[openssl/openssl] bd1751: Reject oversized inputs in ASN1_mbstring_ncopy()

  Branch: refs/heads/openssl-3.0
  Home:   https://github.com/openssl/openssl
  Commit: bd17511070fb39a67bfa19682affb765e706a974
      https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/bd17511070fb39a67bfa19682affb765e706a974
  Author: Viktor Dukhovni <[email protected]>
  Date:   2026-06-08 (Mon, 08 Jun 2026)

  Changed paths:
    M crypto/asn1/a_mbstr.c

  Log Message:
  -----------
  Reject oversized inputs in ASN1_mbstring_ncopy()

In ASN1_mbstring_ncopy() the destination size for BMPSTRING and
UNIVERSALSTRING output was computed by a signed left shift on an
int:

    outlen = nchar << 1;        /* MBSTRING_BMP  */
    outlen = nchar << 2;        /* MBSTRING_UNIV */

For nchar large enough the result is not representable in int.  In
the worst case (nchar == 0x40000000) nchar << 2 wraps to zero,
OPENSSL_malloc(1) is called, and traverse_string() then writes
4*nchar bytes into the one-byte allocation: a heap buffer
overflow.  The MBSTRING_UTF8 path computes outlen by summing
per-character byte counts in out_utf8(), and that sum can overflow
the same int under similarly large inputs.

Neither path is reachable from code that processes X.509
certificates through the DIRSTRING_TYPE mask used by
ASN1_STRING_set_by_NID(): UNIVERSALSTRING is absent from that
mask, and the UTF-8 sum requires inputs on the order of half a
gigabyte.  Reaching them needs an application that calls
ASN1_mbstring_copy()/ASN1_mbstring_ncopy() directly, or registers
a custom NID via ASN1_STRING_TABLE_add(), with an oversized
attacker-controlled input.

Add range checks before each shift and in out_utf8(), raising
ASN1_R_STRING_TOO_LONG at the point of detection.  Move the
existing ASN1_R_INVALID_UTF8STRING raise into out_utf8() too so
the two failure modes report distinct codes; the MBSTRING_UTF8
caller is left with cleanup only and now frees dest on error,
matching the BMP/UNIV branches.

Fixes CVE-2026-7383

Reviewed-by: Nikola Pajkovsky <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Norbert Pocs <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kubec <[email protected]>
MergeDate: Mon Jun  8 13:59:47 2026
(cherry picked from commit d32350ae8ef7426718f5aa9e383d4b51398ee255)


  Commit: eecbe330977e8d023aae1ca2d9bdbe983ef3fdc6
      https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/eecbe330977e8d023aae1ca2d9bdbe983ef3fdc6
  Author: Nikola Pajkovsky <[email protected]>
  Date:   2026-06-08 (Mon, 08 Jun 2026)

  Changed paths:
    M crypto/cms/cms_pwri.c

  Log Message:
  -----------
  cms: kek_unwrap_key: Fix out-of-bounds read in check-byte validation

the check-byte test in kek_unwrap_key() reads tmp[1] through tmp[6]
unconditionally, so the decrypted buffer must hold at least seven
octets. The pre-decryption size check enforces inlen >= 2 * blocklen,
which yields the required seven octets only when blocklen >= 4. For
a KEK cipher with a smaller block size, inlen can be as small as
2 * blocklen and the check-byte read overruns the inlen-sized tmp
allocation.

Reject blocklen < 4 in the early sanity check. All block ciphers
appropriate for CMS PasswordRecipientInfo key wrapping have a block
size of at least 8 octets (DES/3DES = 8, AES = 16), so this only
forbids ciphers that would not be valid KEK choices anyway, and the
existing inlen >= 2 * blocklen check then guarantees the seven-octet
lower bound the check-byte test relies on.

