Re: Sign Relational Manifolds • Discussi on

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Discussion Note 11

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Sign Relational Manifolds • Exposition

1. http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/8850
2. http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/8854
3. http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/8871
4. http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/8915
5. http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/8919

1. http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2012/10/22/sign-relational-manifolds-1/
2. http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2012/10/22/sign-relational-manifolds-2/
3. http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2012/10/23/sign-relational-manifolds-3/
4. http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2012/10/30/sign-relational-manifolds-4/
5. http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2012/11/01/sign-relational-manifolds-5/

Sign Relational Manifolds • Discussion

01. JC: http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/8861
     JA: http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/8868

02. JC: http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/8862
     JA: http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/8872

03. IA: http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/8866
     JA: http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/8875

04. JC: http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/8873
     JA: http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/8890

05. SE: http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/8874
     JA: http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/8886

06. KM: http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/8878
     JA: http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/8944

07. SE: http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/8887
     JA: http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/8901

08. JC: http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/8895
     JA: http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/8908

09. SE: http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/8922
     JA: http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/8927

10. SR: http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/8923
     JA: http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/8929

11. SE: http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/8928

SE: I'm sorry Jon, but you have not said what you think knowledge is.

SE: For example, I use a generalized definition:
     Knowledge is that which determines subsequent action.

SE: In the context of the action of a “manifold of signs” then
     I can begin to hold some consistent and exact conception of
     what I am referring to, while reducing the overloading in our
     conventions.  At this level it is not the individual relations
     that make a difference but rather it is the biophysical structure
     of the manifold upon which the signs rest (and the mechanism that
     underlies the formation of habit in the structure that is the basis
     of “memory”).

SE: Relations then are the analytic product of the manifold,
     you cannot construct the manifold from them.

SE: In this light you might look at what Peirce
     was proposing to do with relative quaternions.

Steven,

I don't think I raised the “problem of knowledge” in that formal
epistemological sense.  Perhaps you took it as being implicit in
the “problem of appearance and reality”, and I guess I could see
some sense in that.  But at this point I'm only referring to the
bare recognition of a tension between the two, the sort of thing
we usually express by saying that “the map is not the territory”.

In the case of a manifold structure, the territory is the object
space X, and the maps are the charts of the atlas that covers X.
We can think of the maps as data, that is, signs of X, and it is
certainly true that knowledge of X will be based at least partly
on data about X, but that is further down the road from where we
are at this point.

At any rate, I don't really need a formal definition of knowledge just yet.
Any sort of provisional definition will serve to move the inquiry forward.
The one you suggest is very close to Bain's definition of belief, which
we might express in gender-neutral and generalized form as “that upon
which an agent is prepared to act”.  That brings us to speaking of
dispositions, plans of action, preparations, and even programs.

Readers of Peirce will know that he views the relation between belief
and knowledge from a uniquely pragmatic point of view, as expressed,
for example, in the following passage:

| Two things here are all-important to assure oneself of and to remember.
| The first is that a person is not absolutely an individual.  His thoughts
| are what he is “saying to himself”, that is, is saying to that other self
| that is just coming into life in the flow of time.  When one reasons, it
| is that critical self that one is trying to persuade;  and all thought
| whatsoever is a sign, and is mostly of the nature of language.  The second
| thing to remember is that the man's circle of society (however widely or
| narrowly this phrase may be understood), is a sort of loosely compacted
| person, in some respects of higher rank than the person of an individual
| organism.  It is these two things alone that render it possible for you —
| but only in the abstract, and in a Pickwickian sense — to distinguish
| between absolute truth and what you do not doubt.
|
| C.S. Peirce, Collected Papers, CP 5.421.
|
| Charles Sanders Peirce, “What Pragmatism Is”,
| The Monist, Volume 15, 1905, pages 161–181,
| Also in the Collected Papers, CP 5.411–437.
|
| http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-October/000905.html

But all that is, as I said, getting ahead of ourself.

Regards,

Jon

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