CryoNet #32891 - #32898

CryoNet - Sat 2 Oct 2010

    #32891: Mad Uploading [robomoon]
    #32892: RE: Reasons Why Uploading Is Unlikely, Ever [Jonano]
    #32893: Reply to Brook [Ettinger]
    #32894: One of the greatest TED talks ever, includes cryonics. Your'e... [Rudi Hoffman]
    #32895: experimental validation of uploading [Daniel Crevier]
    #32896: Re: Reasons Why Uploading Is Unlikely, Ever  [Mike Perry]
    #32897: Cryopreservation of periodontal ligament cells with magnetic ... [oberon]
    #32898: Reply to Ettinger Reasons Why Uploading Is Unlikely, Ever Rea... [Edgar Swank - ACS President]

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Message #32891
Date: Fri, 1 Oct 2010 12:41:50 +0200 (CEST)
From: [email protected]
References: <[email protected]>
Subject: Mad Uploading

In case there's no example from a movie or TV series popping out like Jack-in-the-Box with an uploading plot about a feedback against copies, how about a comic? Espc. a comic for females! Since C. Loveday didn't respond to my comic idea on Cryonics Europe, I wonder if a copy of her couldn't be doing it. Perhaps they are afraid there will be a copy of Proofessor RoboMoon from the Artifishial Unteligenz Labratory, a tender romance with AU devoted to AI, umph! Lovely she will be on BBC WM radio today. 

>From the final part of Message #32887 by John de Rivaz:
> One way one might look at it is via the idea of feedback. If you tell
> someone how negative feedback improves the quality of the information coming
> out of an amplifier [send the signal through the amplifier and then subtract
> the difference between the input and the output divided by the gain, ie the
> error and feed that back to subtract from the input] that may well conclude
> that you are mad. It seems like going back through time to correct a mistake
> in life. Nevertheless it works if you get it right. If you conclude that
> people are ultimately information -- which is clearly what uploading and
> duplication does, then feedback considerations apply. The duplicates will
> conspire together against the duplicator to stop more being made. A time
> must come when the duplicator would be overwhelmed, leaving a finite number
> of duplicates. Come to think of it, I think this is the plot of a film or TV
> series, but can't recall the title.

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Message #32892
Date: Fri, 1 Oct 2010 13:19:17 +0200
Subject: RE: Reasons Why Uploading Is Unlikely, Ever
From: Jonano <[email protected]>

Uploading technologies will be very easy in the future, people will be
able to change their identity, memory or personality as easy as
changing a radio channel.

And I think it's a good thing for cryonics patients, if we know alot
about identities, and how to manage them, we will do less errors in
correcting & repairing them, but before we need to be able to create
them easily. Maybe in about 1000 years, not 200 years from now.

We will also be able to select and experience alot of pre configured
emotions that we will be inserted in our brain and interact with the
personality that we choose. We will have a better liberty that way.

The experience industry will be large and flourishing. We will
probably lost ourselves in it. We will control alot more than today
all identities, personalities changing and memory management.

I'm not expert but I love to speculate.

--Jon

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Message #32893
From: [email protected]
Date: Fri, 1 Oct 2010 10:45:25 -0400 (EDT)
Subject: Reply to Brook

In #32889 Brook Norton suggests a "cache" giving rise to an  illusion of 
time span. However, I claim that there is (probably) a literal,  physical span 
of time (and also of space) for any condition or event, the reason  being 
that (probably) nothing can exist at a moment of time (in a zero  interval) 
or at a point in space (in a zero volume). For whatever it is worth,  current 
quantum physics includes a spread of being.
 
It is certainly true, as Brook says, that we have been shaped by evolution  
and accident to tend to treasure unfounded beliefs. Brook says that  
logically it shouldn't matter to you whether you live or die, but I don't  think 
his argument holds.
 
R.E.
 
In a message dated 10/1/2010 5:00:09 A.M. Eastern Daylight Time,  
[email protected] writes:

CryoNet  - Fri 1 Oct 2010

#32889: "Survival" possibilities [Brook  Norton]
#32890: Reasons Why Uploading Is Unlikely, Ever   [Ettinger]

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Message  #32889
From: Brook Norton <[email protected]>
Subject: "Survival"  possibilities
Date: Thu, 30 Sep 2010 13:00:43 -0700

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Norton:  We can "continue" (in large part, never 100% unchanged) but not
"survive".  And we can "continue" as a corpse, as an upload, as a duplicate,
whatever -  all equal options as continuers - but there are no survivors. 
And
so  concern over which is the true way to survive is misguided   concern.