Fixes CVE-2026-9076
Signed-off-by: Nikola Pajkovsky <[email protected]>

Reviewed-by: Daniel Kubec <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <[email protected]>
MergeDate: Mon Jun  8 14:11:44 2026


  Commit: 3939c291bc58f0c9ba2b475627715a3e2ca63375
      https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/3939c291bc58f0c9ba2b475627715a3e2ca63375
  Author: Nikola Pajkovsky <[email protected]>
  Date:   2026-06-08 (Mon, 08 Jun 2026)

  Changed paths:
    M test/cmsapitest.c
    M test/recipes/80-test_cmsapi.t
    A test/recipes/80-test_cmsapi_data/cms_pwri_kek_oob.der

  Log Message:
  -----------
  cms: kek_unwrap_key: test for fix out-of-bounds read in check-byte validation

added EnvelopedData blob with a PasswordRecipientInfo using
id-alg-PWRI-KEK and an AES-128-CFB key encryption cipher. CFB's 1-byte
effective block size let the inlen >= 2 * blocklen guard in
kek_unwrap_key() accept a wrapped key shorter than the seven octets
the check-byte test reads from tmp[1..6]; the encryptedKey OCTET
STRING here is only two bytes.

Signed-off-by: Nikola Pajkovsky <[email protected]>

Reviewed-by: Daniel Kubec <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <[email protected]>
MergeDate: Mon Jun  8 14:11:45 2026


  Commit: cbe418ae978539cf14a398a207dba834c0e93e83
      https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/cbe418ae978539cf14a398a207dba834c0e93e83
  Author: Viktor Dukhovni <[email protected]>
  Date:   2026-06-08 (Mon, 08 Jun 2026)

  Changed paths:
    M crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c

  Log Message:
  -----------
  Avoid length truncation in ASN1_STRING_set

The ASN1_STRING_set() function takes an `int` length, make sure the
argument is not inadvertently truncated when it is called from
asn1_ex_c2i().

Fixes CVE-2026-34180

Reviewed-by: Norbert Pocs <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <[email protected]>
MergeDate: Mon Jun  8 14:16:40 2026


  Commit: ee45b8d9d42925a0e487ac6566e5697d899754f2
      https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/ee45b8d9d42925a0e487ac6566e5697d899754f2
  Author: Jakub Zelenka <[email protected]>
  Date:   2026-06-08 (Mon, 08 Jun 2026)

  Changed paths:
    M crypto/cms/cms_enc.c
    M crypto/cms/cms_env.c
    M crypto/cms/cms_err.c
    M crypto/cms/cms_local.h
    M crypto/err/openssl.txt
    M include/crypto/cmserr.h
    M include/openssl/cmserr.h
    A test/cms-msg/enveloped-content-type-for-aes-gcm.pem
    M test/cmsapitest.c
    M test/recipes/80-test_cms.t

  Log Message:
  -----------
  CMS: Produce error when AEAD algorithms are used in enveloped data

Fixes GH-21414

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <[email protected]>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/27772)


  Commit: 03c1f4d45fb963aee7d5833390c507cd290182bc
      https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/03c1f4d45fb963aee7d5833390c507cd290182bc
  Author: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
  Date:   2026-06-08 (Mon, 08 Jun 2026)

  Changed paths:
    M crypto/cms/cms_enc.c

  Log Message:
  -----------
  Reject potentially forged encrypted CMS AuthEnvelopedData messages

1. Adjust ossl_cms_EncryptedContent_init_bio to not accept non-AEAD
ciphers.

If a forged CMS message with AuthEnvelopedData is received with
a non-AEAD cipher specified, we silently accept that and decrypt
the message, skipping any authentication, which violates RFC 5083.

We also add checks to ensure we fail if we try to encrypt
AuthEnvelopedData without using an AEAD cipher.

2. Ensure that tag lengths on cms AEAD data is the recommended size.

RFC 5084 recommends that mac tags be at least 12 bytes for AES-GCM
and 4 bytes for AES-CCM on AuthEnvelopedData. As this code is not
algorith-specific we add a check for a minimal size and just use the
lower limit which is sufficient to prevent this attack.

Without this check, its possible to set the tag length to 1 and within
256 guesses, forge a CMS message.

