Re: [PATCH nf v2] netfilter: nf_reject: initialize IPCB at inet ingress
Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | gmane.comp.security.firewalls.netfilter.devel,gmane.linux.network,gmane.linux.kernel,gmane.linux.kernel.stable |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <aohV0xIb23Pvs7yt@chamomile> |
On Mon, Aug 10, 2026 at 04:07:03PM +0000, David Lee wrote: > From: Kyle Zeng <[email protected]> > > The inet ingress hook runs before ip_rcv_core() and ip6_rcv_core(), so > neither IPCB nor IP6CB has been initialized when nft_reject_inet passes > a packet to nf_send_unreach() or nf_send_unreach6(). skb->cb can > therefore retain metadata from an earlier protocol layer. > > For IPv4, icmp_send() treats IPCB(skb)->opt as parsed IPv4 options. > Stale option offsets can make __ip_options_echo() copy an > attacker-controlled length into its 40-byte reply option buffer and > overflow the stack. On an unpatched v7.2-rc5 kernel, the IPv4 > reproducer produced: > > BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in __ip_options_echo() > Write of size 255 > > For IPv6, icmpv6_send() consumes IP6CB(skb) as parsed IPv6 metadata. It > always uses iif for source selection and, when MIP6 is enabled, uses > dsthao as an extension-header offset. These fields must not be stale. > > For NF_INET_INGRESS, clear the address-family-specific control block > and restore its input interface before constructing the ICMP error. > This matches the initialization normally performed by ip_rcv_core() > and ip6_rcv_core(). > > Fixes: 117ca1f8920c ("netfilter: nft_reject_inet: allow to use reject from inet ingress") > Cc: [email protected] > Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5.6-sol Codex:gpt-5.5-cyber > Signed-off-by: Kyle Zeng <[email protected]> > Co-developed-by: David Lee <[email protected]> > Signed-off-by: David Lee <[email protected]> > --- > Changes in v2: > - Initialize IP6CB in nf_send_unreach6() for inet ingress. > - Preserve the IPv6 input interface before constructing the reply dst. > > v1: https://lore.kernel.org/netfilter-devel/[email protected]/ > > Bug found and triaged by OpenAI Security Research and > validated by Trail of Bits. > > Trail of Bits has an IPv4 reproducer for this bug that triggers the > KASAN stack-out-of-bounds write in __ip_options_echo() and can share it > if needed. A separate IPv6 test reaches nf_send_unreach6() from inet > ingress and confirms that an ICMPv6 unreachable is constructed. > > net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv4.c | 6 ++++++ > net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv6.c | 9 +++++++++ > 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv4.c > index 4626dc46808f..4933f65138d6 100644 > --- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv4.c > +++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv4.c > @@ -355,6 +355,12 @@ void nf_send_unreach(struct sk_buff *skb_in, int code, int hook) > if (!skb_dst(skb_in) && nf_reject_fill_skb_dst(skb_in) < 0) > return; > > + /* Inet ingress runs before IPv4 initializes IPCB. */ > + if (hook == NF_INET_INGRESS) { > + memset(IPCB(skb_in), 0, sizeof(*IPCB(skb_in))); > + IPCB(skb_in)->iif = skb_in->skb_iif; > + } > + > if (skb_csum_unnecessary(skb_in) || > !nf_reject_verify_csum(skb_in, dataoff, proto)) { > icmp_send(skb_in, ICMP_DEST_UNREACH, code, 0); > diff --git a/net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv6.c b/net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv6.c > index ef5b7e85cffa..c36910b8a95a 100644 > --- a/net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv6.c > +++ b/net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv6.c > @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ > #include <net/ip6_fib.h> > #include <net/ip6_checksum.h> > #include <net/netfilter/ipv6/nf_reject.h> > +#include <net/dst_metadata.h> > #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h> > #include <linux/netfilter_bridge.h> > > @@ -440,6 +441,14 @@ void nf_send_unreach6(struct net *net, struct sk_buff *skb_in, > if (hooknum == NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT && skb_in->dev == NULL) > skb_in->dev = net->loopback_dev; > > + /* Inet ingress runs before IPv6 initializes IP6CB. */ > + if (hooknum == NF_INET_INGRESS) { > + memset(IP6CB(skb_in), 0, sizeof(*IP6CB(skb_in))); > + IP6CB(skb_in)->iif = skb_valid_dst(skb_in) ? > + ip6_dst_idev(skb_dst(skb_in))->dev->ifindex : > + skb_in->dev->ifindex; Why do different? Maybe just use: IP6CB(skb_in)->iif = skb_in->skb_iif; like in the IPv4 chunk? > + } > + > if (!skb_dst(skb_in) && nf_reject6_fill_skb_dst(skb_in) < 0) > return; > > -- > 2.53.0 >