CryoNet #32889 - #32890

CryoNet - Fri 1 Oct 2010

    #32889: "Survival" possibilities [Brook Norton]
    #32890: Reasons Why Uploading Is Unlikely, Ever     [Ettinger]

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Message #32889
From: Brook Norton <[email protected]>
Subject: "Survival" possibilities
Date: Thu, 30 Sep 2010 13:00:43 -0700

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Norton: We can "continue" (in large part, never 100% unchanged) but not
"survive". And we can "continue" as a corpse, as an upload, as a duplicate,
whatever - all equal options as continuers - but there are no survivors. And
so concern over which is the true way to survive is misguided  concern.

 

Ettinger: Equal options? Surely not. In my view, a survivor is a continuer.
Continuers (in particular  your qualia) overlap each other in space and
time, which allows partial identification of later and earlier versions, and
we must settle for  that.  The fact that duplicates or whatever would seem
"as good as" to  outside observers is irrelevant.

 

Norton (this post): I'm calling a survivor one who advances through time,
bringing along some special identity-critical quality that makes the later
person the "same person" as the earlier person. I'm calling a continuer one
who advances through time, changing in accordance with the laws of nature,
such that the later person is changed (at least in small part) from the
earlier person and has no claim to be the "same person" because there is no
identity-critical quality that goes along with the person through time.

 

If there is some identity-critical quality, name it.

 

Ettinger posits that that quality is the qualia because the qualia of the
earlier and later (a fraction of a second later) person overlap in time. The
same qualia existing at different times. Ah ha, the special-quality that the
person takes with him through time. It is tempting to see the qualia as
spanning time because the qualia integrates our past states in the last
fraction of a second with our current state at time = now, resulting in an
awareness of who we are and what we are doing at present. But there is no
need to invoke new time-spanning physics to explain how the qualia
integrates internal and external sensory inputs over time. I image the brain
has a "cache" where it stores the sensory inputs from last few moments, then
either forgetting the data or moving them to the next brain section for
integration into longer term memory. The qualia integrates the current
sensory inputs with the near-past "cache" and results in awareness. Caching
takes the place of time-spanning. So we are again left with no special
identity-critical quality that moves with the person through time.

 

Ettinger objects that continuing as a corpse is certainly not equal (in
preference) to continuing as a healthy person. Well, if one comes to accept
the above argument that a future person is not "the same person" as an
earlier person, then, logically, one is left with the conclusion that it
does not matter what becomes of future continuers. I can't see any grand
design or grand purpose to the universe, and so the universe does not care
what happens to me. Gravity will just as happily redirect my motion in a
beneficial or a harmful way. I think that approach extends to the personal
level as well - there is no better or worse future for a continuer. All that
REALLY matters is how I feel NOW. Sorry if that's a disappointing view of
the meaning of life, but I didn't design the whole thing.

 

What? I don't care if I live or die in the next minute??  This is where I'll
invoke the evolutionary-mirage. As described in a prior post, evolution
makes us feel good when we envision a healthy future, and feel bad when we
envision a future that threatens our continuation. My fear in the face of
imminent death is an evolutionarily ingrained emotional reaction without
logical consistency. Like being frightened of flying when you are in a good
airplane. Were I able to fully accept, at a visceral level, that my
continuer is not the same person, then I would not care if I died or lived
in the next minute.

 

Brook Norton



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Message #32890
From: [email protected]
Date: Thu, 30 Sep 2010 22:08:47 -0400 (EDT)
Subject: Reasons Why Uploading Is Unlikely, Ever    

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Reasons Why Uploading Is Unlikely,  Ever 

Publication  plan:  My tentative plan is to email one Reason a week, to 
various venues, and use the  intervening days to respond to comments on the 
latest.                       
Preliminary: "Uploading"  here means simulating a person in an algorithmic 
digital computer in such a way  that a living person results, a conscious 
person.  
Some possible types of computer, such as those doing  quantum computation, 
are disregarded because not enough is so far known about  them. Thus I am 
considering only computers similar to those now in use, except  for 
improvements in speed and storage capacity. It is generally believed that  this type 
of computer, including Turing's paper tape computer, can compute  anything 
computable.  
I'm sure that some readers/writers will disregard my  delimitation of the 
topic and change the subject. I'll try to deal with  that. 
Reason  1.  A simulation in a digital computer is just a coded description. 
With unimportant  exceptions, a description of a thing is not that thing, 
and encoding the  description makes it worse. 
For example, I can write down the quantum description of  a hydrogen atom 
in its ground state, but that writing on paper will not be a  hydrogen atom. 
If I could write down the description of a water molecule, a  collection of 
these would not be wet. Doubtless some would say that a simulated  person 
could drink simulated water, but that would be a poor simulation of an  
argument.

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