Fixes CVE-2026-34182

Reviewed-by: Nikola Pajkovsky <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <[email protected]>
MergeDate: Mon Jun  8 14:33:15 2026


  Commit: f48adad79a21fed9bfc31ea3ef65bee810e12ddd
      https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/f48adad79a21fed9bfc31ea3ef65bee810e12ddd
  Author: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
  Date:   2026-06-08 (Mon, 08 Jun 2026)

  Changed paths:
    M test/cmsapitest.c

  Log Message:
  -----------
  Add tests for CVE-2026-34182

Test to ensure that for a given CMS message:

1) We do not allow the creation of a CMS message containing
   AuthEnvelopedData with a non-AEAD cipher.
2) We do not accept a message containing AuthEnvelopedData with a
   non-AEAD cipher specified in the AlgorithmIdentifier.
3) We do not allow tag lengths less that 4 bytes.

Reviewed-by: Nikola Pajkovsky <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <[email protected]>
MergeDate: Mon Jun  8 14:33:17 2026


  Commit: 3ff64913615d648cfbb6a6f1cf5529ae7ea829d7
      https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/3ff64913615d648cfbb6a6f1cf5529ae7ea829d7
  Author: Igor Ustinov <[email protected]>
  Date:   2026-06-08 (Mon, 08 Jun 2026)

  Changed paths:
    M crypto/cms/cms_pwri.c

  Log Message:
  -----------
  Fix potential NULL dereference processing CMS PasswordRecipientInfo

Avoid NULL dereferencing when keyDerivationAlgorithm is absent
in CMS PasswordRecipientInfo.

Fixes CVE-2026-42766

Reviewed-by: Eugene Syromiatnikov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <[email protected]>
MergeDate: Mon Jun  8 18:57:52 2026
(cherry picked from commit f019b72c589071a73acda9812775389a857884c9)


  Commit: ba699b606969d20a108dda3cfe5422d4cc94eefb
      https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/ba699b606969d20a108dda3cfe5422d4cc94eefb
  Author: Igor Ustinov <[email protected]>
  Date:   2026-06-08 (Mon, 08 Jun 2026)

  Changed paths:
    A test/cms-msg/make_missing_kdf_der.py
    A test/cms-msg/missing-kdf.der
    M test/recipes/80-test_cms.t

  Log Message:
  -----------
  Test for CVE-2026-42766

The script make_missing_kdf_der.py was developed by Mayank Jangid
and Kushal Khemka.

Co-Authored-by: Mayank Jangid <[email protected]>
Co-Authored-by: Kushal Khemka <[email protected]>

Reviewed-by: Eugene Syromiatnikov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <[email protected]>
MergeDate: Mon Jun  8 18:57:53 2026
(cherry picked from commit 7020987c162fe81e12e10101dd32f57bdfc7ff5e)


  Commit: 7fbfde7677ed8808828bf00ff01c937ca04bdda2
      https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/7fbfde7677ed8808828bf00ff01c937ca04bdda2
  Author: Norbert Pocs <[email protected]>
  Date:   2026-06-08 (Mon, 08 Jun 2026)

  Changed paths:
    M providers/implementations/exchange/dh_exch.c

  Log Message:
  -----------
  Match the local q DHX parameter against the peer's q

As FFC/DH peer public key validation uses the peer's q value instead
of checking against the local q, we must also check that these
q values match when setting the peer's public key.

