Re: De In Esse Predication

jon awbrey wrote:

> Egged on a bit by Gary and John, I am only just starting to return to
> the question of modality, as that was never so compelling to me in math,
> where one gets by with a "necessary" and a "sufficient" that seem to rank
> inane dismissal quotes in other people's ears, and so mood was never before
> so compelling to me as the cousin/cozen issues of intentionality, but here
> are some links to Peirce's derivation of information from logical grounds,
> Peirce's 1865-1866 Lectures at Harvard and the Lowell Institute, where he
> introduces his newfangled notion of "information" and the theory thereof:

This is very good news indeed, jon.

Of course, you've already expressed that third term (beyond 
"necessary" and "sufficient"). And truly, logical breadth X 
logical depth = information.

But that's not the whole picture by half, right? Therefore, 
modality has finally to be taken up with all that 
trichotomic semiosis ought imply.

Personally, I'm glad that John and I have been "nudges" here.

I can hardly wait. . .

Gary


Jon Awbrey wrote:

> o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
> 
> DEIP.  Discussion Note 4
> 
> o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
> 
> JA = Jon Awbrey
> TJ = Tom Johnston
> 
> Re: CP 4.517
> 
> JA, amending JA:
> 
>     I will probably have to go about the mindless data collection
>     for a while longer before I try to draw a conclusion, but in
>     the meantime I have become more intrigued with the connection
>     to Peirce's theory of information as the third quid between
>     extension and intension, and relative to the states of which
>     information the entire spectrum of modalities is refracted
>     before our minds' eyes.
> 
> TJ: I like that last sentence, and look
>     forward to finding out what it means.
> 
> Egged on a bit by Gary and John, I am only just starting to return to
> the question of modality, as that was never so compelling to me in math,
> where one gets by with a "necessary" and a "sufficient" that seem to rank
> inane dismissal quotes in other people's ears, and so mood was never before
> so compelling to me as the cousin/cozen issues of intentionality, but here
> are some links to Peirce's derivation of information from logical grounds,
> Peirce's 1865-1866 Lectures at Harvard and the Lowell Institute, where he
> introduces his newfangled notion of "information" and the theory thereof:
> 
> C.S. Peirce, Harvard Lectures (1865)
> 
> 23.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-March/000216.html -- CE 1, 272
> 24.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-March/000217.html -- CE 1, 272-274
> 25.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-March/000218.html -- CE 1, 274
> 26.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-March/000219.html -- CE 1, 274-275
> 27.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-March/000220.html -- CE 1, 275-276
> 28.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-March/000221.html -- CE 1, 276
> 29.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-March/000222.html -- CE 1, 276-277
> 30.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-March/000223.html -- CE 1, 277
> 31.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-March/000224.html -- CE 1, 278-279
> 32.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-March/000225.html -- CE 1, 279-280
> 33.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-March/000226.html -- CE 1, 280
> 34.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-March/000227.html -- CE 1, 280-281
> 35.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-March/000228.html -- CE 1, 281-282
> 36.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-March/000229.html -- CE 1, 282-283
> 37.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-March/000230.html -- CE 1, 283
> 38.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-April/000356.html -- CE 1, 285
> 39.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-April/000357.html -- CE 1, 285-286
> 40.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-April/000358.html -- CE 1, 286-288
> 41.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-April/000359.html -- CE 1, 288
> 42.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-April/000361.html -- CE 1, 288-289
> 43.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-April/000362.html -- CE 1, 289
> 44.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-April/000363.html -- CE 1, 289-290
> 
> C.S. Peirce, Lowell Lectures (1866)
> 
> 11.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-March/000204.html -- CE 1, 458-459
> 12.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-March/000205.html -- CE 1, 459-460
> 13.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-March/000206.html -- CE 1, 460
> 14.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-March/000207.html -- CE 1, 461
> 15.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-March/000208.html -- CE 1, 461
> 16.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-March/000209.html -- CE 1, 462
> 17.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-March/000210.html -- CE 1, 462
> 18.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-March/000211.html -- CE 1, 462-463
> 19.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-March/000212.html -- CE 1, 463-464
> 20.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-March/000213.html -- CE 1, 464-465
> 21.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-March/000214.html -- CE 1, 465
> 22.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-March/000215.html -- CE 1, 466-467
> 
> 02.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-March/000195.html -- CE 1, 467
> 03.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-March/000196.html -- CE 1, 467-468
> 04.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-March/000197.html -- CE 1, 468-469
> 05.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-March/000198.html -- CE 1, 469
> 06.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-March/000199.html -- CE 1, 470
> 07.  http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2003-March/000200.html -- CE 1, 470-471
> 
> JA: In the spirit of an even wilder guess, I think that he would say that there
>     is a difference between what we are destined to believe about, for example,
>     the objective referent, if any, of the phrase "physical causality" at the
>     "end of inquiry" (EOI) and what we are likely to believe in that respect
>     at the present time -- time being relative, too, off course -- and that
>     it may form a useful analytic ideal or a "hypostatic independentity",
>     to coin a phrase, to think of this "physical_causality_EOI" as being
>     there all along, or not being there all along, waiting for us to
>     discover the quantum of truth in the sign "physical causality".
> 
> TJ: Perhaps I should know better than to ask this, but what the heck:
>     (a) What marks the EOI?  No more disagreements among members of
>     the relevant community of inquiry (physicists, biologists, etc)?
>     (b) Assuming we do reach an EOI in some subject area, what accounts
>     for it?  Why have we stopped disagreeing?  Is it that, guided by the
>     pragmatic principle, we have finally arrived at a set of statements
>     that accurately represent/describe things as they really are?
> 
> These are good questions, part of what I tried
> to address in my dissertation ever in progress:
> 
> http://members.door.net/arisbe/menu/library/aboutcsp/awbrey/inquiry.htm
> 
> Whatever EOI be in the end, how it functions in the
> meantime is as a normative ideal.  I will round up
> the usual Chapter & Peirce, but in the meanwhile
> here is a 3-logy of good books on the subject:
> 
> Peter Skagestad, 'The Road of Inquiry:  [CSP]'s Pragmatic Realism'.
> Cheryl Misak, 'Truth and the End of Inquiry:  A Peircean Account of Truth'.
> C.F. Delaney, 'Science, Knowledge, and Mind:  A Study in the Philosophy of [CSP]'.
> 
> The Big EOI can be understood on analogy with the
> little EOI's that make up the "fixions of belief"
> that we reach every day in our everyday inquiries.
> The primer canon shot on that score is found here:
> 
> http://members.door.net/arisbe/menu/library/bycsp/fixation/fx-frame.htm
> 
> Jon Awbrey
> 
> o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
> 
>