Ettinger: Equal options? Surely not. In my view, a  survivor is a continuer.
Continuers (in particular  your qualia)  overlap each other in space and
time, which allows partial identification  of later and earlier versions, 
and
we must settle for  that.  The  fact that duplicates or whatever would seem
"as good as" to  outside  observers is irrelevant.



Norton (this post): I'm calling a  survivor one who advances through time,
bringing along some special  identity-critical quality that makes the later
person the "same person" as  the earlier person. I'm calling a continuer one
who advances through time,  changing in accordance with the laws of nature,
such that the later person  is changed (at least in small part) from the
earlier person and has no  claim to be the "same person" because there is no
identity-critical quality  that goes along with the person through time.



If there is some  identity-critical quality, name it.



Ettinger posits that that  quality is the qualia because the qualia of the
earlier and later (a  fraction of a second later) person overlap in time. 
The
same qualia  existing at different times. Ah ha, the special-quality that 
the
person  takes with him through time. It is tempting to see the qualia as
spanning  time because the qualia integrates our past states in the last
fraction of  a second with our current state at time = now, resulting in an
awareness of  who we are and what we are doing at present. But there is no
need to invoke  new time-spanning physics to explain how the qualia
integrates internal and  external sensory inputs over time. I image the 
brain
has a "cache" where it  stores the sensory inputs from last few moments, 
then
either forgetting the  data or moving them to the next brain section for
integration into longer  term memory. The qualia integrates the current
sensory inputs with the  near-past "cache" and results in awareness. Caching
takes the place of  time-spanning. So we are again left with no special
identity-critical  quality that moves with the person through time.



Ettinger  objects that continuing as a corpse is certainly not equal (in
preference)  to continuing as a healthy person. Well, if one comes to accept
the above  argument that a future person is not "the same person" as an
earlier  person, then, logically, one is left with the conclusion that it
does not  matter what becomes of future continuers. I can't see any grand
design or  grand purpose to the universe, and so the universe does not care
what  happens to me. Gravity will just as happily redirect my motion in  a
beneficial or a harmful way. I think that approach extends to the  personal
level as well - there is no better or worse future for a  continuer. All 
that
REALLY matters is how I feel NOW. Sorry if that's a  disappointing view of
the meaning of life, but I didn't design the whole  thing.



What? I don't care if I live or die in the next  minute??  This is where 
I'll
invoke the evolutionary-mirage. As  described in a prior post, evolution
makes us feel good when we envision a  healthy future, and feel bad when we
envision a future that threatens our  continuation. My fear in the face of
imminent death is an evolutionarily  ingrained emotional reaction without
logical consistency. Like being  frightened of flying when you are in a good
airplane. Were I able to fully  accept, at a visceral level, that my
continuer is not the same person, then  I would not care if I died or lived
in the next  minute.



Brook Norton




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Message #32894
Date: Fri, 1 Oct 2010 11:14:42 -0400
Subject: One of the greatest TED talks ever, includes cryonics. Your'e...
From: Rudi Hoffman <[email protected]>

--000e0cdffe7a6cb34c04918fa79c

Hello, cryonetters, etc.,

Wow.

I have long been a fan of "TED talks"...which have short, incredibly high
impact presentations by world class folks on multiple topics with a basic
theme of "making the world work for all sentient creatures."  Everyone on
this list should be aware of...and, I humbly suggest, would find
intellectually enlivening this great series.  This incredible education is
available free thru simply subscribing to this free weekly email link feed.


I just listened and viewed one of the BEST TED talks ever.

And, remarkably, it deals with precisely the question(s) which have been
speculated on at length (but not ad nauseum) on this site and other cryonics
bulletin boards.  Regarding consciousness creation, the precise mechanisms
of what makes us who we are, and whether this is even theoretically
definable by extreme computation.

IS UPLOADING POSSIBLE?

I have followed with great interest the many deep and surprisingly profound
writings on this topic for the last several months.  While electing to not
share my thoughts and speculations on the topic of "uploading", I have
privately wondered if our future understanding will make current
speculations obsolete and irrelevant.  Similar to the observations Brook
Norton proposed about the illusion of continuity and consciousness being an
artifact.  Ettinger and nearly all of you have made great comments...but are
we limited to just thought experiments regarding the nature of the self?