Fixes CVE-2026-42770

Signed-off-by: Norbert Pocs <[email protected]>

Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <[email protected]>
MergeDate: Mon Jun  8 19:56:27 2026
(cherry picked from commit 29b9df160cc5f20ee3907cce0cb271b982846bce)


  Commit: 323f0b6e7d530a4cb4336d50c88cb70f3ac2a451
      https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/323f0b6e7d530a4cb4336d50c88cb70f3ac2a451
  Author: Viktor Dukhovni <[email protected]>
  Date:   2026-06-08 (Mon, 08 Jun 2026)

  Changed paths:
    M providers/implementations/ciphers/cipher_aes_ocb.c
    M test/evp_extra_test.c

  Log Message:
  -----------
  Apply the buffered IV on the AES-OCB EVP_Cipher() path

aes_ocb_cipher(), the OCB provider's OSSL_FUNC_CIPHER_CIPHER slot,
processed input without flushing the buffered IV into the OCB
context.  Effective nonce was 0 regardless of the caller's IV;
EVP_*Final_ex() then emitted a tag depending only on (key, iv).
This gave (key, nonce) reuse and single-query universal forgery on
the EVP_Cipher() path.

Apply update_iv() at the head of aes_ocb_cipher() to mirror the
streaming handler.  The matching GCM one-shot does this already.

Add a cross-driver round-trip test for AES-{GCM,CCM,OCB} and
ChaCha20-Poly1305 in test/evp_extra_test.c.  Each cipher is
exercised with and without AAD; the no-AAD case is needed because
any prior EVP_CipherUpdate(NULL, aad, ...) routes through the
streaming handler and applies the IV itself, masking the bug.

Fixes CVE-2026-45445

Reviewed-by: Eugene Syromiatnikov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <[email protected]>
MergeDate: Mon Jun  8 20:02:00 2026
(cherry picked from commit 50c95c5d1e83f4f46a555dfa7fd9c632d3eba9dc)


  Commit: 71e2a5d263518cf5866043bd60ee4994d59e53a3
      https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/71e2a5d263518cf5866043bd60ee4994d59e53a3
  Author: Dmitry Belyavskiy <[email protected]>
  Date:   2026-06-09 (Tue, 09 Jun 2026)

  Changed paths:
    M providers/implementations/ciphers/cipher_aes_siv.c
    M test/evp_extra_test.c

  Log Message:
  -----------
  Fix handling of empty-ciphertext messages in AES-SIV

AES-SIV: EVP_DecryptUpdate_ex Accepts All-Zero Tag for Empty-Ciphertext
Messages on context reuse.

Fixes CVE-2026-45446

Reviewed-by: Eugene Syromiatnikov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <[email protected]>
MergeDate: Mon Jun  8 20:19:02 2026


  Commit: 9dfd688ad2290fc5075cacbc9bf0c9a93eefed54
      https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/9dfd688ad2290fc5075cacbc9bf0c9a93eefed54
  Author: Igor Ustinov <[email protected]>
  Date:   2026-06-09 (Tue, 09 Jun 2026)

  Changed paths:
    M crypto/pkcs7/pk7_smime.c

  Log Message:
  -----------
  Fix possible use-after-free in OpenSSL PKCS7_verify()

Fixes CVE-2026-45447

Reviewed-by: Eugene Syromiatnikov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Norbert Pocs <[email protected]>
MergeDate: Mon Jun  8 20:32:32 2026


  Commit: 18de9aba8294b5fb0915866cf3a1bb45f9599b8d
      https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/18de9aba8294b5fb0915866cf3a1bb45f9599b8d
  Author: Igor Ustinov <[email protected]>
  Date:   2026-06-09 (Tue, 09 Jun 2026)

  Changed paths:
    M test/recipes/80-test_cms.t
    A test/smime-eml/pkcs7-empty-digest-set.eml

  Log Message:
  -----------
  Test for CVE-2026-45447 (UAF in PKCS7_verify)

The test data were created with a tool developed by
Thai Duong <[email protected]>.

Reviewed-by: Eugene Syromiatnikov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Norbert Pocs <[email protected]>
MergeDate: Mon Jun  8 20:32:33 2026


  Commit: 61a86a8cd73546c9fea916f3d304c1293e05c046
      https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/61a86a8cd73546c9fea916f3d304c1293e05c046
  Author: Igor Ustinov <[email protected]>
  Date:   2026-06-09 (Tue, 09 Jun 2026)

  Changed paths:
    M crypto/crmf/crmf_lib.c

  Log Message:
  -----------
  Fix potential NULL dereference in OSSL_CRMF_ENCRYPTEDVALUE_get1_encCert()

Check that 'parameter' != NULL before dereferencing in
OSSL_CRMF_ENCRYPTEDVALUE_get1_encCert().

