Re: The Hard Problem Of Consciousness

1. http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/8565
2. http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/8570
3. http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/8577
4. http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/8585

Matt,

I took you to be illustrating the idea that formally distinct
categories of properties could be used to describe what is at
bottom one and the same material realm of objects or processes.

That is a useful idea, at least as far as organizing the data
of experience goes, but it requires us to consider multiple and
overlapping hierarchies of abstraction that organize the contents
of consciousness in different ways.

We can describe things and occurrences as being unique -- individuals,
instants, particulars, singulars -- but that description is relative
to a context of discussion, and further examination finds all objects
of knowledge to be generals.

Regards,

Jon

MF: If physical brain action _is_ experience, then their difference
     is due to a formal distinction.  When we think of brain activity
     or experience we are thinking with universals which were mentally
     abstracted from the singular thing/event.  Just like a particular
     blue triangle is one thing, we make the formal distinction between
     its blueness and its triangleness.  Blueness and triangleness are
     not the same thing, but they were abstracted from one thing.

JA: A few other points that come to mind.

JA: One small point. It would not do, either logically or psychologically,
     to say that properties like blueness and triangleness are abstracted
     from a single blue triangle.  It would be better to say that they are
     abstracted from a manifold of experiences with things that vary both
     in color and in shape.  Thus, blueness is abstracted from a sufficient
     variety of (experiences with) things that are blue, and triangleness
     is abstracted from a sufficient variety of (experiences with) things
     that are triangular.

MF: What I meant in my statement was that the particular blueness and
     particular triangleness (two aspects that are unique to the thing
     being observed) were abstracted from the one thing; what I left
     unsaid was that the abstractions were labeled with the general
     terms "blueness" and "triangleness" because of their relations
     to other similar and non-similar things we've experienced.

MF: I can see that the relating of the unique aspects (unique color
     and shape) with the manifold of experiences is integral with the
     abstraction of the unique aspects from the object. I don't think
     the abstraction could happen in isolation. I think this was Dewey's
     point in The Reflex Arc in Psychology.  They work together like parts
     of an electrical circuit.

MF: I think this is in line with your point, or did I miss something?

-- 

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