Maybe not!  The cool thing is that this discussion is no longer confined to
JUST thought experiments.  Perhaps we are no longer merely the modern
equivalent of superstitious theologians having never ending handwaving
discussions over "how many angels can dance on the head of a pin?"  Or we
would like to think that we are not.  Most of us would consider ourselves
"skeptical empiricists" who take pride in an epistemology informed by actual
facts.

All this is to hopefully INTRIGUE you enough to view one of the best 18
minute videos I have ever seen on the topic of our nature and also providing
an even handed endorsement (?) of cryonics.

The graphics will amaze you.  As well as inform us as to how challenging
modeling even the brain of our friend C. Elegans with a total of 300 brain
cells...and how this scales to "us."

Here is the link.  Hope you find this as cool as I have...and sign up to get
TED Talks!
http://on.ted.com/8bca

Rudi Hoffman
Port Orange, FL



-- 
Rudi Richard Hoffman CFP CLU ChFC

World's Leading Cryonics Insuror rudihoffman.com
Former Board Member Financial Planning Association fpafla.com
Board Member Salvation Army salvationarmy.org
Member Alcor Life Extension Foundation alcor.org,
Member Cryonics Institute cryonics.org
Certified Financial Planner(TM) CFP Board of Standards
Member World Transhumanist Association http://transhumanism.org/
Securities offered through Broker Dealer Financial Services Corp. Member
FINRA and SIPC.

--000e0cdffe7a6cb34c04918fa79c

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Message #32895
From: Daniel Crevier <[email protected]>
References: <[email protected]>
Subject: experimental validation of uploading
Date: Fri, 01 Oct 2010 12:28:37 -0400

I'd like to come back to my posting No. 32877 of september 28. It didn't get 
any reaction, so let me try to add some zest to it. I think this posting 
shows that the theory that uploading preserves consciousness is falsifiable 
: it can be proven or disproven experimentally whether the uploaded person 
is still conscious, and not a zombie.

The experiment I suggest  is the following. Do only a partial uploading of a 
subject : only replace the primary visual cortex by a digital circuit. It 
has been shown that loss of this area leaves stroke victims consciously 
unaware of visual information, even if some visual processing seems to be 
still occuring in other parts of the brain. So if there is a short list of 
brain areas intimately related to consciousness, then the primary visual 
cortex is very much in it. Note also that loss of this brain area leaves all 
other mental abilities intact: the subjects can still think, talk, and 
report on their internal states. If this brain area is digitized, then one 
of two things could happen.

First, the subjects could report that they still have normal vision. 
According to uploaders, this is the expected outcome, since we assume that 
the digitized part of the brain will interface with the rest in exactly the 
same way  as the pre-existing biological one.

Alternatively, the subject could report that he or she has become blind. 
This should be the outcome expected by anti uploaders, since according to 
them the digital circuitry lacks whatever magic is required to induce 
consciousness.

Right now, this can't be done in practice, but we'll get there. The evidence 
so far, though, is pretty much in favor of uploaders: for example, retinas 
are made of neurons, and electronic replicas have been made; subjects were 
quite aware of their inputs.

So, after all, belief in uploading may not be a matter of personal choice or 
values. It may be objectively verifiable.

 Any comments?

Daniel Crevier 

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Message #32896
Date: Fri, 01 Oct 2010 19:11:51 -0700
From: Mike Perry <[email protected]>
Subject: Re: Reasons Why Uploading Is Unlikely, Ever 
References: <[email protected]>

At 02:00 2010-10-01, you wrote:
>Message #32890
>From: [email protected]
>Date: Thu, 30 Sep 2010 22:08:47 -0400 (EDT)
>Subject: Reasons Why Uploading Is Unlikely, Ever
>
>[...]
>Reason  1.  A simulation in a digital computer is just a coded description.

You've overlooked the distinction between "description" and "ongoing 
process." You could presumably interact with an ongoing process, 
maybe have a conversation with it, let it adapt its responses to what 
you say, etc.

>With unimportant  exceptions, a description of a thing is not that thing,

Well, a simulated computation (a process not just a description) is a 
computation and computations are important, aren't they?

