dc16db7989d3a64599dca9863bf
      https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/cb07bb118c3e1dc16db7989d3a64599dca9863bf
  Author: openssl-machine <[email protected]>
  Date:   2026-06-09 (Tue, 09 Jun 2026)

  Changed paths:
    M providers/fips-sources.checksums
    M providers/fips.checksum
    M providers/fips.module.sources

  Log Message:
  -----------
  make update


Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Saša Nedvědický <[email protected]>
MergeDate: Tue Jun  9 12:02:14 2026
Release: yes


  Commit: c5ea1cc227fd60afae8ac4b9438690bbe4888f79
      https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/c5ea1cc227fd60afae8ac4b9438690bbe4888f79
  Author: openssl-machine <[email protected]>
  Date:   2026-06-09 (Tue, 09 Jun 2026)

  Changed paths:
    M CHANGES.md
    M NEWS.md
    M VERSION.dat

  Log Message:
  -----------
  Prepare for release of 3.4.6


Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Saša Nedvědický <[email protected]>
MergeDate: Tue Jun  9 12:02:16 2026
Release: yes


  Commit: b86744fa8898c2ffa233d66b6d08d019da303c3b
      https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/b86744fa8898c2ffa233d66b6d08d019da303c3b
  Author: openssl-machine <[email protected]>
  Date:   2026-06-09 (Tue, 09 Jun 2026)

  Changed paths:
    M CHANGES.md
    M NEWS.md
    M VERSION.dat

  Log Message:
  -----------
  Prepare for 3.4.7


Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Saša Nedvědický <[email protected]>
MergeDate: Tue Jun  9 12:02:23 2026
Release: yes


Compare: https://github.com/openssl/openssl/compare/019befe4bbcb...b86744fa8898

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