Re: Topic :> Dynamics Of Ontologies

Jon Awbrey <[email protected]> Mon, 22 Dec 2003 23:56:38 -0500
Newsgroups gmane.comp.inquiry,gmane.comp.misc.ontology.general
Message-ID <[email protected]>
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Topic :> Dynamics Of Ontologies 5

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By way of introduction to the presentation of ontological theories
as representative points in the phase portraits of the appropriate
types of dynamical systems, I began with the overture that I will
now recapitulate, touching on the salient points that I was able,
no matter how incipiently, to anticipate as being likely to rule
over the future development of the subject:

| In the real world, ontologies change over time.
| This can happen in many different ways and for
| many different reasons, or the absence thereof,
| but we are especially concerned with the types
| of change that occur with real cause, and thus
| that happen for good reason.  A proper account
| of motivated changes in ontologies requires us
| to say something about the purpose of ontology
| as a general resource of intelligent creatures,
| so let's turn our attention next to that topic.

One reason for changing a theory, say Theory 1, is to get a new theory,
say Theory 2, that better fits the object reality that is indicated by
both of these theories as being their common object.  This observation
finds us cast right in the middle of a sign-relational scene, one that
involves the objective reality that amounts to the shared objective of
the two signs that we know as theories.  In comparing the two theories
with regard to the goodness of their fit to reality, we are, in effect,
contemplating each of them as signs that interpret the other, for good
or for ill, serving as interpretant signs of each other's significance.

Let us now consider an Example of one type of theory change that often
occurs, especially in practical applications where the task is to elicit
knowledge from experienced reasoners, or to develop more explicit and more
clarified theories from the initial resources of implicit or tacit knowledge.
This is one aspect of what we tried to articulate in the composite of Figure 1.

o-----------------------------------------------------------o
|                                                           |
|                              Induction                    |
|                 Model  3<----------------->1  Phenomenon  |
|                       ^                 < ^               |
|                      ^               <   ^                |
|                     ^             <     ^                 |
|                    ^           <       ^                  |
|        Deduction  ^     Abduction     ^  Deduction        |
|                  ^       <           ^                    |
|                 ^     <             ^                     |
|                ^   <               ^                      |
|               ^ <                 ^                       |
|  Expressed  2<----------------->4  Implicit               |
|  Theory         Clarification      Knowledge              |
|                                                           |
o-----------------------------------------------------------o
Figure 1.  Dynamics of Inquiry

In this case we illustrated how things would look under the ideal condition
or the simplifying assumption that the pertinent features of the Phenomenon
in question could be derived in a purely deductive manner from the implicit
rule set or the tacit knowledge base of the adequately experienced reasoner.
This means that all of the work of the knowledge elicitation task has to do
with making the sequence of Expressed Theories more clear and more explicit.

Jon Awbrey

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http://www.cs.bsu.edu/homepages/mighty/history.html
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