Re: The Hard Problem Of Consciousness

Re: Matt Faunce
At: http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/8565

JA = Jon Awbrey
MF = Matt Faunce

MF: Do the proponents of the hard problem of consciousness take into
     account formal distinctions? I've thought about the problem based
     on a cursory reading* of it and came up with these thoughts:

MF: If physical brain action _causes_ experience, then the problem
     is the ancient problem of causation: How can one thing cause
     something different from it? But also, if the neural activity
     causes the experience in some other place, it begs the question
     of what or where this other place is.

MF: If physical brain action _is_ experience, then their difference
     is due to a formal distinction. When we think of brain activity
     or experience we are thinking with universals which were mentally
     abstracted from the singular thing/event.  Just like a particular
     blue triangle is one thing, we make the formal distinction between
     its blueness and its triangleness.  Blueness and triangleness are
     not the same thing, but they were abstracted from one thing.

MF: Is there any(other) aspect of Peirce's philosophy
     that needs to be considered?

MF: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hard_problem_of_consciousness

MF: * I hesitated on asking this question with so little reading on it,
     but I decided to present it anyway since the activity on this list
     is so slow.  I'm hoping that responses will inform my inquiry when
     I do eventually read more closely about the problem.

JA: If mind is grounded in triadic relations
     and reality is grounded in triadic relations
     then what remains is to study the ways that
     more mindful materials and less mindful materials
     differ within the variety of triadic relations.

Matt,

A few other points that come to mind.

One small point. It would not do, either logically or psychologically,
to say that properties like blueness and triangleness are abstracted
from a single blue triangle.  It would be better to say that they are
abstracted from a manifold of experiences with things that vary both
in color and in shape.  Thus, blueness is abstracted from a sufficient
variety of (experiences with) things that are blue, and triangleness
is abstracted from a sufficient variety of (experiences with) things
that are triangular.

In larger perspective, anyone attempting to bring Peirce's pragmatism to bear
on contemporary problems in the philosophy of psychology needs to be aware that
many of the isms and issues in the latter field are founded on premises that are
very different from -- perhaps even incommensurable with -- Peirce's own premisses.

This caution applies especially to Peirce's views on the nature of explanation and
the status of causation, two of the points that are linchpins of the present issue.

Regards,

Jon

cc: Arisbe, Inquiry, Peirce List

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