Theory Of Signs
Jon Awbrey <[email protected]>
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o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o TOS. Note 1 o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o Robert Marty and his "Semiotique et Communication" group at Perpignan have put together this collection of 76 + 12 "definitions of the sign": http://members.door.net/arisbe/menu/library/rsources/76defs/76defs.htm It is customary in informal discussions to call things definitions that are really more like partial glosses on the use of a term or even just illustrations of its application in particular domains. This is fine as long as everybody knows the difference, but not everybody does, a circumstance that leads to a lot of needless wrangling, mostly heedless of anything like a real definition. For my part I can remember wondering for many long years why I'd not seen anything like a real definition of anything so important as a sign in Peirce's work -- it had simply never crossed my mind to regard his various and sundry exemplary illustrations as definitions in the formal sense -- until I happened across the following couple of variants in his 'New Elements of Mathematics': | A sign is something, 'A', | which brings something, 'B', | its 'interpretant' sign | determined or created by it, | into the same sort of correspondence | with something, 'C', its 'object', | as that in which itself stands to 'C'. | | C.S. Peirce, NEM 4, pp. 20-21, cf. p. 54, also available here: | | http://members.door.net/arisbe/menu/library/bycsp/l75/l75.htm | http://members.door.net/arisbe/menu/library/bycsp/l75/ver1/01.htm | http://members.door.net/arisbe/menu/library/bycsp/l75/ver2/l75main.htm | http://members.door.net/arisbe/menu/library/bycsp/l75/ver2/l75frame.htm More details on how the definition of a sign relation bears on the definition of logic are given in the contexts of this text: | On the Definition of Logic [Version 1] | | Logic will here be defined as 'formal semiotic'. | A definition of a sign will be given which no more | refers to human thought than does the definition | of a line as the place which a particle occupies, | part by part, during a lapse of time. Namely, | a sign is something, 'A', which brings something, | 'B', its 'interpretant' sign determined or created | by it, into the same sort of correspondence with | something, 'C', its 'object', as that in which it | itself stands to 'C'. It is from this definition, | together with a definition of "formal", that I | deduce mathematically the principles of logic. | I also make a historical review of all the | definitions and conceptions of logic, and show, | not merely that my definition is no novelty, but | that my non-psychological conception of logic has | 'virtually' been quite generally held, though not | generally recognized. (CSP, NEM 4, 20-21). | | On the Definition of Logic [Version 2] | | Logic is 'formal semiotic'. A sign is something, | 'A', which brings something, 'B', its 'interpretant' | sign, determined or created by it, into the same | sort of correspondence (or a lower implied sort) | with something, 'C', its 'object', as that in | which itself stands to 'C'. This definition no | more involves any reference to human thought than | does the definition of a line as the place within | which a particle lies during a lapse of time. | It is from this definition that I deduce the | principles of logic by mathematical reasoning, | and by mathematical reasoning that, I aver, will | support criticism of Weierstrassian severity, and | that is perfectly evident. The word "formal" in | the definition is also defined. (CSP, NEM 4, 54). | | Charles Sanders Peirce, |'The New Elements of Mathematics', Volume 4, | Edited by Carolyn Eisele, Mouton, The Hague, 1976. Jon Awbrey o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o