Fixes CVE-2026-42767

Co-authored-by: Tomas Mraz <[email protected]>

Reviewed-by: Eugene Syromiatnikov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Milan Broz <[email protected]>
MergeDate: Mon Jun  8 20:40:47 2026
(cherry picked from commit 665d5254083affde9982efca7c41dd01cacc8774)


  Commit: c1f5be299cc678fe0d110f823f6afbaf323b8e76
      https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/c1f5be299cc678fe0d110f823f6afbaf323b8e76
  Author: Eugene Syromiatnikov <[email protected]>
  Date:   2026-06-09 (Tue, 09 Jun 2026)

  Changed paths:
    M CHANGES.md
    M NEWS.md

  Log Message:
  -----------
  CHANGES.md, NEWS.md: update for 3.0.21

3.0.21 CHANGES.md includes the following:
 * CVE-2026-7383, CVE-2026-9076, CVE-2026-34180, CVE-2026-34182,
   CVE-2026-42766, CVE-2026-42770, CVE-2026-45445, CVE-2026-45446,
   CVE-2026-45447
 * https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/30626
   "TLSv1.3: Fix server not sending NewSessionTicket after ciphersuite mismatch"
 * https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/31058
   "Validate that a PSK identity is at least one byte long"

3.0.21 NEWS.md includes the following:
 * CVE-2026-7383, CVE-2026-9076, CVE-2026-34180, CVE-2026-34182,
   CVE-2026-42766, CVE-2026-42770, CVE-2026-45445, CVE-2026-45446,
   CVE-2026-45447

Signed-off-by: Eugene Syromiatnikov <[email protected]>

Reviewed-by: Norbert Pocs <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Milan Broz <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <[email protected]>
MergeDate: Tue Jun  9 11:23:33 2026


  Commit: 2aa6495421f162135727bcc09183c151a557a7d3
      https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/2aa6495421f162135727bcc09183c151a557a7d3
  Author: openssl-machine <[email protected]>
  Date:   2026-06-09 (Tue, 09 Jun 2026)