>and encoding the  description makes it worse.
>For example, I can write down the quantum description of  a hydrogen atom
>in its ground state, but that writing on paper will not be a  hydrogen atom.
>If I could write down the description of a water molecule, a  collection of
>these would not be wet.

Simulated water is not wet, right? Is a simulated conscious system 
conscious? To me the analogy between the two is problematic, because 
water (or simulated water) cannot express a point of view about its 
own wetness. A simulated conscious system could pronounce about its 
own consciousness however--and I think you would have to take that 
seriously. In appropriate circumstances your simulated system might 
seem very convincingly to have the feelings and awareness it claimed 
to have. So then you would have to ask, does it "really" have these 
things or is it just a zombie, an imitation with no consciousness? 
That is the main question I think you would face. An a priori 
judgment that it couldn't possibly be conscious because, well, it's 
just a simulation obviously won't do. I don't see any good argument 
at present against imputing consciousness based on information 
processing rather than what kind of matter the system is made of and 
other such substrate issues. In other words I think you could have 
substrate-independent minds.

Mike

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Message #32897
Date: Fri, 1 Oct 2010 21:43:54 -0700 (PDT)
From: [email protected]
Subject: Cryopreservation of periodontal ligament cells with magnetic ...

Cellular viability was 96% for the most effective magnetic protocol.

Cryobiology. 2010 Aug;61(1):73-8. Epub 2010 May 15.
Cryopreservation of periodontal ligament cells with magnetic field for tooth banking.
Kaku M, Kamada H, Kawata T, Koseki H, Abedini S, Kojima S, Motokawa M, Fujita T, Ohtani J, Tsuka N, Matsuda Y, Sunagawa H, Hernandes RA, Ohwada N, Tanne K.
Department of Orthodontics and Craniofacial Developmental Biology, Hiroshima University Graduate School of Biomedical Science, 1-2-3 Kasumi, Minami-ku, Hiroshima 734-8553, Japan.
Abstract
The purpose of this study was to establish a long-term tooth cryopreservation method that can be used for tooth autotransplantation. Human periodontal ligament (PDL) cells were frozen in 10% dimethyl sulfoxide (Me(2)SO) using a programmed freezer with a magnetic field. Cells were cryopreserved for 7 days at -150 degrees C. Immediately after thawing, the number of surviving cells was counted and the cells were cultured; cultured cells were examined after 48 h. Results indicated that a 0.01 mT of a magnetic field, a 15-min hold-time, and a plunging temperature of -30 degrees C led to the greatest survival rate of PDL cells. Based on these findings, whole teeth were cryopreserved under the same conditions for 1 year. The organ culture revealed that the PDL cells of cryopreserved tooth with a 
 magnetic field could proliferate as much as a fresh tooth, although the cells did not appear in the cryopreserved tooth without a magnetic field. Histological examination and the transmissio
 n electron microscopic image of cryopreserved tooth with a magnetic field did not show any destruction of cryopreserved cells. In contrast, severe cell damage was seen in cells frozen without a magnetic field. These results indicated that a magnetic field programmed freezer is available for tooth cryopreservation.
PMID: 20478291 [PubMed - in process]

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Message #32898
Date: Fri, 01 Oct 2010 22:56:43 -0700
From: Edgar Swank - ACS President <[email protected]>
Subject: Reply to Ettinger Reasons Why Uploading Is Unlikely, Ever Rea...

Robert Ettinger writes

> A simulation in a digital computer is just a coded description. 
> With unimportant  exceptions, a description of a thing is not that thing, 
> and encoding the  description makes it worse.
One of those exceptions, and an important one in my estimation, is that
a description of information is exactly information. Information is
exactly what the contents of a brain is.

A computer with the traditional inputs (keyboard, mouse) and outputs
(screen) certainly can't emulate a whole person, but it can, at least
theoretically, emulate a person's brain. A computer's representation of
an apple is not an apple, but neither is a brain's. Break open someone's
head and look, there's no apple in there. If we can write a computer
program to simulate a single neuron, then it's just scaling up to
emulate a whole brain. If the simulated brain can pass a Turing test,
then as far as anyone can tell, they're conversing with a real person..
If the simulation of you responds the same as the real you, they are
practically identical. If my brain simulation has my memories, and
responds as I would, c'est moi.

-- 
Edgar W. Swank   <[email protected]>
President - American Cryonics Society
http://AmericanCryonics.org

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