Re: SSH bruteforce on its way...
| Newsgroups | gmane.comp.security.incidents |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
On Tue, 25 Oct 2005 09:17:07 +1300, Russell Fulton said: > > Would you please provide some supporting references. I can not find any > evidence of existing timing attacks against openssh. In fact Openssh > goes to some trouble to defeat such attacks. Russell, your google-foo is obviously weak. Google'ed for '+ssh +timing +attack', and the first few hits are against the keystroke-timing issue, and about number 6 is: http://lists.debian.org/debian-ssh/2004/11/msg00053.html which says: CAN-2003-0190 describes a flaw in ssh's password prompt timing which makes it easy for an attacker to determine if a username exists on a machine. I've checked and testing and unstable's versions of ssh are vulnerable. Details and some fixes are in this message: http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?l=bugtraq&m=3D105172058404810&w=2 References enough? ;)
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