  Changed paths:
    M .github/workflows/oss-fuzz.yml
    M apps/list.c
    M apps/testdsa.h
    M apps/testrsa.h
    M crypto/aes/asm/aesfx-sparcv9.pl
    M crypto/asn1/a_d2i_fp.c
    M crypto/asn1/a_mbstr.c
    M crypto/asn1/asn1_lib.c
    M crypto/asn1/asn_mime.c
    M crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c
    M crypto/bn/bn_const.c
    M crypto/bn/bn_mod.c
    M crypto/cast/cast_s.h
    M crypto/cms/cms_enc.c
    M crypto/cms/cms_env.c
    M crypto/cms/cms_pwri.c
    M crypto/crmf/crmf_lib.c
    M crypto/des/fcrypt.c
    M crypto/ec/curve448/scalar.c
    M crypto/ec/curve448/word.h
    M crypto/ec/ec_curve.c
    M crypto/ec/ecp_s390x_nistp.c
    M crypto/evp/encode.c
    M crypto/ffc/ffc_params.c
    M crypto/md2/md2_dgst.c
    M crypto/modes/wrap128.c
    M crypto/objects/obj_dat.c
    M crypto/param_build_set.c
    M crypto/pkcs7/pk7_smime.c
    M crypto/rc2/rc2_skey.c
    M crypto/sm2/sm2_crypt.c
    M crypto/sm2/sm2_sign.c
    M demos/cipher/aeskeywrap.c
    M demos/cipher/ariacbc.c
    M demos/digest/EVP_MD_demo.c
    M demos/mac/cmac-aes256.c
    M demos/mac/hmac-sha512.c
    M demos/signature/EVP_Signature_demo.h
    M doc/man1/openssl-pkcs8.pod.in
    M doc/man1/openssl-rehash.pod.in
    M doc/man1/openssl-s_client.pod.in
    M doc/man1/openssl-s_server.pod.in
    M doc/man1/openssl-smime.pod.in
    M doc/man3/BIO_s_bio.pod
    M doc/man3/BN_add.pod
    M doc/man3/OSSL_HTTP_REQ_CTX.pod
    M doc/man3/OSSL_HTTP_parse_url.pod
    M doc/man3/OSSL_HTTP_transfer.pod
    M doc/man3/PKCS7_decrypt.pod
    M doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode.pod
    M doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context.pod
    M doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback.pod
    M doc/man3/d2i_X509.pod
    M doc/man7/EVP_CIPHER-AES.pod
    M doc/man7/provider-asym_cipher.pod
    M fuzz/server.c
    M include/openssl/bn.h
    M include/openssl/ssl.h.in
    M providers/defltprov.c
    M providers/implementations/ciphers/cipher_aes_siv.c
    M providers/implementations/exchange/dh_exch.c
    M providers/implementations/include/prov/implementations.h
    M providers/implementations/keymgmt/ecx_kmgmt.c
    M providers/implementations/macs/poly1305_prov.c
    M providers/implementations/signature/rsa_sig.c
    M ssl/record/rec_layer_s3.c
    M ssl/ssl_ciph.c
    M ssl/statem/extensions_srvr.c
    M ssl/statem/statem.c
    M ssl/statem/statem_lib.c
    M test/bad_dtls_test.c
    M test/cipherlist_test.c
    M test/destest.c
    M test/dsatest.c
    M test/ectest.c
    M test/endecode_test.c
    M test/enginetest.c
    M test/evp_extra_test2.c
    M test/evp_kdf_test.c
    M test/evp_libctx_test.c
    M test/evp_pkey_provided_test.c
    M test/helpers/predefined_dhparams.c
    M test/ideatest.c
    M test/pbetest.c
    M test/pkcs12_format_test.c
    M test/siphash_internal_test.c
    M test/stack_test.c

  Log Message:
  -----------
  Copyright year updates


Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Saša Nedvědický <[email protected]>
MergeDate: Tue Jun  9 12:19:00 2026
Release: yes


  Commit: 2d5eb31ab8d986a0c78e8f005e1eb4046294e58a
      https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/2d5eb31ab8d986a0c78e8f005e1eb4046294e58a
  Author: openssl-machine <[email protected]>
  Date:   2026-06-09 (Tue, 09 Jun 2026)

  Changed paths:
    M providers/fips-sources.checksums
    M providers/fips.checksum

  Log Message:
  -----------
  make update


Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Saša Nedvědický <[email protected]>
MergeDate: Tue Jun  9 12:20:40 2026
Release: yes


  Commit: 51ea949dc1436e865935b47874b21a3bb31a102e
      https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/51ea949dc1436e865935b47874b21a3bb31a102e
  Author: openssl-machine <[email protected]>
  Date:   2026-06-09 (Tue, 09 Jun 2026)

  Changed paths:
    M CHANGES.md
    M NEWS.md
    M VERSION.dat

  Log Message:
  -----------
  Prepare for release of 3.0.21


Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Saša Nedvědický <[email protected]>
MergeDate: Tue Jun  9 12:20:45 2026
Release: yes


  Commit: 26a331d29a6e658e85f986f448b7d5b822675f3c
      https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/26a331d29a6e658e85f986f448b7d5b822675f3c
  Author: openssl-machine <[email protected]>
  Date:   2026-06-09 (Tue, 09 Jun 2026)

  Changed paths:
    M CHANGES.md
    M NEWS.md
    M VERSION.dat

  Log Message:
  -----------
  Prepare for 3.0.22


Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Saša Nedvědický <[email protected]>
MergeDate: Tue Jun  9 12:20:52 2026
Release: yes


Compare: https://github.com/openssl/openssl/compare/51ab23015d56...26a331d29a6e

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